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During the American Revolution, the Penobscot, 
Passamaquoddy-Malecite and Micmac Indian tribes were, a 
potentially powerful force in Maine and Nova Scotia. The 
white population of the region was small and scattered, 
and colonial leaders feared that the tribes would repeat 
their actions of the past wars, during which they had 
seriously harassed the frontiers. The officials of Nova 
Scotia and Massachusetts accordingly embarked upon a pro­
gram to win the support of the Indians and to spare colo-
I
niaL settlements from attack. Both governments were sure 
that their opponents were trying to promote Indian warfare, 
and the resulting rivalry fed upon itself as each side se­
cured minor victories. Both efforts were handicapped by 
serious problems, and neither side was able to defeat the 
other. The tribes were dependent upon.goods and supplies 
secured from both sides and were forced to maintain rela­
tions with both contending parties.
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INTRODUCTION
During the War of the American Revolution, the 
competition for the friendship and assistance of the 
Indian tribes was a major factor in the struggle for the 
northeastern corner of the North American continent. 
British and American leaders believed that the Indians of 
the area held the balance of power. Convinced that their 
enemies would seek alliances with the tribes, these 
leaders plunged into frenzied efforts to woo the Indians 
and to save their people from the horror of Indian war­
fare. Reacting defensively, each side tried to gain 
Indian support for itself.
The failure of Nova Scotia to join the American 
Revolution prompted the struggle for Indian support. A 
number of authors have analyzed that colony’s adherence 
to the British cause and stirred up a controversy.
'^For collected assessments of Nova Scotia’s role in 
the American Revolution, see George A. Rawlyk, Revolution 
Rejected, 1775-1776 (Scarborough, Ontario; Prentice-Hall 
of Canada, 1968). For other accounts, see John Bartlet 
Brebner, The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia, A Marginal 
Colony During the Revolutionary War (Toronto: McClelland 
and Stewart, 1969); Maurice W. Armstrong, The Great Awak­
ening in Nova Scotia, 1776-1809 (Hartford: The American 
Society of Church History, 1948); J. M. Bumsted, Henry 
Alline, 1748-1784 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1971); Gordon Stewart and George A. Rawlyk, A People Highly 
Favored of God,. The Nova Scotia Yankees and ihe American 
Revolution (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1972).
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J. B. Brebner focused on the isolation of Nova Scotia. 
The Yankees who had settled there were outside the main­
stream of revolutionary thought, and the geography of’the 
colony forced them into attempted neutrality, as it had 
their Acadian predecessors. According to Brebner, they 
were cut off from the power of the American colonies by 
the rough terrain of Maine and New Brunswick and by the 
sea. They could not stand alone against either power and 
sought to remain on good terms with both.
Another writer, D. C. Harvey, ascribed Nova 
Scotia’s loyalty to the power of the British navy and the 
success of the Halifax government in suppressing the 
demand for town government on the New England model on the 
Bay of Fundy. Had the French navy been available to the 
Americans earlier, Harvey felt the colony might have 
fallen to the rebellion. The strong control of appointed 
town officials further gave the colonial government a 
check on the people and kept down revolution.
Other authors have seen religious revivalism as 
the primary reason for Nova Scotia’s failure to rally to 
the American cause. Maurice W. Armstrong wrote that Nova 
Scotians were so engrossed in “other worldly” concerns that 
they simply ignored the conflict around them. S. D. Clark 
took this theory one step further., He thought that the 
religious movement represented a breakdown of traditional 
authority in the Yankee towns. The “New Lights,” as the 
participants in the revival were called, represented a new 
8
type of social revolution that tended to displace the 
political goals of the American Revolution.
In his biography of Henry Alline, leader of the 
revival in Nova Scotia, J. M. Bumsted also offered opinions 
on Nova Scotian loyalty. He noted Alline*s  spurning of the 
secular •world and Quaker-like rejection of war and turmoil 
and concluded that Alline and the Great Awakening offered 
the colony an alternative to revolution and a safety valve 
for discontent. The New Lights left the world of politics 
and retreated to metaphysical realms.
Gordon Stewart, with the assistance of George 
Rawlyk, has produced something of a synthesis of the above 
views. He wrote that Nova Scotia’s special circumstances 
of settlement and relative isolation removed its Yankee 
settlers from the turmoil in the colonies from which they 
had come. Nova Scotians were fighting for rights that were 
taken for granted in New England, and their position was 
weak, because of the power of the Halifax government, with 
its garrison and authoritarian traditions. Political 
opinion in Nova Scotia was ten years behind New England 
and, according to Stewart, never caught up. Conditions in 
Nova Scotia were not the same as those across the Bay of 
Fundy.
Stewart argued that what Brebner saw as innate 
neutrality was, in fact, moral confusion. Preoccupied by 
the religious revival, the Yankees of Nova Scotia doubted 
the morality of the Revolution. Basically friendly to the 
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Americans, they suspected that the violence of the rebel 
war effort damned its participants*  Halifax, with its 
corruption and violence, was also evil, and the Yankees of 
Nova Scotia thus felt obliged to remain above the battle. 
Such aloofness was the path to salvation.
Stewart did not preclude the possibility of Nova 
Scotian participation in the American Revolution but felt 
that an American army would have been necessary to initiate 
the process. Nova Scotia was too far behind the Americans 
ideologically and too consumed with private concerns to 
break into revolution by herself.
Modern assessments of Nova Scotia’s loyalty to 
Britain do not assign a critical role to the Indians. 
While no significant evidence exists indicating that fear 
of Indian attack played any part in the development of Nova 
Scotian loyalism, a number of authors feel that Indian 
support preserved their region from conquest. Writers in 
Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Maine have expressed this 
thought. Although they have also claimed victory in the 
struggle for Indian support, both sides could not have 
decisively won this competition, and the mutual claims of 
victory indicate something of stalemate.
American commentators tended to evaluate the sit­
uation in much the same way as W. H. Kilby did in his 
Bastport and Passamaquoddy. Kilby wrote that during the 
American Revolution, ’’the friendliness of the Indians was 
held to be the means of saving the eastern settlements and 
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giving our nation the important point of possession when
2the war closed and the treaty was to be made." Kilby 
also asserted that, "had not the neutrality of the Penob­
scot, Passamaquoddy, St. John and Micmac Indians been 
secured, the settlers of Eastern Maine could hardly have
•5maintained their existence."^
Other American writers expressed views similar to 
those of Kilby.Marion Jacques Smith wrote that the 
American effort among the Indians was a defensive measure
5to prevent attacks instigated by the British. G. W. 
Drisko thought that this work among the tribes saved the 
region for the United States. Drisko*s  opinion was 
shared by two other writers, M. E. C. Smith and J. D. 
Weston, both of whom were sure that with Indian help, the
2William H. Kilby, Eastport and Passamaquoddy 
(Eastport: E. E. Sheath and Co., 1888), p. 485.
3Ibid., p. 437.
^Many American authors of local histories and other 
works dealing with eastern Maine do not mention Indian 
participation in the Revolution. In some cases, the author 
felt that such participation was irrelevant to his effort 
because the town with which he was dealing was settled after 
the Revolution. Others ignored the whole question when they 
might legitimately have dealt with it. See the Bibliography 
for local histories examined.
^A History of Maine: From Wilderness to Statehood 
/T497-18207 (Portland: Falmouth Publishing House, 1949)> 
p. 227.
^Narrative of the Town of Machias (Machias: no 
publisher, 1904). p. 65. Mr. Drisko evidently saw the 
capture of the Margaretta and the battle of Machias as 
the entire Revolution in the town. He wrote almost 
nothing about John Allan.
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7British could have swept through much of eastern. Maine.
Canadian authors have, felt much the same way and 
have been much more likely to mention the struggle for 
Indian support during the Revolution. Most felt that the 
British won the competition for Indian goodwill after 
initial American successes, but that American control of 
the Indians would not necessarily have led to the fall of 
Nova Scotia to the Americans.
The older Canadian opinion was expressed by James 
Hannay, who felt that John Allan, whose career as American 
Indian Superintendant will be discussed in later chapters, 
constantly attempted to incite the Indians to mischief. 
The Americans treated the Indians so badly, however, that 
few would aid the rebels. W. Stewart MacNutt expressed a 
similar view in a later treatment of the subject, although 
he did not state that the Americans actively mistreated 
the Indians. Other Canadian writers simply asserted that 
the Indians supported the British during the war and were
7M. E. C. Smith, ’’Machias in the American. Revo-*,  
lution and Afterward,” New England Magazine, August, 1895> 
p. 682; J. D. Weston, History of Eastport and Vicinity: A 
Lecture April 1834» before the Eastport Lyceum (Boston: No 
publisher, 1854), pp." 31-2.
qJames Hannay, History of New Brunswick (St. John: 
Bowes, 1909), pp. 110, 121; W. Stewart MacNutt, New 
Brunswick, A History: 1784-1867 (Toronto: Macmillan of 
Canada, 19 6 3)» p. 8 •
12
an important consideration to settlers within Nova
Scotia.
Several authors stressed early American dominance 
among the Indians. They felt that Michael Prancklin, Nova 
Scotian Indian Superintendent, won the Indians back to the 
British and kept them from doing serious damage to the 
colony. The most significant of these writers was 
J. B. Brebner, who wrote of the ’’uncertain'1 business of 
seeking Indian support. He felt that Prancklin finally 
beat Allan, the American agent, secured the St. John 
valley and loosened Allan’s hold over the Indians in the 
territory dominated by the Americans. Brebner attributed 
Prancklin’s victory to an excellent talent for Indian 
relations and the greater supply of trade goods available 
to him. The American agent held an orphan command, 
according to Brebner, constantly shunted between the 
Continental Congress and the General Court of Massachusetts. 
He was never properly supplied and therefore could not hold
^WiJLliam 0. Raymond, The River St. John (Sackville, 
New Brunswick: The Tribune Press, 1945)> P*  211; G. C. 
Campbell, The History of Nova.Scotia (Toronto: The Ryerson 
Press, 1948), p. 159; Wilson Dallam Wallis and Ruth 
Sawtelle Wallis, The Malecite Indians of New Brunswick 
(Ottawa: National'Museum of Canada, 1957), P*  14. The 
Wallis book was not very useful;, the authors were concerned 
more with tribal origin and legends than with the history 
and traditions springing from the .latter periods of 
Malecite history.
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the support of the-Indian tribes.^
Canadian authors who mention Indian participation
11 •in the Revolution thus tend to agree in substance. They 
may disagree on the details,, such as when the British 
became dominant among the Indians, but they agree that 
Halifax dominated the Indians throughout most of the war. 
They were less likely to stress the danger to Nova Scotia 
had the Indians gone completely over to the Americans, but 
a number of them mentioned such possibilities. A few felt 
that the colony might have fallen under such attack, but 
most were more confident.
Canadian and American writers thus tended to see 
the struggle for Indian support on different levels. The 
Americans felt that loss in the competition would have
Brebner, The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia, 
pp. 322, 324-7. Other writers voicing similar.opinions 
included W. Stewart MacNutt, who on pages- 83-4 of his The 
Atlantic Provinces, The Emergence of Colonial Society, 
1712-1837 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965) gave a 
different but non-contradictory view of the struggle from 
the account in his History of New Brunswick (see note 11). 
George Frederick Clark agreed that Francklin won the 
Indians back, although he said very little about the Revo­
lution. His book, Someone Before Us (Fredericton, New 
Brunswick: Brunswick Press, 1970), was mainly concerned 
with archaeology. Harold B. Davis, an American writer, 
also agreed with Brebner on this point. In his An Inter­
national Community on the St. Croix, University of Maine 
Studies, 2nd ser., No. 64 (Orono: tJniversity of Maine Press, 
1950), p. 13, he wrote that the Indians“were finally won 
away by Michael Francklin." The Passamaquoddies remained 
loyal, but their devotion weakened.
number of Canadian authors who dealt with the 
Revolution did not mention the Indians at all.
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delivered much of Maine into British hands. The Canadians 
felt that Nova Scotia would probably have survived Indian 
hostility. They were so sure that Halifax was the ’ 
decisive victor in the struggle that most did not analyze 
the possibilities of defeat. Authors on both sides felt 
that their people would have sustained heavy damage from 
Indian hostility, but the Americans seemed more aware of 
the possibility of total defeat.
The claims of victory by both sides in the compe­
tition for the Indians present an interesting aspect of 
this problem. The American commentators were aware of 
weakness in the closing years of the war, and the Canadian 
writers admitted an initial weakness, but both adamantly 
claim overall victory. Both sides were partially justi­
fied in their claims. Each of the contending parties were 
successful enough in their efforts with the Indians to 
achieve many of their war aims. This becomes evident when 
their basic goals among the Indians are examined.
When the war broke out, both sides feared the 
Indians. Although the ability and willingness of the 
Indians to harm either side was questionable, the govern­
ments of Massachusetts and Nova Scotia believed that the 
tribes of the region could do them great damage. Both 
immediately set forth a policy of winning Indian friend­
ship. Massachusetts was totally successful in this; her 
settlements in the disputed area downeast suffered no 
Indian assaults. Nova Scotia was slightly less successful 
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and underwent several minor assaults and alarms; she did 
not, however, suffer any serious harm at the hands of the 
Indians. The Halifax government therefore could also • 
claim victory in this struggle. Thus, in their initial 
aim, that of preventing Indian assaults upon themselves, 
both sides were successful and could claim victory.
The greater assurance of victory among Canadian 
writers may have sprung from the modest goals Halifax set 
for Indian work. The government’s agent, Michael Francklin, 
was merely to recall the Indians to their allegiance to 
King George. The Indians were willing to give such 
assurances of loyalty in return for trade goods. The Nova 
Scotian leaders gave little thought to recruiting the 
Indians to fight the Americans, and the Indians accordingly 
had few obligations as a consequence of the professed 
allegiance to the Crown. The Nova Scotians did not trust 
the Indians enough to raise them militarily against the 
rebels. They felt it better to leave the tribes peacefully 
in the woods. Once the Halifax government got pledges of 
allegiance from the tribes and ended the minor assaults, 
their goals were accomplished, and their victory was com­
plete.
The Americans had other goals beyond the mere 
winning of friendship, and these account for the reluctance 
of the American authors to claim total victory. Massa­
chusetts and General Washington unsuccessfully sought 
Indian troops for the Continental army in the early part 
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of the war. Furthermore, Colonel John Allan, the American 
Indian agent, hoped to use the tribes in the conquest of 
Nova Scotia, the ultimate American goal. Although he 
caused some difficulty for the British, he was rarely able 
to use the Indians offensively. He and the Americans thus 
failed to achieve all their ambitions. For this reason, 
American writers have tended to stress the successful 
defense of eastern Maine and to claim victory on that 
basis; they play down the failure to achieve their other 
goals•
Both sides thus achieved at least partial success 
in their war aims among the tribes of Maine and Nova Scotia. 
These goals were set because the governments of Massachu­
setts and Nova Scotia were sure that their enemies would 
use the Indians against the settlements downeast. The war 
aims of the two governments were determined by what their 
leaders believed, not by the actual situation. In this 
case, these leaders believed that the Indians could do 
their interests grave damage. The early moves of both 
sides reinforced the conviction that mischief was intended 
among the Indians. The struggle for Indian friendship was 
thus self-intensifying, growing in bitterness and desper­
ation as each side won minor victories. Once begun, it 
had a life of its own, at times almost unrelated to the 
realities of the situation.
In this work, the growth of this competition for 
Indian support will be explored, and the relative strengths 
17
and weaknesses of each side will be examined. In the face 
of existing claims and counter-claims of victory, it will 
be necessary to arrive at a judgement regarding the appar­
ent successes of each effort. Who was directing these 
efforts, to what degree were they tied into the British 
and American war measures, and why did they succeed or 
fail? These questions must be answered before a balanced 
view of the events can be achieved. The study will also 
provide information on the methods and flavor of day-to- 
day operations among the men who dealt with the Indians. 
Perhaps in this way it will be possible to arrive at true 
appreciation and interpretation of. the work of the major 
participants.
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Chapter 1
PRE-WAR CONDITIONS DOWNEAST
The American Revolution thrust Massachusetts and
Nova Scotia into the first hostilities since the expulsion 
of French power from North America. Once again, opposing 
forces, faced each other across the Bay of Fundy and in the 
wilderness of eastern Maine and the St. John valley, but 
this time, the conflict was between Englishmen, subjects 
of King George III. The style and progress of that con­
flict were largely determined by the conditions existing 
when the war broke out. These conditions, which had been 
developing since the European race first appeared in North 
America, are a vital prelude to the more detailed study of 
the competition for the support of the Indians of Maine 
and Nova Scotia.
Qj One of the necessary conditions for the development 
of this contest for Indian friendship was the continued loy­
alty of Nova Scotia to the British Empire, which was dis­
cussed above.
® A second condition shaping the competition in east­
ern Maine and Nova Scotia was the active support of the 
rebellion by Machias, which immediately made it a focus 
of action for the American cause. Little has been written 
to(explain Machias*  devotion to the rebellion. Earlier 
19
authors tended to see it as a normal, ’’patriotic” response 
and accepted it without further investigation, The only- 
later historian to deal with this subject has been John 
Howard Ahlin, in his Maine Rubicon; Downeast Settlers 
during the American Revolution, He attributed Machias*  
revolutionary zeal to frustration over repeated failure to 
win royal recognition of land titles, neglect by the Mass­
achusetts government, unsettled governmental conditions 
downeast, traditional rebellion against the laws governing 
the harvest of mast trees and the natural "anti-authority” 
tendencies of frontier people. These conditions created a 
situation in which a break with established authority came 
rather easily. Ahlin also noted that the lumber industry 
of Machias was strongly tied to the Boston area and that 
any measures of government that harmed the economy of 
Boston also affected the rather fragile economic condition 
of Machias. Ahlin thus felt that the Machias region was 
susceptible to rebellion, and rather naturally followed the
2 colony of Massachusetts into the Revolution.
\ Calais: Calais Advertiser Press, 1966) pp. 5-11.
2Ahlin also noted that there was little agricul­
tural activity at Machias; much food and hay came from Nova 
Scotia or Boston. As the war progressed and as shortages 
developed due to Nova Scotian loyalism and the British navy 
on the Maine coast, many people downeast may have regretted 
their initial rush to rebellion.
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The third, and most important, circumstance in
Maine and Nova Scotia was the presence of the Indian tribes. 
Their economic and political status, which shaped the' thrust 
of the programs to win their support, had been determined by 
developments stretching back into their history beyond even 
their first contacts with European culture..
The tribes that were to play a role in the Revo­
lution were the remants of a broad band of culturally- 
similar, associated tribes that had once stretched from the 
Nipmucks of New Hampshire to the Malecites on the St. John 
River. The Micmacs, who lived along the eastern coast of 
present day New Brunswick and in Nova Scotia proper, were 
associated with the tribes to the west but were never mem­
bers of the Abnaki Confederacy, to- which their neighbors 
belonged. They may have aided the Confederacy in war, but 
remained outside at other times.
The Abnaki Confederacy maintained a considerable 
number of cultural contacts, aided by the mutually intelli­
gible dialects spoken throughout the region. There were 
three major dialectal groups. The tribes of New Hampshire 
and the Saco valley used the first of these. The second,
•^Fannie Hardy Eckstorm, ’’Indians of Maine,” in 
Louis C. Hatch, Maine, A History, Vol. I (New York: Amer­
ican Historical Society, 1919), PP*  43-4, 55; Andrea 
Jeanne Bear, ’’The Concept of Unity among Indian Tribes of 
Maine, New Hampshire and New Brunswick” (unpublished Senior 
Scholar thesis, Colby College, 1966), pp. 100, 1Q5. 
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spoken by the Androscoggin, Kennebec and Penobscot tribes, 
outlasted its ■western counterpart, but is now virtually 
extinct as a spoken language. The third has survived 
among the Passamaquoddies and Malecites.^ This al mil a-rj ty 
of language, along with the geography of the region, was a 
key factor in maintaining cultural homogeneity throughout
5
the Confederacy.
The Indians of the Abnaki Confederacy were migra­
tory, seeking the most abundant sources of food. Their 
villages were little more than ’’base camps” for winter 
living. After planting their crops in the villages each 
spring, they left their inland settlements for the coast 
and a summer of fishing. They returned to the villages in 
the fall, harvested and stored their crops, and prepared 
for a winter of hunting and trapping. The practices dif­
fered slightly from tribe to tribe. Among the Indians 
studied in this work, the Malecites were the most active 
agriculturally. The Micmacs did very little planting de- 
pending almost entirely upon game for sustenance.
^Eckstorm, ’’Indians of Maine,” p. 44.
^Bear, ’’Concept of Unity,” p. 65.
^Diamond Jenness, Indians of Canada (Ottawa: E. 
Cloutier, 1955), pp• 267-70; James Phinney Baxter, "The 
Abnakis and their Ethnic Relations,” Collections of the 
Maine Historical Society, 2nd ser., ill, 13-40; Prank G. 
Speck, and W. S. Hadlock, ’’Report on the Tribal Bound­
aries and Hunting Areas of the Malecite Indians of New 
Brunswick,” American Anthropologist, XLVIII (June, 1946), 
355-74; Eckstorm, “Indians of Maine," pp. 56-8.
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Abnaki and M'icmac chiefs traditionally had very 
little authority. Among the Penobscots, for example, a 
chief was very weak, more a leader than a ruler. He repre­
sented the group in extra-tribal affairs and provided 
advice and leadership in time of war. Although sons occa­
sionally succeeded fathers, the chieftainship was not
7hereditary. Micmac chiefs were evidently weaker than their 
Abnaki counterparts. Their main duty was the assigning of 
hunting areas to the family bands. They frequently did not 
lead the tribe in war but surrendered that duty to war 
leaders, men skilled in war. The position of the chiefs 
improved somewhat as the tribes came into increasing con­
tact with Europeans. They became commercial leaders in 
th? trading that followed the new contacts. Their new;.eco­
nomic status buttressed the chiefs’ positions and weakened
9 the more democratic forms that had previously prevailed.
^Frank’ .G. Speck, Penobscot Man, The Life History of 
a Forest Tribe in Maine (New York; Octagon Books, 1970),
pp. 203-4.
o
Jenness, Indians of Canada, p. 268.
(rnl dsworth Hailev. The Conflict of European
25
The Indian culture that spread across Maine and 
Nova Scotia received devastating blows from the European 
civilization that appeared with the first exploring ships 
along.the North American coast. When confronted with the 
results of European technology, ancient skills soon disap­
peared, and traditional patterns of life faded into a 
growing dependency upon European goods obtained through 
trade. The French, with their thirst for furs and zeal to 
Christianize, weakened the tribal structure and life styles. 
The English, with their need for land and growing contempt 
of the Indian, destroyed several tribes and drove the sur­
vivors from the lands where they had lived for genera­
tions. Both were enemies of Indian tradition and contrib­
uted to the decline of the tribes.
The root of the conflict between the English and 
the Indians lay in the conflicting systems of land tenure. 
When the Indians made a grant to whites, they intended, 
merely to allow the purchaser to take up traditional 
Indian uses of the land. The French understood this and 
made no attempt to dispossess the Indians; with their small 
population they had no need to do so. The English, however, 
under the pressure of a rapidly growing population, took 
active and exclusive possession of the lands they purchased. 
Furthermore, the English mode of settlement which placed 
them squarely astride traditional Indian routes to the sea, 
24
sowed seeds of almost constant conflict.^
The small conflicts in Maine were part of the 
massive English-French struggle for control of the conti­
nent, but the basic causes had little to do with the 
larger conflict. The Indians were fighting for their lands
11and way of life; for them, no compromise was possible. 
The several wars were too numerous to detail here, but, 
beginning in 1675 and continuing until the end of the. 
French and Indian War in 1765, English forces slowly, and 
with many reverses, destroyed the tribes of western Maine 
and reduced the other tribes of Nova Scotia and Maine to 
exhaustion and peace. Under the stress, the Abnaki Confed­
eracy broke down, and self-interest dominated. The tribes 
were never able to strike a decisive blow against the 
English, and one by one, the tribes of western Maine were 
broken into tiny, dispirited remnants, some of who simply 
vanished.* 112
^Sister Mary Celeste Leger, The Catholic Indian 
Missions in Maine (Washington: Catholic University of 
America, 1929), p. 65; Kenneth M. Morrison, "Sebastien 
Rale vs. New England; A Case Study in Frontier Conflict” 
(unpublished Master’s thesis, University of Maine at Orono, 
1970), p. 18.
11 Clark Wissler, Indians of the United States
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 19^6), p. 81.
12Bear, "Concept of Unity,” p. 106.
By 1765, only the Penobscot, Malecite-Passamaquoddy 
and Micmac tribes maintained their tribal structures with t
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1 3any strength. The Malecites and Passamac[uoddies had not 
been touched by the expansionist English movements, and 
the light settlement of Nova Scotia left the Micmacs ' 
virtually intact.^
The expulsion of the French from North America 
deprived the Indians of more than a mere ally. They no
longer had two sources of supply for manufactured goods. 
All goods henceforth would have to come from the English. 
After the fall of New France, therefore, the Indians were ’ 
prisoners of their need for certain goods, and the British 
colonial governments now used this need to control the 
tribes.
small group of Indians also remained on the 
Androscoggin River and eventually sought some assistance 
from Massachusetts during the Revolution. Other Indians 
remained throughout western and central Maine. Arnold’s 
expedition met a number of them as they ascended;the 
Kennebec River. They were too few to figure significantly ' ( 
in the war. For the references to Indians during the 
Arnold expedition, see Kenneth Roberts, March to Quebec, 
Journals of the Members of Arnold’s Expedition (Garden 
City, New' York: Doubleday, 1958). The references occur in 
the following journals: Lieutenant John Montresor, pp. 7, 
19; Doctor Isaac Senter, p. 215; John Joseph Henry, 
PP. 513-5, 317, 344.
' ^No modern definitive work on the Indian wars in 
New England has been published, but a number of works are 
available. These are: Charles E. Clark, The Eastern 
Colonial Frontier, The Settlement of Northern New" England, 
1600-1765 (New York: Knopf, 1970): Sister Mary Anna Joseph 
(Mary Genevieve Hennessey), “French and English Pressures 
on the Indians of Acadia and New England, 1667-1727" (un­
published Master’s thesis, University of New Brunswick, 
1968); Douglas E. Leach, The Northern Colonial Frontier, 
1607-1765 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1966); 
Robert E. Moody, “The Maine Frontier, 1607 to 1765" 
(unpublished Doctor’s dissertation, Yale University, 1953).
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The Indians*  need for manufactured goods had been 
developing for many years. They had obtained these goods 
through trade with Europeans since the first explorers 
dropped anchor along the coasts of New England and the 
Maritimes. When settlers followed explorers, opportunities 
to gain manufactured goods were greatly increased. The new 
items the Indians got in return for their furs were far 
superior to the traditional implements; the standard of 
living among the tribes shot up, but the traditional way 
of life was lost in the process. Iron, steel and copper 
goods replaced the older stone implements, and handicrafts 
practiced for centuries disappeared in a very few gener­
ations. The metal kettle or axe became essential as the 
Indians forgot how to live without them. So great was the 
need for the newer articles that the tribal way of life 
shifted, and the acquisition of iron became its main
15focus. By the outbreak of the American Revolution, this 
process had been going on for over 150 years, and Indian 
dependence upon manufactured goods was established.
The dependence upon manufactured goods changed the 
Indian style of life in other ways.. To get the necessary 
goods, the tribes had to trade with the whites and needed 
commodities for exchange. Wampum was lised occasionally,
^Bailey, Conflict of Culture, pp. 10-2, 46-7 w • •
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16 but the basic medium was furs.
As the need for furs increased, the Indians soon 
realized the usefulness of firearms and sought them. Once 
the Indians got guns, the new weapons had a greater effect 
upon them than any other manufactured item brought to 
America by the Europeans. In spite of abusive use of 
individual weapons, guns revolutionized hunting and war­
fare. Poor gun management and maintenance increased the 
Indian need for guns, and when the supply of furs 
decreased due to overhunting, the Indians, with nothing to
17 trade, were often unable to obtain replacement weapons.
Guns led the Indians to overhunt their lands and 
further harmed the traditional way of life. When animals 
were killed chiefly for fur and not for food, the kill was 
much larger. Utilization of the whole carcass declined, 
and eventually a shortage of food and furs developed. The 
increased time spent hunting also caused the decline of 
agriculture and greater dependence upon white sources of 
food. The Micmacs, who never practiced much agriculture, 
were particularly hard hit as the game animals became 
scarce. The search for hunting territories and markets for
1^Ibid., p. 49.
. Carl Parcher Russell, Guns on the Early 
Frontier, A History of Firearms from Colonial Times 
through the Years of the Western Fur Trade (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1957), pp. vii-viii; 
Bailey, Conflict of Culture, p. 53.
j
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furs increased the desperation of war. Conflict, made 
more deadly by firearms, replaced the old blood feud, and 
casualties were greater. Old behavioral norms broke down 
under the pressure of the search for furs. The result was 
often the failure of food supplies, drunkenness, disease
ipand depopulation.
Elizabeth Ann Hutton detailed the process of de*  
cline in her study of the Micmacs. As game declined due 
to overhunting, the Indians had to travel further to find 
enough for their needs. The increased time Bpent in 
travel lessened the time available to provide the basic 
needs of life. The same shortage of game reduced the food 
supplies available, and the Indians had to purchase provi­
sions. They finally became so dependent upon white sup­
plies that charity was necessary.
The Indians of Nova Scotia had become dependent 
upon manufactured goods and foods produced by whites 
during the wars.between the English and French. This made 
them submissive to the whites when they needed goods. 
J. B. Brebner stated that the Nova Scotia Indians had to 
make peace in 1760 because they needed supplies that they
Bailey, Conflict of Culture, pp. 13, 57-8, 97-8, 
114-5.
O^’The Micmac Indians of Nova Scotia to 1834” 
Jinpublished Master’s thesis, Dalhousie University, 1961), 
pp. 80, 82, 88-9, 101-2, 181.
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20 could get no other way. Their survival depended upon it.
After the war, the Indians attempted to re-establish dual 
sources of supply by trading with the French on the islands 
of St. Pierre and Miquelon, but the Nova Scotian authorities 
moved quickly to interdict these supply lines. They 
wanted no repetition of the situation before the fall of 
New France, when the Indians played the warring parties
21against each other.
The Indian dependence upon manufactured goods and
English provisions did not lessen before the American 
Revolution. In 1764, Governor Wilmot of Nova Scotia wrote
. the Board of Trade that ’’The custom of giving them provi­
sions and cloathing has been too long established to be
22broke with Safety.” To refuse more supplies would simply 
make them hostile. Subsequent reports from Nova Scotia 
noted similar demands from the Indians. The government 
attempted to introduce methods by which the Indians could 
support themselves; the new colony of Nova Scotia could ill 
___________ \
20Brebner, Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia, xpp. 22-3,
70; Hutton, “Micmacs of Nova Scotia,” p. 135*
Letter, Lord Shelburne, Secretary of State to
Lord William Campbell, Governor of Nova Scotia, Feb. 19,1767, 
Public Archives of Canada, Noya Scotia A, Colonial Corre­
spondence of Nova Scotia, 1*603-1867 , LXXIX, 17-8, (this work 
will be cited hereafter as Nova Scotia A); Hutton, ’’Micmacs 
of Nova Scotia,” p. 135*
22]jetter, June 24, 1764, Nova Scotia A, LXXIV, 124-9
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afford the expense of maintaining large numbers of 
Indians. J
Once the Indian dependence upon the English became 
apparent, the colonial governments attempted to take con­
trol of the tribes by exploiting their needs. In Maine in 
the early 1700’s, Massachusetts attempted a policy of 
peace through trade and truck houses, or trading posts, at 
Saco and on Casco Bay. In 1726, the General Court took 
control of the operation and fixed the prices of furs. The 
system thus established lasted with only minor changes 
until the Revolution.
Three basic posts served until the close of the 
French and Indian War. These were at St. George’s, at 
Richmond on the Kennebec River and at Union Falls on the 
Saco River. When peace came after the fall of Quebec, two 
new posts were added at Fort Halifax in Winslow and Fort 
Pownall in Prospect on the Penobscot River.Massachu­
setts*  system seemed popular with the Indians and was used 
substantially, but, of course, they had an alternative 
until 1760.25
^Letters:, Board-of Trade to Wilmot, July 13» 1764, 
Benjamin Green to Lords Commissioners of Trade and Planta­
tions, Aug. 24, 1766, Lieutenant Governor William Francklin 
to Lord Hillsborough, Secretary of State, July 20, 1768, 
Nova Scotia A, LXXV, 26, LXXVII, 217-8, LXXXIII, 28-9.
^^Robert e. Moody, "The Maine Frontier," pp. 505-7, 
350-4.
25Douglas Leach, Northern Colonial Frontier,
pp. 147-9.
31
Nova Scotia did not adopt the truck house system 
as "whole-heartedly as did Massachusetts. The colonial 
authorities encouraged the Indians to trade at Halifax 
after the colony fell to Britain but did not set up a sys­
tem of truck houses until 1760—1761, when six trading 
stations were established under Benjamin Gerrish, the new 
Agent of Indian Affairs. The government appointed and 
supervised the truck masters and provided the trade goods, 
but the Nova Scotian system never worked. Gerrish*s  
method of obtaining trade goods at great profit to himself 
and his friends created a scandal and discredited the sys­
tem. The truck houses also ran into debt because of the 
large numbers of gifts that they were forced to give to 
the Indians. After an unsuccessful attempt at reform, the 
government abandoned the system in 1764. The colony could 
no longer bear the expense. To protect.the Indians, trade 
was then opened at certain locations supervised by the 
government.26
By 1775, the process of decline, growing dependence \ 
and control by colonial governments had reduced the Indians 
to three tribes, the Benobscots, the Malecite-
^Hutton, "I'licmacs of Nova Scotia,” pp. 163-4,
166—7, 169-71 ; Elisabeth Ann Hutton, ’’Indian Affairs in 
Nova Scotia, 1760-1834” Collections of the Nova Scotia 
Historical Society, XXXIV (1963), 34-40*
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27Passamaquoddies and the Micmacs. These three groups were 
the remnants.of the Abnaki Confederacy and the most faith­
ful to the old spirit of the alliance. The tribes easily 
maintained close and friendly relations among themselves
28 because of the similarity of culture discussed above.
The relative strength of the three tribes is very 
difficult to determine.. Alden Vaughn estimated that there 
were only 16,000 to 18,000 Indians in all New England 
after the great epidemic of 1616-1617. He further noted 
that most of these lived in southern New England where the 
Indian population was always denser than that in the
27'Writers have disagreed over the relationship 
between the Malecites and the Passamaquoddies. Most 
writers have seen them as one tribe or two subdivisions 
of the same tribe. F. G. Speck and W. S. Hadlock, in 
their ’’Report on Tribal Boundaries and Hunting Areas of 
the Malecite Indians,” p. 574, wrote that without an 
exhaustive study of the dialects of both groups, one 
could not determine their relationship. For the purposes 
of this thesis, the Malecite-Passamaquoddies were 
regarded as essentially two groups within one tribe. The 
distinction made was mostly geographical, between groups 
around Passamaquoddy Bay and on the St. John.River.
According to Speck and Hadlock, "Tribal Bound- \
aries," p. 555, the Penobscots were linguistically closer 
to the Abnakis, and the Malecites had a similar relation­
ship with the Micmacs. They all were separate parts of 
the Wabanaki culture and dialectic group. For references 
to the Abnaki Confederacy and relations among these three 
tribes, see Speck and Hadlock, "Tribal Boundaries," p. 559; 
Davis, International Community, p. 3; F. Speck, 
"Eastern Algonkian Confederacy," pp. 493, 497.
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According to the Wendall Estimate, in 1690 there 
were 1,480 Indian men in Maine and 2,740 in Nova Scotia. 
This is the earliest figure available for the Indian popu­
lation of Maine and Nova Scotia and seems quite high. If 
each of these warriors had two or three dependents, the 
Indian population of Maine would have been between 5>000 
and 5>000 souls. According to the same calculations, at 
the same time between 5,000 and 8,500 Indians were living
Alden Vaughn, The New England Frontier, Puritans 
and Indians, 1620-1765 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965)> 
p.28. Two estimates of Indian population were made in 
1726, one of which also gave figures for the relative 
strength of the tribes in 1690. Both evaluations are val­
uable but of limited usefulness because of the precipitate 
decline of the Indian population in the middle years of 
the eighteenth century. These two sources were "An Esti­
mate of the Inhabitants, English and Indian, in the North 
American Colonies, also their Extent in Miles-1726,"New 
England Historical and Genealogical Register, XX. 1 (1966), 
pp. 7-9 (cited hereafter as the Wendall Estimate), and 
"John Gyles*  Statement on the Number of Indians,” Collec­
tions of the Maine Historical Society, III (1852), 5$ 5-8 
(cited hereafter as Gyles’ Statement;. Little is known 
about the Wendall Estimate save that it was preserved in 
the papers of the Wendall family. Gyles*  Statement was the 
work of one John Gyles, who served the government of Massa­
chusetts for many years on the Maine frontier. He com­
manded several military posts and was a captive among the 
Indians for eight years, a unique, if unwelcome, opportu­
nity to study the tribes of Maine. See also "Narrative of 
Captivity among the Indians, of Cap’t John Gyles, 1689-1698,". 
Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 4th 
ser., V (1861), 449-454. Both Gyles*  Statement and the 
Wendall Estimate are reproduced in the Appendices 1 and 2.
30Wendall Estimate, p. 9. 
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in Nova Scotia. These figures nay have suffered from a 
common problem experienced by early estimates of Indian 
population. They were inflated by men who could not be­
lieve that so few Indians could do so much damage. A 
truer assessment of Indian strength would probably be 
about one-half the numbers given by the Wendall Estimate.
With a rough idea of the earlier Indian population,
estimates of Indian numbers during the Revolution can be 
approached more realistically. Kost of the tribes noted 
in the earlier assessments had virtually disappeared by 
then, and those who remained were much reduced in power.
The Penobscots were the westernmost surviving tribe
with a role in the struggle for Indian support between the
British and American forces in Maine and Nova Scotia.
Gyles estimated their strength at 130 men, and the Wendall 
Estimate gave them forty men less.^ By 1776, however, 
their numbers were still smaller, and they claimed only
31 Hutton gives estimates that substantiate the 
inflation of the Wendall figures. She cites an appraisal 
of Indian strength made by Gargas in 1687-1688, which 
placed the Indian population of Nova Scotia at about 2,000 \
people. A second and smaller estimate indicated a male 
population of about 4,00, or a total population of 800 to 
1,200 souls. See her "Micmac Indians of Nova Scotia,” 
pp. 231, 134.
32William L. Lucey, The Catholic Church in Maine 
(Francestown, New Hampshire: M. Jones Co., 1957), p. 22.
■^Gyles’ Statement, p. 357; Wendall Estimate, p. 9.
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34-fifty fighting men. The whole tribe then numbered 
between 150 and 250 souls. >
The size of the Passamaquoddy ^.nd Malecite tribe 
by 1775 was more difficult to determine. In 1726, Gyles 
numbered them at 140 men at Machias, Passamaquoddy Bay and 
on the St. John River.The Wendall Estimate gave a total
36of 115 nen in the same three locations. These two fig-
\
ures would indicate a total population of between two 
hundred and four hundred people. In 1776, Chief Ambrose 
St. Aubin told the government of Massachusetts in Watertown 
that there were sixty men in his village on the St. John 
River. Government documents showed that 126 men, excluding 
Penobscots and Micmacs, served the United States in some 
way before 1780; fifteen of these lived at Passamaquoddy.
dependents, of whom 58 were living at 
Since all the men of the Malecite- 
se men
37Passamaquoddy.‘
*Slinutes of a conference between Chief Orono of 
the Penobscots and Benjamin Greenleaf, July 20, 1776, 
Massachusetts Archives, XXIX, 530.
-^Gyles*  Statement, p. 557.
36Wendall Estimate, p. 9.
37^ Return of Indians in or who have been in United 
States Service, July 28, 1780, by Frederick Belesdernier, 
aid to Colonel John Allan at Machias, in Frederick Kidder, 
Military Operations in Eastern Maine and Nova Scotia during 
the Revolution, Chiefly Compiled from the Journals and 
Letters of Colonel John Allan (Albany: J. Munsell, C1867), 
p. 284-5.
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Passamaquoddy tribe were unlikely to have served the 
American cause, one may assume that the tribe had more 
members than the 579 listed in Delesdernier*s  return. ‘ 
These figures, incomplete as they are, seem to indicate 
that the Malecites and their kinsmen at Passamaquoddy, 
isolated from the wars that weakened other tribes, main­
tained a steady level of population at least until the 
Revolution. They probably still had the 400 to 600 people 
that Gyles reported in 1726.^
The Micmacs to the east of the St. John River were 
the largest of the tribes involved in the American Revo­
lution in Maine and Nova Scotia. As seen above, their 
numbers were estimated at about two thousand almost a cen- 
tury before the Revolution. In 1776, representatives of 
the tribe told officials of Massachusetts at Watertown that 
there were over ten villages of Micmacs. The five villages
^Reports of the various conferences held during 
the war tend to substantiate this estimate. The Nova 
Scotian Superintendant of Indian Affairs, Michael Prancklin, 
held a conference on the St. John in 1781 that 581 Indians 
attended. In 1777, when Francklin’s American counterpart, 
John Allan, removed most of the Indians from the St. John 
valley to Machias, he reported that about 500 Indians made 
the trip. One conference under Francklin on the St. John 
reportedly drew 500 Indian men and 600 dependents, but this 
particular affair was set up to include significant numbers 
of Micmac and Canadian Indians as well. See Nova Scotia A, 
C, 194-5, CI, 265-6; Kidder, Military Operations, p. 513.
^^See note 51 above.
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represented at the conference had a total of 280 men.^Q 
Counting dependents, these villages would probably have 
held between 800 and 1,100 persons, and the whole tribe 
conceivably could have had as many as 2,500 members. 
Lieutenant Governor Francklin suggested a more plausible 
figure in 1768, however, when he wrote that 500 Indian
41warriors lived m Nova Scotia. Most of these men were 
probably Micmacs. With about 500 men, the tribe would 
presumably have had between 1,500 and 2,000 members.
As one can see from the above figures, the number 
of Indians for which the British and Americans were com­
peting was not large. At the very most, there were prob­
ably no more than three thousand Indians in the whole 
region, and the actual figure was probably little more 
than two thousand. There were no more than eight hundred 
warriors, most of whom were Micmacs. The tribe that prof­
ited most from the competition, the Malecites, at the 
center of the disputed area, probably had no more than 
one hundred and fifty warriors.
^Minutes of Watertown Conference, July 10, 1776, 
in James Phinney Baxter (ed.), Baxter Manuscripts, Documen­
tary History of the State of Maine, XXIV (Portland: Maine 
Historical Society, 1916), 72; cited hereafter as Baxter 
MSS.
41 Letter, Prancklin to Lord Hillsborough, July 20, 
1768, Nova Scotia A, LXXXIII, 248.
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The numbers and 'distribution of the white popu­
lation of Nova Scotia.and Maine was as significant a 
factor in the region as was the size and distribution of 
the Indian tribes*  The small and widely scattered popu­
lation of the territory strongly influenced the tactics 
of both sides. Had the area been securely settled by 
large numbers of whites, the Indians would have been much 
less significant.
The authorities of both colonies were well aware 
Of the damage that relatively small numbers of Indians 
could inflict upon small and isolated settlements. Most 
remembered the previous Indian wars and the terrors of 
surprise attack from the forest. These memories stimu­
lated the struggle and imparted a certain desperation to 
it, particularly on the American side, where the settle­
ments were especially scattered.
Unfortunately, accurate population statistics for 
Maine and Nova Scotia in this era are not available. 
Sources for Maine are especially rare.
John Ahlin was able to find no firm statistics for 
the immediate area with which he was dealing. He used a
42 description of the entire District of Maine by John Calef.
^5^or Calef’s account, see John Calef, "The Siege 
of Penobscot by the Rebels containing a Journal of the 
Proceedings,’’ The Magazine of History, III, 11 (1910).
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Calef, a Loyalist from the Penobscot, stated that the 
total population of Maine was 15,190 people. On the basis
I
of this figure and other information on the settlements 
east of the Penobscot, Ahlin arrived at a figure of 4>000 
settlers for eastern Maine in 1776.
In the absence of other data, the 1790 census of 
the United States can shed some light on downeast popula­
tion distribution during the Revolution. Fifteen years 
elapsed between the opening of the war and the taking of 
the census, but seven of them were war years during which 
the area lost population as men fled to safer regions. The 
census showed an increase of only five hundred people over 
Ahiin’s estimate for 1775*  Some areas vacant in 1775 had 
been settled by 1790, but overall growth in the area was 
slow. All Maine east of Camden held only 12,508 souls, 
and seven years after the end of the war, a small band of
44 Indians could have done great damage in this region.
A comparison of the population in individual towns 
is even more instructive. Machias, the largest town in 
Washington County in 1790, had only 818 people, of whom 
177 were men above the age of sixteen. The only other
^Ahlin, Maine Rubicon, p. 7.
^^United States, Bureau of the Census, Heads of 
Families at the First Census of the United States taken in 
the Year 1790, Maine (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1908), p. 9. All subsequent statistics on the 1790 
population of Maine come from the same source. 
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incorporated town in the county, Buck*s  Harbor, had 62 
people, of ■whom twelve, were men of sixteen or older. The 
largest plantation east of Machias, Number Eight (present 
day Eastport and Lubec), had 244 people. There were only 
98 people between Passamaquoddy Bay and Machias. The 
largest Washington County plantation, west of Machias was 
Number Four (incorporated as Steuben) with 71 men of six­
teen or older in a population of 233• Total population in
45 the area was 792 with 203 males above the age of sixteen.
Coastal settlement in Hancock County was more 
substantial than in Washington County and probably had 
grown significantly between 1783 and 1790. The largest 
town was Penobscot (now Penobscot, Castine and Brooksville) 
with 1,048 inhabitants. The second largest town, Mount 
Desert, encompassing that whole island, had a population 
of 744 people. The rest of the district east of the 
Penobscot had slightly over 4,000 people.
Eastern Maine was thus weak and open to attack 
when the Revolution began. The population was centered 
at Machias, Jonesboro, Addison, the Narraguagus valley and
4.6G-ouldsboro. None of these settlements was secure from
^other plantations with settlement in 1790 lay 
in a line immediately north of the coastal townships and 
probably had little significant population during the war. 
They were: Number 11 (Cherryfield), Numbers 12 and 13 
(Columbia and Columbia Falls).
^Memorial of the Centennial Anniversary of the
Settlement of Machias, p. 39-
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iridian attack, and memories of such assaults spurred the 
Massachusetts government and the people of Maine to seek 
with considerable urgency the friendship of the downeast 
Indians.
The distribution and size of the white population 
of Nova Scotia rendered much of that colony as vulnerable 
to Indian attack as eastern Maine. Centered in clusters 
of villages along the coast, the population was open to 
raids from the virtually unsettled interior of the province. 
While Indian attacks probably would not have brought down 
the colony, assaults on the isolated areas of the St. John 
valley and the outlying districts on the peninsula would 
have caused heavy damage and great suffering. Like their 
Massachusetts counterparts, the Nova Scotian authorities 
set out to woo the Indians and prevent such hostilities.
The population of Nova Scotia varied during the 
war. Thomas C. Haliburton estimated that the colony had 
about 13,000 inhabitants in 1764. By 1772, it had risen 
to 19,100, including 2,100 Acadians, of whom 800 lived on 
Cape Breton. The numbers decreased to 12,000 by 1781, but 
by 1784, after the influx of Loyalists, the population had 
climbed to 20,400.47
Most of this population lived within the borders of
47Thomas C. Haliburton, An Historical and Statis­
tical Account of Nova Scotia, II (Halifax, Nova Scotia: 
Howe, 1929), I, 243, 2657 ii, 250, 261, 275.
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the present-day province. A few did not, however, and were 
particularly exposed to Indian and American attack. About 
thirty families had settled on Passamaquoddy Bay at the 
very borders of Massachusetts. Behind them, 1,200 to 1,500
48 British and 400 Acadians inhabited the St. John valley.
In 1764 Halifax was the largest settlement on the
49peninsula, holding 3>000 people. East of the capital, to 
Canso and beyond, the coast was occupied by only 581 
people. The South Shore to the west of Halifax had 2,300
50 people, of whom 1,600 lived around Lunenburg.
The Cape Sable Shore was very sparsely populated. 
Barrington, behind Cape Sable Island, had three hundred 
inhabitants, and Yarmouth had only 150.
The most thickly settled area of Nova Scotia was 
the shore of the Bay of Fundy, with its transplanted New. 
England Yankees. Annapolis County had 1,000 settlers. 
Other towns, mostly around Minas Basin, were Cornwallis 
with 518 people, Horton with 670, Falmouth with 278, New­
port with 251 and the Cobequid region with 400 settlers.
^Brebner, Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia, p. 117; 
Raymond, River St. John, p. 187.
^Haliburton*s  estimates for 1764 are the best 
available guide to Nova Scotian population distribution. 
It should be remembered that many of the figures given 
are probably smaller than the actual population in that 
area during the Revolution.
All information on the population of Nova Scotia 
in 1764 comes from Haliburton, Account of Nova Scotia, II, 
275.
43
Nova Scotia, with her sparse and scattered popu­
lation, thus seemed as vulnerable to Indian attack as did 
Maine, Any settlement with less than five hundred people 
was threatened. If isolated, it could be damaged severely 
by the Indians present in the colony. Remote farms, even 
those around the larger settlements, were even more ex­
posed. War parties could roam the wild and vacant interior 
of the colony and strike at will. Pew towns could be com­
pletely secure. Nova Scotia thus had no less interest in 
securing Indian friendship then Massachusetts.
The adherence of the Indians to the Roman Catholic 
faith was another of the factors affecting the struggle for 
their friendship. A Massachusetts law forbidding priests 
to settle within the colony kept Catholic religious leaders 
away from the Maine Indians. Before the war, the Penobscots 
had asked for priests, but the authorities refused per­
mission. The British did provide priests for the tribes 
when the situation warranted it, but they would have pre­
ferred to convert the Indians to Protestantism. A new 
priest, Mathurin Bourg, arrived in Nova Scotia from Canada 
in the summer of 1773 to replace Father Bailly as Indian 
missionary under the auspices of the British government. 
When the Revolution began, the Malecites were afraid of 
joining the Americans lest they lose Bourg’s services. The 
Americans in Boston promised them a replacement but could
44
51 not find one. -The Indian desire for religious personnel 
remained a factor throughout the war and caused frantic 
American efforts to secure priests to counter the influ­
ences of British sponsored missionaries, who, as will be 
seen, never hesitated to use their priestly powers to sway 
the tribes into the British sphere of influence.
Thus, conditions in the disputed area determined 
the shape of the competition for Indian friendship. Loyal 
Nova Scotia and fervently rebellious Machias forced a 
confrontation downeast. Within the area of that confront­
ation lived the Penobscot, Passamaquoddy-Malecite and 
Micmac tribes of Indians. The colonial governments of Nova 
Scotia and Massachusetts opened a campaign to win the 
friendship of these tribes and prevent assaults upon their 
scattered settlements in the area. Once in motion, the 
efforts among the Indians flowed along courses set by the 
long history of Indian and white contact throughout the 
region, and the conflicts of the Revolution followed many 
of the old patterns.
51 Robert H. Lord, John E. Sexton and Edward T. 
Harrington, History of the Archdiocese of Boston In the 
Various Stages of its Development, I (New York: Sheed and 
Ward, 1944), 251 , 281-2.
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Chapter 2
OPENING MOVES: 1775-1776
When the American Revolution broke out around
Boston early in 1775, the leaders of Massachusetts and 
Nova Scotia faced radically different circumstances. The 
rebel government of Massachusetts was challenging a great 
empire that had recently won a considerable victory over 
its traditional enemy, France. Even if the other colo­
nies in North America followed her lead, Massachusetts was 
still embarking upon a struggle in which there appeared to 
be little chance of success. Nova Scotia, on the other
hand was controlled by a tight but unsteady oligarchy in 
Halifax. Governor Francis Legge, appointed in 1775, had.' 
challenged its rule and had sought to expel its corrupt 
members from the government. The oligarchy's initial •
reaction was to employ the Revolution to get rid of Legge,
who was accused of fomenting unrest. With the spread of 
sedition in the other colonies, the Crown dared not call 
the oligarchy's bluff and removed Legge from office. Only
then did the Nova Scotian government apply itself seriously
to the problems of the Revolution.
The different positions in which the Nova Scotian 
and Massachusetts governments found themselves produced
different reactions to the problem of the Indians at the 
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beginning of the war. Nova Scotia, with its divided gov­
ernment, made few attempts to court the tribes. The con­
tacts consisted mainly of warnings to the Indians to avoid 
the treason of the Americans. Few organized sttempts to 
gain the support of the Malecites and Micmacs were made. 
Massachusetts, on the other hand, was much more attentive 
to all the tribes of Maine and Nova Scotia. The, leaders 
of the colony sought all the help they could enlist. Des­
peration drove them to strive to win (or neutralize) the 
potential power groups around them. Deeply conscious of 
their weakness, they well knew that they could afford no 
additional enemies; they were already hard-pressed to de­
fend their outlying territories. Faced with such insecu­
rity, they naturally made great efforts to secure the 
friendship and military assistance of the Indians, efforts 
much greater than those made by Nova Scotia.
In the early years of the war, the Massachusetts 
authorities had some definite advantages in their dealings 
with the Indians on their eastern borders. They had a 
good understanding of the Indian mind and knew how to 
impress it. They were able to translate their conflict 
with Britain into terms that moved the tribes to their 
side. They had an established policy of Indian trade and
4
The Penobscots lived too far from the Nova Scotian 
sphere of influence to be of concern to the government in 
Halifax at this time.
47
a system to implement it. They also had the element of 
fear on their side. The natives were familiar with the 
colonial methods of Indian warfare, which they had seen 
destroy their neighbors to the west. The shattered remnants 
of the western tribes were a constant reminder of the folly 
of armed opposition to Massachusetts. Skillful utilization 
of these advantages permitted Massachusetts to retain her 
eastern lands when the war ended.
Massachusetts made her first move to secure tribal 
goodwill on May 15, 1775, when the Massachusetts Provincial 
Congress, or General Court, dispatched a letter to its 
’’Friends and good Brothers,” the Eastern Indians of Maine 
and Nova Scotia, warning of the “great wickedness of such 
as should be our friends but are our enemies.” These evil 
men wanted to enslave and impoverish both Americans and 
Indians and take away all guns, so that neither colonists
2nor natives could hunt. The Congress then wrote of other 
British transgressions and asked the tribes to do what they 
could to dissuade the Canadian Indians from joining the 
British. The Congregationalists of Massachusetts then 
called the blessing of God down on the Catholic Indians 
( an indication of colonial desperation), and promised to 
supply them with anything they wanted or needed.
The letter to the Indians had tangible results for
^Baxter MSS., XIV (1910), 244-5; see also Kidder,
Military Operations, pp. 51-2.
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Massachusetts. Joseph Orono, chief of the Penobscots, 
journeyed to Watertown, where the government was meeting 
because of the British occupation of Boston. On
June 21, 1775, he pledged conditional support to the 
colonies. ”In behalf of the whole Penobscot tribe," he 
said, "I hereby declare to you, if the grievances, under 
which our people labor were removed, they would aid, with
3their whole force, to defend the country." The griev­
ances mentioned by Orono were dishonest traders, trespass 
upon their timberlands by whites and the absence of a 
priest among them. Anxious to gain every possible adherent, 
the Massachusetts Congress moved with unusual speed to cor­
rect the Penobscots*  problems. They were not willing to 
give written permission for a priest, although they made it 
plain that they had no objection to a priest among the 
Penobscots. This was a direct violation of a Massachusetts 
law that prohibited priests within the colony. Action was 
also taken to provide trade goods for the Indians and to
4pay the expense of their trip home.
Other Indian chiefs also came to Massachusetts 
during the Rummer of 1775*  Chief Swashan and four others
Quoted in Bangor Daily Commercial, October 13>1911> 
as clipped and preserved in Eckstorm Manuscripts, Bangor 
Public Library.
. Slbid .; Lord, et al., Archdiocese of Boston, I, 
280-1 ; Kiclder, Military Operations. pp. 53-4; Baxter MSS., 
XIV, 286.
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from St. Francis appeared in Watertown and told the Massa­
chusetts government that four or five tribes with two 
thousand men were ready to aid the colonies. Swashan' 
reported that both the French and Indians of Canada sup­
ported the colonies, but the French were afraid to take up
5arms. Lewis, a chief of the Caughnawaga Mohawks, was 
also in town in August.
The Malecite chiefs of the St. John River did not
visit Massachusetts during the summer of 1775 but sent a
*
letter of friendship to the colony. When head chief
Ambrose and second chief Pierre Toma heard of the war, 
they went to the Penobscot truck house and sent a message 
to Boston promising to stand firm with the Penobscots in
They also
British encroachments upon American liberties.
demanded a truck house on the St. John River and
and a Catholic priest from the Americans. They had a
resisting
^Nova Scotia Gazette /Halifax/, October 17, 1775, 
quoting an unspecified Boston newspaper; Massachusetts, 
House of Representatives, Journal, August 17, 1775, p. 81. 
St. Francis was an Indian center in Canada, northwest of 
Maine, south of the St. Lawrence River. The term '’Canada," 
is used in this thesis to designate the St. Lawrence colony; 
it does not include Nova Scotia.
^Massachusetts, House of Representatives, Journal, 
August 2, 1775, PP- 54-5. 51
®Tbid.. October 11 , 1775, p. 148; Lord., et el.,_'rKJ 
Archdiocese of Boston, I, 281-2.
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The Massachusetts reply to the letter from the 
Malecites followed a form that was rapidly becoming stand­
ard. It espressed love and brotherhood for the tribes and 
vilified the British; it also contained little concrete 
response to the Indian demands. The government ignored the 
request for a truck house on the St. John but promised to 
send supplies for the Malecites to the existing truck house 
at Penobscot. Massachusetts did not object to a priest 
among the tribe but made no promise to help obtain one. 
The government urged the Indians to send down all future 
request and complaints, hoping in this way to prevent Indian
o
contact with the British.
In response to the Malecites*  letter, Massachusetts 
drew up a policy statement for their conduct of the compe­
tition for Indian support. On October 11, 1775, a commit­
tee of the government reported that it would be of great 
advantage "to cultivate a good Harmony with the Tribes of
Q
Indians near the Settlements in North America” and to 
prevent them from trading with the enemy. The members of 
the committee, therefore, recommended that the government 
send ammunition, provisions and clothing to the Penobscot 
truck house to be traded for furs. They also suggested
Massachusetts, House of Representatives, Journal, 
October 16, 1775, p*  166.
^Ibid., p. 155.
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that the Indians be sent gifts and letters of friendship 
to insure their good will towards the colony.
For the remainder of the war, Massachusetts fol- "'i 
lowed the policy of supplying goods to the Indians, al­
though the process underwent very basic changes. The 
committee recommended that the native's be allowed to trade 
furs for provisions, but as the number of dependent Indians 
grew, this policy was abandoned. The Indians were then 
given supplies to prevent them from returning to British- 
held areas.The basic policy of attempting to hold tribal 
allegiance through the native dependence upon manufactured 
goods did not change, however.
The committee also recommended that letters of 
friendship be sent to all the tribes. This device was very 
effectively used by the Massachusetts government in the 
early war years. Such letters flattered the Indians by 
stressing their importance and interpreted the conflict in 
terms that appealed to them. The first letter the colony 
sent to the “Eastern Indians” on May 15, 1775 used this 
approach. It warned the natives that the British were 
trying to take away guns and goods, while stressing that 
the colonists had no quarrel with the British and merely
^Allan’s journal for August through Decern er of 
1777 spoke of “giving" the Indians their “allowance." See 
Kidder, Military Operations, pp. 131• 134, 136, 138. 140-2, 
145, 147, 148-50, 153-4, 1$6, 158-60.
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11sought peace. These points were readily understandable 
by the Indians. After years of war, the tribes merely 
wanted to.be left in peace. If the colonists were being 
harrassed by the British, the Indians could sympathize 
with them. The natives could also understand what depri­
vation of manufactured goods would mean. Dependent upon 
them, but unable to obtain enough of them to live com­
fortably, the tribes had lived for years in a state of 
economic depression. The Indians thus had personal expe­
rience with the problems faced by the colonists and were 
bound to sympathize with them.
A basic Indian fear of the Americans aided colo­
nial propaganda. The last conflict between English 
colonists and. the natives had ended little more than ten 
years before the American Revolution. During the Indian- 
colonial wars, the tribes on the east of the Penobscot had 
seen the tribes of western Maine virtually destroyed, and 
the survivors driven from their ancestral lands by colo­
nial forces. The Indians outside Nova Scotia had had 
little contact with British regulars, but they were well 
aware of the ruthless and bloody exploits of the colonial 
troops. After the previous war, the Indians were inter­
ested mainly in preserving tribal lands and life styles; 
a conflict with the colonies would endanger these aims.
Baxter MSS. XIV, 254-5 
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The Indians preferred to avoid the known evil of American 
hostility rather than to submit to the unknown benefit of
12British protection.
With its Indian policies set, during the remainder 
of 1775, Massachusetts occupied itself with the mechanics 
of supplying the tribes. Jedediah Preble was chosen truck­
master for Penobscot on October 14 and was given £5Q0 for 
the purchase of "provisions, ammunition and goods." The 
government later ordered quick payment of the money and 
immediate transportation of the goods downeast because of
1 X ( the lateness of the season.
While Massachusetts was inaugurating a basically 
sound policy toward the Indians in the spring and fall of 
1775, the Nova Scotian colonial government was following a 
less effective course of action. After years of virtually 
ignoring the tribes because of lack of money and incli­
nation, the government was unsure of their loyalty. The 
situation worsened in the summer of 1775 when the Nova
1 2William L. Lucey felt that the tribes of eastern 
Maine and Nova Scotia held a mere shadow of their former 
strength, knew it, and were in no mood to fight. Their 
wooing by Massachusetts merely reflected colonial desper­
ation (see his Catholic Church in Maine, p. 22). His com­
ments were not entirely true, however, as one can see from 
the relative population figures for the area where the 
conflict occurred. Even in their weakened state, the 
Indians of Nova Scotia and Maine could have done great . 
damage if they had conducted a traditional war against 
either side.
1 ^Massachusetts, House of Representatives,-Journal, 
October 14 and 17, 1775, PP*  165-4, 171-2.
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Scotian Assembly prohibited the coastal trade in gunpowder 
without special license. Gunpowder immediately became very 
scarce, and the Indians were enraged. When Governor Legge 
learned of this, he called the tribal chiefs to Halifax for 
a conference and gave them many gifts but could not win 
them to his side. The Indians left with the conviction 
that the British were indeed seeking to deprive them of 
their firearms, as the Americans had told them.4
Aside from this heavy-handed attempt to repair an 
initial blunder, the governor and council of Nova Scotia 
did nothing else to secure Indian support until prodded to 
do so by General Thomas Gage, governor of Massachusetts and 
commander-in-chief of British forces in North America. "If 
you can fall upon the means to secure the Indians to our 
Side,” he wrote from Boston June 7, 1775, "it will be of 
great use and I may possibly have occasion for them, in
15these parts.”
In response to Gage’s letter, the Council proposed 
that Joseph Goreham, commander at Fort Cumberland on the 
Isthmus of Chignecto, raise several companies of Indians 
and Acadians and thus secure them to the government of Nova
^/■Report from John Allan to the government of 
Massachusetts, November 21, 1776, in Kidder, Military 
Operations, pp. 167-8.
15Letter, Gage to Legge, enclosed in a letter from 
Legge to the Earl of Dartmouth, a Secretary of State in the 
British government, in Nova Scotia A, XCIV, 133.
55
Scotia. The attempt failed, however, and Governor Legge
16suggested that it be dropped.
Nova Scotia was even having problems maintaining 
contacts with the tribes around the Bay of Fundy. Joseph 
Goreham at Fort Cumberland was their source of intelligence 
about the activities of the tribe, and the information he 
was sending to Halifax was not encouraging. He reported 
that the Indians were suffering from a severe shortage of 
ammunition and provisions and begged the Council to take
17 action to improve the situation.
By late 1775, the government of Nova Scotia was 
becoming concerned with conditions among the Indians and 
increasingly aware of the importance of the tribes in the 
growing conflict. Governor Legge reported to Lord Dart­
mouth that:
as the Americans are trying every means to gain 
/the Indians/ over to their party, we shall not 
only lose the benefit of them for our own defense, 
but should they gain them to take up arms against 
us, they wou’d be more formidable to the Settlers 
here than an army of Americans.
In response to the American threat, Legge sent Cap­
tain John Stanton to the St. John River to contact the
,DLetter, Joseph Goreham to Legge, November 2, 1775, 
in Nova Scotia A, XCIV, 231. Goreham was asking that the 
Council rescind its action directing him to recruit Indians 
and Acadians. He wanted no responsibility for carrying out 
orders that were contrary to Governor Legge’s wishes.
^Nova Scotia A, XCIV, 231-2.
1 RLetter, Legge to Dartmouth, November 4, 1775,
Nova Scotia A, XCIV, 235-6.
56
Indians there. Stanton*s  mission failed, however, when he 
was unable to reach the St. John after being delayed at 
Annapolis for seventeen days by foul weather. When the- 
people there told him that the unusually cold weather would 
have frozen the river and made passage to the Indian vil­
lages difficult, he gave up the attempt to cross the Bay 
of Pundy and turned back-without any effort to determine
19 personally conditions on the St. John. Legge dutifully 
reported this failure to Dartmouth and promised a new at­
tempt to reach the St. John Indians as soon as weather 
permitted.20
Thus, by the end of 1775, Nova Scotian authorities 
had failed to establish contact with the St. John Indians, 
the tribe most likely to harm the colony. This failure 
must be viewed in light of the promises of Massachusetts to 
provide this tribe with provisions and ammunition. Nova 
Scotia had also failed to formulate a policy for Indian 
affairs. Informed of Indian distress, the Nova Scotian 
Council made no move, to relieve it. Their idea of winning 
Indian loyalty was the dispatch of a captain of infantry to 
the villages, where the Indians were to rally to the crown 
out of sheer devotion. Great adjustments in thinking would
19̂Letter, Captain Stanton to Legge, December 4, 1775, 
Nova Scotia A, XCIV, 272-3.
20Letter, Legge to Dartmouth, December 26, 1775,
Nova Scotia A, XCIV, 342-3.
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have had to occur before Nova Scotia could have made any 
headway among the Indians.
The actions of Nova Scotia and Massachusetts during 
1775 reflected vast differences in practical experience in 
Indian relations and a very different strategic outlook. 
The men running the rebel government of Massachusetts were 
following an established pattern. Massachusetts*  old 
policy of controlling the frontier through trade and diplo­
macy gave its leaders a basic knowledge of the tribes. The 
leaders of Nova Scotia, on the other hand, British 
appointees of Halifax merchants, usually knew little about 
the Indians. They presumed the basic loyalty of the tribes 
and expected that a mere summons in the name of the King 
would bring the Indians to obedience. They completely 
failed to understand the severe economic depression under 
which the Indians lived and which was driving them into the 
supply-laden arms of Massachusetts.
During 1775, the two colonies showed great differ­
ences in motivation as well as experience. Massachusetts 
could afford no more enemies. Faced with the necessity of 
defending a large and thinly populated area, supported by 
an uncertain coalition of rebellious colonies, and unsettled 
by the British occupation of her capital, the colony was 
desperate for allies. Anxious to defend Maine, her tradi­
tional buffer to the north, but with few troops to do so, 
Massachusetts looked to the Indians for assistance.
Nova Scotia, on the other hand, complacently passed 
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the first year of the war. Her government was involved in 
internal feuding, and her leaders expected an early end to 
the revolt. Halifax was slow to realize the potential 
damage the Indians could do and distinctly sluggish in 
assembling the apparatus to counter Massachusetts’ early 
moves. Nova Scotian leaders were undisturbed when half­
hearted efforts to win tribal support failed, and urgent 
warnings of Indian dissatisfaction went unheeded.
The year 1776, which would see increased effort 
among the Indians by both sides, opened with a flood of 
problems in Massachusetts’ Indian operation. In February, 
the Provincial Congress received a petition from the inhab­
itants of eastern Maine seeking more support for the Indi­
ans. Rumors downeast told of a big Nova Scotian effort to 
win the Indians to the British side, although the Nova 
Scotian government had done very little in this regard. 
The petition from eastern Maine, however, commented on the 
lack of clothing and ammunition among the Indians and 
stated ’’That the Government of Nova Scotia have offered to 
support them with all necessary’s provided they will join
21the enemies of the United Colonies.” The Indians had
--------------------------------- -----------------------------------
(21V/Kidder, Military Operations, pp. 55-6. Rumors 
were flying around the two colonies. Reports made in the 
meetings of the Nova Scotia Council were fantastic. One 
report on August 15, 1775, spoke of a'projected invasion of 
Nova Scotia by two thousand men, who were supposedly waiting 
in Machias for orders to move out. See Public Archives of 
Canada, Nova Scotia B, Executive Council Minutes, 1720-1785> 
XVI, 148-50. It was not beyond the realm of possibility 
that the Indians started the rumor about massive Nova Scotian 
I 
refused the offer, according to the petition, preferring to 
support the colonies, but they would have to have goods to 
trade for their furs. The petitioners accordingly asked 
for the establishment of a truck house at Machias to meet
22Indian needs. The colony immediately agreed to the re­
quest; £400 was appropriated for goods for the truck house. 
Stephen Smith was unanimously elected truck master by the
23Provincial Congress.
The Massachusetts government soon learned, however, 
that Indian policy was not just the establishment of trading 
centers for the Indians. Complaints poured in. The Penob­
scots protested that their wishes in regard to the appoint­
ment of a truckmaster had not been followed and strongly 
implied that colonial promises were worthless. The General 
Court replied that the changes in truck house personnel had 
been made at the request of twp Indians in Boston, whom the 
authorities assumed were representatives of the tribe. The 
Indians eventually accepted a compromise and a Massachusetts 
promise to fulfill previous agreements. The government 
asked the Indians to sign all future letters carefully to 
prevent further'deceptions of the colony by imposters. 
Complaints came in from the white settlers on the St. John.
aid in order to gain their goal of a Massachusetts truck 
house on the St. John or in adjacent parts of Maine.
ppKidder, Military Operations, pp. 55-6.
2^Massachusetts, House of Representatives, Journal, 
Pebruary 12 and 14, 1776, pp. 276, 289.
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The Indians there had become unruly in the American cause, 
partially as a result of a letter from George Washington, 
who had urged them to support the colonies. Anyone sus­
pected of being a Tory was being plundered, and order had 
completely broken down. Stephen Smith, the new truck 
master at Machias, was also unhappy,. He complained about 
dishonest white traders, Indians with exaggerated ideas of 
their own importance and the general lack of money for his 
establishment. Smith got some relief in the form of £1,000 
for more goods. He also got increased duties among the
24 Micmacs and Malecites.
In an effort to deal with the complaints and diffi­
culties that had arisen, Massachusetts held a conference 
with a number of Micmacs and Malecites who were in Water­
town in response to letters from the Massachusetts Council 
and George Washington. The conference was held in the 
Watertown meeting house where the House of Representatives 
had been sitting. James Bowdoin, President of the Council 
and head of the government, presided. The Malecites from 
the St. John attended, including Ambrose St. Aubin, their 
head chief, along with two Micmacs from Windsor, two from 
Miramichi and Richibucto, one from Beausejour in Cumberland, 
!
(J^Letter, General Court to Penobscot chiefs, Baxter 
MSS., XIV, 541-2; letters, people on the St. John River to 
Mass, govt., May 21, 1776, and Stephen Smith to Mass, govt., 
June 22, 1776, in Kidder, Military Operations, pp. 65, 60; 
Ahlin, Maine Rubicon, pp. 55-6.
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one from Le Heve and one from the Qaspe. Five of the 
eleven Micmac villages sent representatives; the rest had 
not been reached in time to make the trip but favored the 
colonial cause. Unfortunately, unknown to the colonial 
authorities, a number of the Indians present had no author­
ity to make agreements in the name of their tribes. For 
this reason, the Micmacs of Nova Scotia would not honor the
25 final treaty. v
Chief Ambrose of the Malecites spoke for the assem­
bled Indians on July 12, 1776. He proclaimed the unity of 
the Malecite and Micmac tribes and the oneness of purpose 
betweeh colonists and Indians in fighting the British. The 
tribes promised to ignore all British entreaties for aid 
and to "worship or obey /only/ Jesus Christ, and General 
Washington." Ambrose then presented material demands. He 
wanted Massachusetts to help the Indians obtain a priest. 
The Indians also wanted a truck house closer to their lands 
than Machias and sought to have a number of Acadians
26 removed from their lands.
v^axter Mss., XXIV, 166-8, 179; Kidder, Military 
Operations, pp. 172-5. In his first report to the Massa­
chusetts government, Allan described the consternation 
among the Micmac chiefs when their -delegation returned from 
Watertown. They finally decided not to accept the treaty, 
although they remained friendly to the rebel cause. For 
other accounts of the Watertown Conference, see Lord, et al., 
Archdiocese of Boston, I, 288-90, and Ahlin, Maine Rubicon, 
pp. 56-7.
@$iinutes of the Watertown Conference, Baxter MSS., 
XXIV, 168-70.
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27 Council President Bowdoin answered Ambrose. He
spoke for the other colonies as well, for Massachusetts had 
been designated Continental agent for relations with these 
tribes. Bowdoin reserved replies to specific Indian demands 
until the government could deliberate on them but set forth 
the general colonial line of propaganda. He told the chiefs 
that the government was very impressed with the devotion of 
the tribes to the American cause. The English, he said, 
were making war on the Americans to satisfy British greed. 
The English had once been respected by the Americans as older 
brothers, according to Bowdoin, but when they had wasted 
their own money, they had to steal American wealth to sup­
port their luxury. The British were even trying to enslave 
the colonists. The Americans bore this patiently at first 
and petitioned for relief. Finally, however, the colonists 
could take no more and resisted the demands. The British 
retaliated by seizing the colonial towns into which they had 
been freely admitted and by marching about the countryside, 
killing, stealing and burning. A great Congress in Phila­
delphia had chosen ’’That Great Warrior General Washington”
/
to fight the enemy, and he had driven the British from 
Boston and would soon free all America, some small American
27Bowdoin spoke as agent for all the .American 
colonies. The Continental Congress had designated Massachu­
setts as its agent for matters concerning the Eastern Indians.
&
28 reverses in Canada notwithstanding.
Having provided, for the American victory, Bowdoin 
turned to the colonial relationship with the Indians. He 
had given them the facts, he said, so that they would not 
be deluded by what they heard from Halifax. He, promised 
that Massachusetts would do everything possible to protect 
the tribes and to be their brothers. He was not asking the 
Indians to go to war but would be happy to have them fight 
if they so desired. Bowdoin, however, hardened the rhet­
oric of brotherhood with a direct threat. The government 
of Nova Scotia was likely to try to turn them against the 
United Colonies, but the Indians must not be deceived. "If 
they should engage you in a War against us,” Bowdoin warned,
29“you will be undone, and will be a ruened people.” Bow­
doin mentioned this as friendly advice, but the Indians 
were sufficiently familiar with New England Indian warfare 
to be sobered by it.
Bowdoin replied to specific Indian demands the fol­
lowing day, July 15, after consultation with the rest of the 
government. The Americans were most anxious for the Indians 
to have a priest but could not get one. Massachusetts would 
be happy to furnish a Protestant minister if the Indians
28Minutes of the Watertown Conference, Baxter MSS., 
.XXIV, 171-2.
29Ibid., pp. 172-4.
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wanted one, which, of course, they did not. The government 
again refused to establish a truck house on the St. John, 
because an installation would be beyond the colony"s 
borders. They did promise to send more goods to Machias
30 and to offer better prices for the Indian furs.
Following Bowdoin’s answer to their demands, the
Indians announced that they would join the colonies in war. 
Their love for Boston prevented them from standing by while 
she was abused. In making the announcement, however, 
Ambrose again demanded a trading station on the St. John, 
in spite of Bowdoin’s refusal. Three Indians were willing 
to enlist immediately, Ambrose continued, and the minutes 
of the conference recorded that "Upon this tree of them 
went from their seats into the Isle and manifested' a great
31desire to go."
Upon hearing of the Indian desire to go to war, 
Bowdoin informed Ambrose and the other Indians that the 
colony proposed to raise a special regiment, composed of 
five hundred Indians and two hundred fifty colonists; field 
officers were to be colonists, the other officers were to 
be evenly divided between Indians and colonials. All would 
receive the same pay and provisions. The Indians expressed
32 pleasure with the proposed arrangement.
• > PP* 174-5. j1Ibid., pp. 177-8.
^^Ibid., pp. 180-1.
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The Indians •were perfectly willing to talk about 
eternal friendship and regimental organization, but when 
the Council wanted to discuss the number of men each vil­
lage would provide and when they would enter military 
service, the Indians1 fervor evaporated. In spite of 
previous promises, the Indians began to realize that they 
could not guarantee enlistments. The Council was planning 
to send the new regiment to the Continental Army by fall, 
but the Indians now suddenly discovered that they could not 
possibly get any men to Boston before spring. President 
Bowdoin was unyielding but could get no firm commitment. 
As most Indian villages without their men would have been 
short of winter provisions, the Indians had legitimate 
reasons for not wanting to serve during winter; they were 
quiet about them, however, in hope of gaining more conces­
sions from Massachusetts.
•^Ibid., pp. 183-5
/
The conference closed on July 17, 1776 with the 
signing of a treaty. In this ’’Treaty of Alliance and 
Friendship,” the Indians recognized the independence of 
’’the United States of America in General Congress Assem-. 
bled.’’ Massachusetts (and through her, the other colonies) 
and the Indians agreed to be peaceful friends and brothers 
and to set up machinery for the- settlement of disputes. 
The Indians also agreedr despite their previous objections, 
to provide without delay six hundred men to serve with
66
Washington for terms not exceeding three years. The Indian 
delegates were to use their influence to persuade other 
Indians to enlist. Massachusetts agreed to provide provi­
sions at her truck house at Machias. Both sides repudiated 
any previous agreements repugnant to this one, and the 
Indians agreed not to give assistance to adherents of the 
King.^4 The colony then provided passage home for the
35delegates.
The efforts of the Massachusetts government to 
recruit Indians sprang from pressure by Washington, who had 
become interested in gaining Indian service in July of 1776. 
He wrote a letter to the Continental Congress suggesting 
the use of the Eastern Indians to counteract British use of 
the tribes on the western frontier. He had information 
that five or six hundred of ’’the St. Johns, Nova Scotia, 
Penobscot &ca” might be enlisted. Such enlistments would
I
tie the Indians to the colonial cause and provide a first 
line of defense should the British try to penetrate New 
England. If Congress approved (and they did), Washington 
proposed to allow the Massachusetts General Court to exe­
cute the measure. The Indian promise at Watertown of six. 
•^Text of Watertown Treaty, July 17, 1776, Baxter 
MSS., XXIV, 189-92. The Indians signed the agreement to 
provide the men for the army with no idea of how to enforce 
it. They had no way of forcing men to enlist to fill the 
quota. They may have simply signed the treaty without 
protest to keep the Americans feeling favorably towards them.
■^^Minutes of the Watertown Conference, Baxter MSS., 
XIV, 185-6.
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hundred men for the Continental Army was the result of 
Washington’s interest..
The promises secured by Massachusetts at Watertown, 
however, were nearly worthless. The Indians had no way of 
guaranteeing that men would come forward to enlist. 
Furthermore, while there probably were six hundred men of 
fighting age in the region, their enlistment would have 
caused grave dislocations within the tribes. The removal 
of so many men would have left few in the villages, and 
those remaining would have been unable to support the women 
and children.
Under these conditions, few Indians enlisted, and 
Washington became impatient. On August 5, 1776, he sent a 
letter to the Massachusetts government urging speed and 
terming the effort a "Matter of the greatest consequence."*̂  
In response to this letter, the colony sent agents to the 
Penobscots and Passamaquoddies. Agent Thomas Fletcher got 
a typical reaction among the Penobscots. He read his in­
structions and Washington’s request to the assembled 
Indians, but, expressing regret, they refused to send a 
contingent. They had heard that many troops had arrived 
in Canada and feared an attack.
■^6John C. Fitzpatrick (ed.), The Writings of 
George Washington, V (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1952)7 221, 251, 565.
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Fletcher thus obtained nothing from the Indians but 
promises to scout the area, to assist a force of rangers if 
one was sent to the region, and to pass along any intelli­
gence gained. The Penobscots again used the occasion to 
request the removal of white trespassers from their lands. 
Under pressure to get troops, Fletcher promised action on 
this demand. He also attempted to buy Indian recruits with
•27
£50 in bribe money sent from Boston; this also failed.
The Micmacs also failed to honor the Watertown 
treaty. A conference of chiefs held in September of 1776 
sent a letter to Boston informing the government that the 
Micmacs at Watertown had had no right to speak for the 
tribe and that no men could be spared for the Continental 
army. The tribe*s  natural inclination was for peace, and 
the chiefs sent the treaty back to Massachusetts.^8
37̂Letters, Fletcher to Mass. Council, Mass.
Council to Fletcher, Baxter MSS, XIV, 367-9,. 378.
38Kidder, Military Operations, pp. 57-8. John Allan, 
later to be Chief Continental Agent to the Eastern Indians, 
made his debut in Indian-colonial affairs when he hand- 
delivered this note from the Micmacs to the government in 
Boston.
By October, Washington’s ardor for Indian troops 
had cooled, and the pressure on Massachusetts slackened. 
Facing a winter with few supplies, Washington feared that 
any Indians in the Continental camps might become disil­
lusioned and hostile. He therefore urged Massachusetts to 
retain any tribal recruits for future use at a central
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39 location •within its borders. Washington’s fears were 
unwarranted, however, because he was not about to be inun­
dated with Indian volunteers.
The year 1776 closed in Eastern Maine with the 
disastrous Eddy expedition, in which seventy-two men 
attempted to capture Nova Scotia. The failure of the 
people of Cumberland to rise in support of the invaders 
and the subsequent American defeat at Fort Cumberland' 
brought the expedition to an inglorious end. The defeat 
dealt a real blow to colonial prestige among the Indians, 
a number of whom were present at the defeat, among them
40 head chief Ambrose St. Aubin of the Malecites. Letters 
from George Washington, which never failed to impress the 
natives, were on the way, however, and would provide a 
rallying point for American efforts among the tribes.
•Washington’s letters, dated "On the banks of the 
great river Delaware, December 24, 1776,”’;were addressed
41 to the Passamaquoddy and St. John Indians. The letter 
•^Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings of Washington, VI 
(1932), 235-6.
^Ofteturn of the Indians present during the attack 
upon Fort Cumberland, no date, in Kidder, Military 
Operations, p. 78. For a more complete account of the 
Eddy expedition, see Chapter IV, ”0n to Fort Cumberland,” 
in Ahlin, Maine Rubicon, pp. 42-60,.
41Washington wrote these letters on the day that he 
and his army crossed the Delaware River and attacked Trenton. 
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to the Malecites on the St. John expressed the ganeral’s 
satisfaction with the tribe’s continued support of the 
colonial cause. He was also pleased to hear that they'
A
would soon have a truck house on the St. John River. The 
letter to the Passamaquoddies was less friendly in tone. 
While acknowledging the continued friendship of the tribe, 
Washington expressed disappointment in their refusal to 
send warriors to him. At first, he had taken this as a 
sign of broken fellowship. He later realized, according 
to the letter, that the men were hunting and unavailable 
for war, but he hoped that in the future they would send 
warriors to him as the Renobscots and Malecites had. The 
general further warned against disloyalty to the Americans, 
telling the tribe of Indian affairs in the South. The King, 
he wrote, had tried to incite all the tribes to war against 
the colonies, but most had refused. The Cherokees and 
other southern tribes, however, had attacked white settle­
ments. Colonial troops then ’’went into their country, 
burnt their houses, destroyed their corn, and obliged them 
zL 2Massachusetts was making plans for the truck 
house on the St. John when Washington wrote his letter. 
According to the General’s letter, Pierre Toma, the man 
who presented the request for the truck house, had not 
yet returned to the St. John. Washington’s letter may 
therefore have been the first notification of the new 
installation to reach the tribes.
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to sue for peace, and give up hostages for their future 
good behavior.” Washington closed with an admonition never 
to "let the King’s wicked counsellors turn your hearts *
^Fitspatrick (ed.), Writings of Washington, VI, 
434-6.
44]jord, et al., Archdiocese of Boston, I, 283.
^Speech by Chief Ambrose St. Aubin of the Malecites, 
Minutes of the Watertown Conference, Baxter MSS., XIV, 
268-70.
43 against me and your brethren of this country.” '
Washington’s name was a major force among the 
Indians. He received every delegation from the east and 
knew how to make a good impression. He was a man of great 
dignity and ease of manner with a certain complacency that
44 never failed to impress tribal visitors. The Indians 
singled' him out among the Americans and held him in rather 
high esteem. At the Watertown Conference, for example, the 
Indians present promised to "worship or obey Jesus
45Christ, and General Washington."
The reasons for the Indians’ high regard for
Washington are hard to discern. The traits of personality 
noted above must have had great effect upon the Indians he 
met. Evidently Washington was the kind of grave, distant 
leadership figure that the Indians respected. Furthermore, 
he was the most visible and one of the most important of 
the American leaders. The tribes, victims of official 
neglect for many years, were greatly impressed when this 
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great man deigned to. meet them or send letters. Washington . 
considered the Indians to be of great importance and spared 
no effort to woo them. The impact of his exertions among 
the Indians was magnified by the lack of a similar effort 
among the British. To the Indians, Washington appeared to 
be the leader of the Americans; his opposite number would 
have been the King, who was above such propaganda efforts. 
It seemed that the leader of the British was ignoring them, 
while the great General Washington understood their "true’ 
worth" and was treating them accordingly.
Washington’s letters to the Malecite and Passama- 
quoddy tribe illustrated the very thinly veiled threat of 
violence that underlay relations between Indians and colo­
nials. Washington's stern warnings, given in terms of 
friendly advice, were typical of the admonitions dealt to 
the Indians, who were never allowed to forget that should 
they step out of line, American retaliation would be swift, 
and terrible. The tribes were very familiar with the 
colonial methods of dealing with troublesome tribes' and 
did not give the Americans any chance to employ them.
The Indians did not have to fear hostile action 
from Nova Scotia during 1776. In fact, they might have 
wondered if the British authorities had forgotten their 
existence. While Massachusetts was setting up truck houses, 
entertaining chiefs and attempting to recruit Indians into, 
the Continental Army, Nova Scotia was embroiled in a 
dispute between Governor Francis Legge and the local power
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structure. Only after Legge’s recall did the Nova
Scotian authorities begin a determined drive to prevent 
the Massachusetts colonials from winning"the Indians to 
the American cause.
The first reference to the struggle for Indian 
support in Nova Scotia in 1776 occurred in a letter from 
Michael Francklin to John Pownall, secretary to the Lords 
Commissioners of Trade and Plantations. The letter, writ­
ten May 4-, after the removal of Legge, expressed regret: 
that the Indians have been too much neglected ever 
since Mr Legge’s Administration to the great con­
cern of the King’s Servants here, and the frequent 
uneasyness of the people; had they been cherished 
and taken care of we should have found them useful 
for intelligence and other Services, instead of 
which it is possible and not unlikely ..• that they 
may be seduced to act against us. '
4 Francis Legge became Governor of Nova Scotia in 
1775 and opened his tenure with a campaign to reform and 
streamline the colonial government. His reforms immedi­
ately brought him into conflict with the governmental 
methods of the ruling oligarchy, which, .at the very least, 
bordered on the corrupt. With their positions threatened, 
the leading figures of the colony sought to oust Legge, 
who resisted fiercely and pressed his reform attempts. His 
efforts to curtail smuggling activities further destroyed 
his support outside.Halifax, where he might have looked for 
support against the clique in the capital. Finally, in 
desperation, the opposition to his government threatened to 
take Nova Scotia into the rebel camp if he were not removed. 
The Crown dared not call their bluff and removed Legge in 
1776. Lieutenant Governor Arbuthnot then assumed the 
government. Michael Francklin, who had served as Lieuten­
ant. Governor under Legge, had been removed from that office 
before Legge was recalled and thus lost a chance to assume 
the top post, to which he had long aspired. For more 
details of Legge’s tenure, see Viola F. Barnes, ’’Francis 
Legge, Governor of Loyalist Nova Scotia, 1775-1776,” 
New England Quarterly, IV, 5 (July 1951), 420-447.
47Nova Scotia A, XCV, 235-7.
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Francklin had just learned that he was not to be
■Governor of Nova Scotia. He was asking instead to be • 
made Lieutenant Governor with a salary of £500 a year and 
Superintendant of Indian Affairs with a salary of £200 a 
year. In these capacities he planned to reside in Cumber­
land, where a dependable officer of the government was 
needed. He felt that he would be particularly effective 
as Superintendant of Indian Affairs because his "having 
been a Prisoner in the Lands of the Indians in my Younger 
Days and my speaking French have always given me a very
49 considerable influence among the Savages." Unfortunately 
for British relations with the Indians, Francklin would not 
receive the desired appointment during 1776.
The attempt to win Indian support for Nova Scotia, 
carried out under the colonial government in the early 
years, was usually hampered by lack of funds. The assembly 
was most unwilling to vote money to support the struggle, 
maintaining that the British government should pay the cost. 
Nova Scotia was a sparsely settled colony, dependent upon 
Britain for a subsidy and could ill afford to assume any 
new obligations. The Assembly*s  reluctance in these matters 
was shown in its treatment of a petition for payment of
^Michael Francklin was a long-time member of the 
Halifax structure with a broad commercial and political 
background.
49Nova Scotia A. XCV, 235-7.
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money advanced for relief of distressed Indians in Kings 
and Windsor counties. Governor William Campbell had 
ordered Secretary Bulkeley to send some provisions to the 
Indians, and Bulkeley, who had done so at his own expense, 
was asking repayment of the money. Although the sum was 
small, a little over £9, the Assembly refused payment and 
demanded that he be paid out of the contingency fund, which
50 was small and over burdened in these difficult times.
The Nova Scotian records and correspondence for the 
rest of the year contain no mention of any efforts to win 
the friendship of the Indians. Francklin, displeased that 
he had been given no position in the government, was not 
using his influence among the Indians, and those on the 
St. John and in other remote parts of the colony seemed 
likely to be won over to the' American side. Furthermore, 
inasmuch as some of these areas were controlled, they were 
in American hands. The settlements on the St. John River 
had given their allegiance to Massachusetts in May of 1776, 
placing the Malecite tribe primarily under American influ­
ence.*̂  Eddy’s assault on Fort Cumberland, while failing 
disastrously, shook British power by providing a rallying 
point for the Indians and American sympathizers in the 
area. This assault finally drove the Nova Scotian
50■ Public Archives of Canada, Nova Scotia D, 
Assembly Journals, 1758-1805> XII, 55-7.
51 Ahlin, Maine Rubicon, p. 48.
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authorities to begin a determined campaign for influence 
on their northwestern frontier.
Puring'1776, Nova Scotia’s main responses to 
American incursions, military and political, into her ter­
ritory were defensive and often ineffective. When some of 
the ’’rebels" from Cumberland visited "Rebellious territory" 
to encourage the invasion of Nova Scotia and then returned, 
Governor Arbuthnot, who had replaced Legge, reported to 
Secretary of State Lord George Germain on July 8, 1776 that 
they had come to "corrupt" the St. John Indians. Arbuthnot 
had sent a message to the Indians to counteract the rebel 
moves and had put a price of twenty guineas on the heads of 
these traitors. So far, he wrote, the Indians had merely
52 become insolent, stealing cattle and disrupting trade. 
Similar steps were taken when the Eddy expedition arrived 
in Nova Scotia. Jonathan Eddy, William. Howe, Samuel Rogers 
and John Allan, "who has been also deeply concerned in . 
exciting the said Rebellion," had prices of £200 put on 
their heads.Putting prices on heads, while dramatic, 
was not the way to secure Indian friendship or end the 
rebellion.
By the end of 1776, Nova Scotian failure to deal
^Nova Scotia A, XCVI, 93-4.,
^Minutes of Nova Scotia Council, November 17, 1776, 
Nova Scotia B, XVII, 80-1.
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with Indians was so pronounced that Sir George Collier, 
who commanded the British Navy in Nova Scotian waters, was 
complaining about it to Lord Germain. He was concerned * 
that Indians had participated in hostilities at Fort 
Cumberland on the side of the Americans. He felt that this 
could have been avoided had any attention been paid to
54their chiefs.
The years of 1775 and 1776 thus saw Massachusetts 
jump into the lead in the struggle for the support of the 
Indians. Her active and effective programs of Indian 
affairs enabled her to move quickly and to gain Indian 
sympathy on her eastern frontier. Nova Scotia, on the 
other hand, by the end of the second year of the war had 
failed to deal effectively with the Indians, and Massachu­
setts was extending operations into Nova Scotian territory. 
Countermeasures were not far in the future, however, as 
Nova Scotia prepared to act in 1777.
^Letter, Collier to Germain, November 21, 1776, 
Nova Scotia A, XCVI, 522.
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Chapter 3
GROWING CONFLICT: 1777
When 1777 dawned, Massachusetts was waging her 
campaign for Indian support in the forests of Maine and 
Nova Scotia and encountering little opposition from Halifax, 
where the Nova Scotian government was still without an 
effective counter-policy. Increasingly fearful of unrest 
as the British failed to quickly crush the rebellion, 
Halifax was now beginning to respond to American advances 
among the Indians. By the end of the year, Nova Scotia 
would have made good progress; for the moment, Massachusetts 
retained the initiative.
While Halifax struggled to assemble a coherent 
policy towards the Indians, Boston pushed resolutely for­
ward in an effort to hold Indian support already won and to 
overcome Eddy’s defeat at Fort Cumberland. Encouraged by 
the adherence of the Indians and settlers on the St. John 
to the American cause, Massachusetts reversed an earlier 
decision and moved to secure its hold over the Malecites 
with a traditional ploy, the establishment of a truck house. 
John Preble arrived at the mouth of the St. John on Janu­
ary 13, 1777, with the necessary supplies. The river was 
frozen, and Preble had to send the provisions over the ice 
for sixty miles. The Indians were already complaining 
about the prices, which were high because the government 
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still expected truck houses to support themselves, and the 
increased cost of transportation further raised the costs. 
As a result, the Indians threatened to trade with the 
enemy, despite their current poor relations with the Brit­
ish. Furthermore, those Indians who had served with Eddy 
were unpaid, and the Indians were unhappy about that.1 
Massachusetts*  relations with the Indians, particularly on 
the St. John, were at a low point for the early years of 
the Revolution, but the imminent arrival of John Allan 
would soon bring improvement.
1 Letter, John Preble to Mass, govt., January 27,1777,
Baxter MSS, XIV, 405-7.
John Allan, the son of a British veteran who 
migrated to Nova Scotia in 1749, held the primary respon­
sibility for the American operation among the Eastern 
Indians through most of the war. He may have been formally 
educated in Boston, and probably gained his excellent 
practical knowledge of the Indian culture around Fort 
Cumberland where he grew up. His first involvement in the 
Revolution came in 1775 when the Micmacs were upset by the 
■Nova Scotian prohibition of the shipping of gunpowder.
Allan, to whom the tribe often turned, for advice, promoted 
the colonial cause among them until he fled Nova Scotia to 
escape arrest in July of 1776, arriving in Machias on
80
2August 13*
From Machias, Allan went to Boston and Philadelphia 
to explain the situation in Nova Scotia. He dined with 
General Washington at Trenton and eventually returned to 
Boston with Continental commissions designating him a 
colonel in the infantry and superintendent of the Eastern 
Indians. In Boston he obtained funds for his work, and he 
returned to Machias in May of 1777. He planned a three 
point program: the protection of eastern Maine, the iso­
lation of Nova Scotia from Canada by closing the St. John 
valley to British messengers, and the conquest (or liber- 
ation) of Nova Scotia.
Allan carried on his work with the help of three 
assistants: ’’Cap"**  Preble, Mess1* Lewis Delesdernier & James 
Avery, all of whom the Indians are much attached to.” 
Delesdernier spoke perfect French and some Indian and was 
of tremendous service. Avery was very capable as well, 
although his linguistic abilities were more limited than 
Delesdernier1s.
2Robert E. Moody. ”John Allan,” Dictionary of 
American Biography (1928), I, 183; George H<~Allan, 
"Sketch of Colonel John Allan of Maine,” New England 
Historical and Genealogical Register, XXX (1876), 353; 
Kidder. Military Operations, pp. 168-173.
^Kidder, Military Operations, p. 13» Moody,
"John Allan," D.A.B., I, 183*
^Allan’s report to Mass, govt., November 18, 1777»
Baxter MSS., XV, 1910, 298.
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Allan had received complaints from the Indians 
before he left Boston and was anxious to meet the tribes 
as soon as possible. He therefore left Machias for the’ 
St. John River on June 1, 1777, and arrived at Aukpaqpe 
four days later. The Indians gave him a tumultuous welcome. 
In the conference that followed, Allan attempted to gain a 
strong alliance with the Indians and was somewhat success­
ful. He was given the same powers within the tribe former-
5 ly held by the agent of France.
Allan’s hard work came to nothing, however, The 
arrival of a British vessel, the Vulture, in the mouth of 
the St. John, heralded increased British activity on the 
river. After several months of congratulating themselves 
on their victory at Cumberland and vying with each other 
to claim credit for it, the Nova Scotian and British 
authorities launched a determined campaign to regain the 
St. John River and its Indians.Francklin was appointed 
Nova Scotian Superintendent of Indian Affairs in early 1777
^Letter, Allan to Mass, govt., March 18, 1777, 
Allan’s Journal, entries for June 1, 5 and 7, 1777, 
Kidder, Military Operations,pp. 185, 92, 94-6.
r
Letter, Germain to Lt. Gov. Arbuthnot, January 14, 
1777, in which Germain also congratulated Francklin and 
the New Windsor militia for their prompt action, which the 
King appreciated. See also letters, General Massey, com­
mander of troops in Nova Scotia, to Germain, January 30 
and February 10, 1777, Nova Scotia A, XCVII, 84-6, 110, 119.
with a salary of £300 a year.? For the first time Nova
Scotia had both a viable instrument and the desire to deal 
effectively with the Indians.
The ship, Vulture, sent to the St. John River in
response to Allan’s arrival there, carried Colonel Arthur
Gould, member of the Council of Nova Scotia. On his 
arrival, Gould issued a proclamation to the Indians in a 
sterling example of colonial French.
Je suis venu ... de reallumer cette ancienne amitie 
que tousjours Subsiste entre vous et ... Le Roy les 
plus juste et protexteur de son Peuple.
Nous oublieron tout le passe et attribueroh la 
folie de Panne passe de une petit numbre de vos 
enfants a la Consequence de agir san consideracion 
et aux Impression fait par des mauvais conseille et 
persuade vous mon frere que it n’a point de protec- 
cion pour vous et votre just-et-puissant Roy.
Et pour le mieux reetablir cette Amitie notre 
Indulgent Govemeur desire que vous laissera venir 
avec moi a Halifax quatre de vos principaux Sauvages 
pour Confirmer cette amitie, Ils seront retoume Q 
avec la plus grand soin et mauquera pour votre tribe.
Gould then spoke with the same chiefs that Allan 
had recently met and promised to hire Father Bourg to pro­
vide the Indians with the spiritual guidance they had
Q 
sought for so long. The chiefs were friendly, and a
?Letter, William Knox to Arbuthnot, March 5, 1777, 
Nova Scotia A» XCVII, 130.
^Proclamation by Gould to the St. John Indians, 
May 11, 1777, enclosed in a letter from Arbuthnot to 
Germain, June 12, 1777, Nova Scotia A, XCVII, 190-1.
. ^Ibid., pp. 139-90; Lord, et al., Archdiocese of 
Boston, I, 292.
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number of them took an oath of allegiance. Second Chief 
Pierre Toma now swung his support to the British, but many 
of the others refused to follow his example.^
The confrontation between Gould and Allan on the 
St. John demonstrated the difficulty of dealing with the 
Indians. While Gould was reporting the oaths of allegiance 
taken by the chiefs, the tribe was harboring Allan, and 
only Pierre Toma favored Britain, according to Allan’s 
reports. Such activities might be seen as double-dealing, 
but the Indians were simply anxious to avoid hostilities 
with anyone. It was easy to be friends with both sides as 
long as no concrete actions were demanded. In this situ­
ation, the Indians managed to promise both sides what they 
wanted.
Some Indians, determined to adhere to the Americans, 
were understandably uneasy when the British burned the 
houses of persons who had aided Allan. Por safety, Allan 
persuaded them to return with him to Machias. With the 
British in pursuit, Allan, twenty-one of his men and many 
of the Malecites retired up the St. John to Meductic and 
portaged south into American territory. The journey was a 
difficult one; many elderly people among the Indians had 
to be carried. The monotony was occasionally broken,
---------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------
ioLetter, Arthur Gould to Arbuthnot, enclosed in 
letter from Arbuthnot to Germain, June 12, 1777, Nova 
Scotia A, XCVII, 209; Allan's Journal, June:11, 1777, in 
Kidder, Military Operations, p. 109.
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however. On the morning of July 20, "a large Moose passed 
with great speed through /Allan’s/ camp, the Indians and 
dogs in pursuit."Allan did not reach Machias with his 
party until August 8, after traveling for nearly a month.
The British authorities were pleased with the
events on the St. John. Arthur Gould reported that they 
arrived at the mouth of the river at a fortunate time 
because Allan and others had assembled there, hoping to 
harass the borders of Nova Scotia. Gould’s forces captured 
Allan’s boat and two small schooners loaded with Indian
12 supplies and dispersed the Americans into the woods,.
Major Studholme learned that the retreating colonists had 
gone up the river and pursued them with a small force. He 
failed to intercept them, however, because the captain of 
the Vulture had no orders governing such a situation and
13 refused to act without them.
^Allan’s Journal, entries for June 11 and 19
July 6, 7, 11, 12 and 20, August 8, 1777, in Kidder, 
Military Operations, pp. 99, 109, 113-4, 116, 119, 125*  
ihe number of Indians who came to Machias with Allan is 
unknown. The journal entry for July 13 (Kidder, p. 117) 
seemed to describe a large- group. Furthermore, groups of 
Indians kept arriving in the camp as the party?neared 
Machias. From this information, it would seem that Allan 
-brought a substantial portion of the Malecite tribe back
. to Machias with him.
1 ?Letter, Gould to Arbuthnot, enclosed in letter
Arbuthnot to Germain, June 12, 1777, Nova Scotia A, XCVII, 
209-10.
^Letters, General Massey to Germain, July 12 and 
August 20, 1777, Nova Scotia A, XCVII, 246, 279-81.
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While Allan was on the St. John, the Indians and 
settlers on the upper reaches of most Maine rivers were 
alarmed by reports of a large force marching toward them 
from Canada. The first such information, which came from 
the truck house at Penobscot, disclosed that a force of 
eighty Indians with some regulars under the command of 
Monsieur Lunier was coming to destroy American settlements 
on the Kennebec, Penobscot and St. John Rivers. Alarmed, 
the settlements east of the Penobscot hoped to intercept 
this group with a message of surrender before it reached 
them. Norridgewock on the Kennebec was shaken by similar 
fears.14 The reports of a British descent through the 
northern forests added urgency to Allan’s work. If any 
portion of the tribes joined such a force, the damage to
^^letters, Joshua Brewer to the Mass, govt., 
May 27, 1777, Samuel Jordan to Mass, govt., June 7, 1777, 
petition, inhabitants of Norridgewock to General Court, 
June 8, 1777, Baxter MSS.. XIV, 115-4, 425, 110-1. 
Monsieur Lunier was supposed by the Americans to be a 
British agent on the upper Penobscot River. An elusive 
figure of questionable efficacy, he loomed large in the 
minds of men who feared British control of the Indians. 
He was never mentioned in Nova Scotian records, and his 
true role is more obscure. Ahlin was also unsuccessful 
in pinning down the man and discovered him only through 
the American sources. None of the Americans who reported 
his existence ever saw him; all gained knowledge of him 
from the Penobscots. Andrew Gilman, commander of a small 
force on the Penobscot, first learned of him while at Old 
Town and passed the word to Boston. See Ahlin, Maine 
Rubicon, pp. 106, 185*  There is no evidence, however, 
that the man, if he existed, was .a British agent; he 
could have been a French trapper who worked the upper 
Penobscot. Whatever he was, his influence over the Indians 
was small, and he evidently did not seriously hurt the 
American cause.
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Maine could be enormous.
When the British attacked, however, they came from 
the sea. On August 15, 1777, less than a week after Allan’s 
return from the St. John, a small British fleet sailed to 
Machias Harbor while he was conducting a conference with 
the Penobscot, Passamaquoddy and Malecite Indians outside 
the town. Allan and the Indians rushed to the scene of the 
fighting. The raid failed. After the battle, in his 
report to the Massachusetts Council, Allan noted his satis- . 
faction with the Indian participation .in the-combat. "None 
Deserves Greater Applause," he- wrote, "than our Indian
15friends." The officers commanding the defense have 
assured him that none "Beheaved more Gallantly, Exposing 
themselves openly to the fire of the Cannon and Small arms, 
very diff^ then what has been Generely Practised by
16Indians." Jonathan Eddy also praised the Indians. "It 
happened extremely well for us," he wrote, "that Mr Allan 
and Mr Preble had arrive here with about 40 Indians who
17 were of great service to us and assisted us greatly."
The highly praised Indian role did not involve any
'✓Report, Allan to Mass, govt., August 17, 1777, 
Baster MSS.. XV, 14.
16Ibid.
1'Report, Eddy to Mass, govt., August 17, 1777, 
Baxter MSS.. XV, 14.
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heavy fighting. The Indians mostly ran about the area of 
f
battle loosing hideous cries that intimidated the British. 
The major action in which the warriors participated took 
place on the morning of August 15, when about forty of 
them under Captain Smith, took part in an action that pre­
vented the British from moving up the river to attack the 
town. Once again, war cries and sharpshooting disconcerted
18the attackers and foiled their plans.
The Battle of Machias was among the very few mili­
tary actions in which the Americans got significant aid 
from the Eastern-Indians, and the tribes were trapped into 
helping. Conferences such- as this one in progress usually 
began with heavy rhetoric pledging undying support for the 
colonialscause. On this occasion, these words were hardly 
spoken when the sound of guns echoed upriver from Machias. 
The Indians had to fight or lose face. Once committed they 
were brave and determined fighters; they were too proud not 
to be.
This battle strengthened the ties between the 
Indians and colonists by adding the camaraderie of combat 
to the previously rather weak bond of affection. Machias 
was the first British defeat the Indians, had seen; the
^8Smith, ’’Machias in the Revolution,” pp. 682-4.
For a more complete account of the Battle of Machias, see 
Ahlin, Maine Rubicon, pp. 86-92. Unfortunately, this 
account does not give details of the Indian participation. 
Beyond the brief statement in the text, few other details 
are available.
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memories of Fort Cumberland and the St• John were replaced 
in many Indian minds by the victory at Machias, in which 
they had participated,
British and lfova Scotian reactions to the unsuccess­
ful raid on Machias were mixed. Collier, who commanded the 
attack, put the best interpretation on it in his reports to 
superiors. He said that his assault had dispersed the 
rebels around Machias, destroyed their stores and forced 
them to abandon plans for the invasion of Nova Scotia. In 
his proclamation to the people of Machias, Collier declared 
that his raid upon the town was a reprisal for raids on 
Nova Scotia and that he would burn Machias if the inhabit- 
ants of that town continued their depredations.
General Massey was not pleased with Collier and his
i
assault on Machias. Collier’s action had thoroughly alarmed
1Q̂Letter, Collier to Germain, October 11, 1777, and 
provlamation, Collier to inhabitants, of Machias, October 11, 
1777. Nova Scotia A, XCVII, 311-2, 320-5. Collier told 
Machias in his proclamation that only his mercy had pre­
vented him from burning the town. This, seemed unlikely, 
because during.-the attack, the British burned most of the 
buildings that fell into their hands and because Collier’s 
forces never got close enough to the town to put it to the 
torch. Collier’s mercy thus appeared less formidable than 
he would have had people think. After the attack on 
Machias, Collier cruised down the coast, according to his 
letter, to harass the enemy, to cut supply lines and to 
keep the militia from joining the forces opposing Burgoyne. 
If Collier really believed that the Maine militia was a 
threat to Burgoyne, he had an exaggerated idea of American 
mobility. He may, of course, simply have been seeking to 
make a good impression upon Germain.
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all eastern Maine, forcing Major; Small, who was marching on 
Machias, under Massey’s orders, to turn back at the St. 
John. Massey felt that, had he been informed of Collier’s 
plans, he could have sent along a number of his own men, 
who might have carried the day. As it was, the opportunity
onfor a surprise strike at Machias was lost.
Collier’s action alarmed Machias and the government 
in Boston. On August 12, 1777, the expedition to regain 
the St. John River was disbanded on orders from the General
04Court. All/.efforts were to be concentrated on strength­
ening Machias as the forward American base, as the colony 
went over to defense.
Once the excitement of the British attack died 
down, Allan was left to cope with the problem of keeping 
the Malecites supplied and content. From the time he left 
Aukpaque he had had doubts about bringing these Indians to • 
Machias. He reported to the government that "My coming to
22Machias was a matter more of Necessity than Inclination.” 
He feared that drunken quarrelling would be a problem and 
that the expense of his operation would greatly increase.
Letter, Massey to "My Lord," probably Germain,
September 20, 1777, Nova Scotia A. XCVII, 501-3.
^Letter, Arbuthnot to Germain, September 14, 1777,
Nova Scotia A, XCVII, 295; Ahlin, Downeast Rubicon,p. 93.
^22Aeport, Allan to Mass, govt., August 17, 1777, 
Baxter MS ., XV, 177.
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He had been forced to bring them along, he wrote, because 
they were destitute; to have left them on the St. John
2’5 would have been to deliver them into British hands.
The presence of these new dependents greatly in­
creased Allan’s supply problems. From the time they 
arrived in Machias, he had to furnish them with nearly all 
their provisions. He also tried to find them work as 
messengers, fearing that ’’otherwise they will certainly go 
of/fj."24 The fiction of trade now had been dropped, and 
Allan got very little in return for the goods he dispensed. 
Failure of the supply line from Boston would almost cer­
tainly have led to a mass defection of Indians, and the 
British navy was harassing the coast in an attempt to break 
that supply line. Allan assured the government that he was 
using all possible economy, but provisions were being used 
at an alarming rate. The Indians, however, had abandoned 
their homes and corn fields on the St. John to serve the 
American cause, and Allan had to supply them as fully as
. 23Ibld. 24Ibid.
25Ibid; Allan’s Journal, weekly entries describing 
dispensation of provisions to Indians, in Kidder, Military 
Operations, pp. 124-5, 130-1, 134, 136, 138, 140-2, 145, 
147, 148-50, 153-4, 156, 158-60; letter, Collier to Germain, 
October 11, 1777, Nova Scotia A, XCVII, 512.
25possible.
The Indians were homesick as well as destitute.
They wanted to return to the St. John.and expecteda colo­
nial army to help them. As the summer of 1777 wore on, *25
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Allan worried about the lack of such an army and had
26 increasing difficulty making excuses to the tribe. As 
seen above, Massachusetts abandoned all preparations to 
assault the St. John after the British raid on Machias.
The presence on the St. John of Michael Francklin, 
the Nova Scotian Superintendent of Indian Affairs, made it 
important for Allan to retain the confidence and goodwill 
of the Malecites at Machias. Had they returned to their 
homes, they would have been under strong British influence. 
The portion of the tribe on the St. John was unlikely; to 
attack the Americans while another part of the tribe under 
their head chief, Ambrose, was encamped at Machias. 
Francklin*s  efforts on the river were great, but he had 
little success because of the schism in the tribe. Stephen 
Smith, the truck master at Machias, wrote that Francklin 
was ’’exerting himself to the utmost, in order to bring 
over all the Indians he can meet with, to a sense of what
27 he calls their duty, but with little success.”
Francklin was more successful among the Micmacs. 
On August 18, 1777, Allan wrote the government that he had 
hoped "to have been among the Micmacs" by that time. The 
British government was attempting to win them over, and
Report, Allan to Mass, govt., August 18, 1777, 
Baxter MSS., XV, 177; Allan’s Journal, August 23, 1777, 
In Kidder, Military Operations, p. 131 •
27’Letter, Stephen Smith to Mass. Council, July 31,
1777, Baxter MSS., XV, 3*
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"every shop in Halifax is open for them to Demand as they
28please" If no one opposed him, Francklin would likely 
gain the Micmacs to his side, but Allan’s influence among 
the Micmacs was shaky, due to their nearness to British
t I
power and distance from Allan’s base at Machias.
Francklin’s activities and the British military 
operations downeast disturbed the General Court, and they 
raised a new force of several hundred men to be stationed 
at Machias. The General Court also felt that it would 
"greatly promote the Service of the United American. States 
to have the same person Commander of the troops to be .
co stationed at Machias, that is appointed over the Indians. 
The General Court, realizing the importance of Allan’s work 
among the Indians, also appointed a lieutenant colonel to
I
carry on the details of command. Allan was to be a roving 
commander, and the lieutenant colonel was to obey "such 
orders as Z~he7 shall from time to time Receive from Col. 
Allan."30
The remainder of 1777 passed without any major 
alarms downeast. Francklin*  s efforts tended to decrease
28Report, Allan to Mass, govt., September 22, 1777, 
Baxter MSS.. XV, 225.
29Report of a Committee of the Mass. General Court, 
September 16, 1777, resolves of Mass, govt., September 17 
and 19, 1777, Baxter MSS.. XV, 214-8.
3°It>id.. p. 217-8.
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in winter, and the British authorities were still not 
making a determined Indian effort on the scale and scope 
of Mr. Allan’s enterprise. By the end of 1777, both sides 
were so busy heeding imagined threats that neither was en- 
gaged in any offense.
Allan still had many of the Indians from the St. 
John with him and remained confident of their devotion to 
the American cause. The Micmacs had sent him tokens of 
friendship and promised to make no agreement with the 
British before they met him. Allan was awaiting Indian
31delegates from Nova Scotia for a conference.
The Penobscots were troublesome. They were often 
in Machias ’’making heavy Complaint ■ of Impositions & Extor- 
sions.”< The supposed British agent on. the upper Penob- 
scot, Lunier, was trying to turn them from their loyalty 
to Massachusetts and possibly was gaining intelligence 
from them, according to Allan’s reports. Allan legally 
could not deal with that tribe; neither the Continental 
Congress nor the Massachusetts General Court had given him 
authority in regard to them. He had received reports of 
embezzlement at the Penobscot truck house and recommended 
art.investigation. Whether or not Lowder, the truck master, 
was guilty of peculation, Allan felt that he was overly
. Report, Allan to Mass, govt., September 22, 1777# 
Baxter MSS., XV, 223.
32Ibid.
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concerned with profit and was sacrificing influence over 
the tribe to get it. 22
Allan had intelligence problems with the Passama-
quoddies as well as with the Penobscots. That tribe made 
frequent trips to Machias and had many contacts with 
.British vessels along the coast. Information flowed both 
ways through them. Allan felt that the colonial cause 
could.not bear such an exchange. He forbade the Passama- 
quoddies to come to Machias unless they brought their 
families and took up residence. All others would be 
forcibly detained. When Allan wanted to meet the tribe, 
he went to the St. Croix.
As the season progressed, Allan’s problems with
the Indians increased. Their "fluctuating turn of mind” 
and susceptibility to liquor kept them aroused and disor­
derly most of the time, and Allan could admit only a few 
to town. During the late summer and fall of Mil, morale 
was unsteady. Allan tried to keep the men busy by sending 
them on hunts to help defray his enormous expenses for 
maintaining them. In September, their morale was good; 
"they /were7 much elated by the News and the Notice taken
55ibid.; report, Allan to Mass. Board of War,
September 25, 1777, Baxter MSS., XV, 229-31•
^-<Report, Allan to Mass, govt., October 12, 1777.
Baxter MSS., XV, 243.
286-7
to Mass, govt., Baxter MSS., XV.
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36of them.” The ’’news” and ’’notice” was a letter from the 
Massachusetts Council congratulating them for their part 
in the Battle of Machias, reporting new American victories,
37 and promising new shipments of goods for them. The 
promise of more supplies was particularly heartening, 
because shortages of goods had been a major cause of 
Indian dissatisfaction.^ By November, however, old prob­
lems had reappeared, and Allan reported that it was beyond 
his power “to keep my Indian Soldiers in Such Regular order
39 as I would chuse." As winter set in, inactivity bred 
boredom, and drunkenness increased.
Allan’s problems with his Indian soldiers sprang 
partially from an attempt by the government to put the 
Indians under military discipline. Allan had been author­
ized to nomraiasion three captains and six lieutenants among 
the Indians. He had given out some of the commissions, 
mostly to natural tribal leaders. Officers, however, did 
not make a tribe into a regiment, and military discipline 
did not develop. The officers refused to take extra pay,
^Report, Allan to Mass, govt., October 12, 1777, 
Baxter MSS.. XV, 243.
•^Letter, Mass. Council to Indians at Machias, 
September 15, 1777, Baxter MSS.. XV, 205.
^Letter, Colonel Benjamin Poster to Mass. Council, 
August 27, 1777, Baxter; MSS., XV, 25-6.
^Letter, Allan to Mass, govt., November 18, 1777, 
Baxter MSS.. XV, 286-7.
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and the money was divided among the privates. The basic 
equality of Indian society was not to be so easily over-
40come.
Allan's problems with the Indians sprang from other 
sources as well. In frontier Maine, cheating the Indians 
was an old and honored practice*  Stephen Smith, truck 
master at Machias, warned the government about this. 
“Avaricious persons,” he wrote, ”gave the Indians liquor, 
got them intoxicated and cheated them of their furs,” thus 
depriving the state of revenue.The General Court real­
ized that good will as well as money was at . stake and 
passed a law forbidding the practice. The new law forbade 
any person to ’’give, sell, Truck, Barter or Exchange,” 
anything an Indian had in his possession for ’’strong beer,
J Q cyder, wine, rum, brandy, or any other strong liquor.”^ 
Penalties were a forty shilling fine or two months in jail. 
Allan duly proclaimed the new law, but enforcement was 
nearly impossible.
By the end of 1777, Allan’s relationship with the 
Continental and Massachusetts authorities had settled into
^Resolve of Mass, govt., September 16, 1777, 
report, Allan to Mass, govt., November 18, 1777. Baxter 
MSS.. XV, 213, 206-7.
(Skemorial, Stephen Smith to Mass, govt., 
June 7, 1777, Baxter MSS.. XV, 109.
^Resolve of Mass, govt., June 21, 1777, Baxter (
MSS.. XV, 131-2.
97
place. He was Continental Indian agent in wastern Maine 
and Nova Scotia working through the Massachusetts govern­
ment. His funds came from Boston, but Massachusetts ex­
pected to be repaid by Congress after the war. He reported 
infrequently to Congress, expecting Massachusetts officials 
to keep them informed. The Continental authorities, who 
felt that Massachusetts had the experience and resources
I
to handle any problems with the Indians, seldom interfered. 
Allan, conscious of his Continental authority, used the 
term ”United States” in several ventures actually bank-
43 rolled by Massachusetts.
In 1777, the use of trade and supply to hold Indi­
an allegiance became well established. The Americans had 
made an early start in the trade but were hampered by 
lengthy supply lines and shortages of goods. The British 
and Nova Scotian authorities had somewhat better sources of 
trade items and were more inclined to give supplies freely 
to the Indians; the Americans took furs in return. During 
the early part of the war the British traded from ships 
along the coast, but these appeared irregularly, forcing 
the Indians to depend upon the American truck houses. Sup­
ply problems slowly made the truck houses inadequate, how­
ever, and British progress into the area lessened Indian 
dependence upon them.
^■^Ahlin, Maine Rubicon, pp. 108-9; Baxter MSS..
XV. 195.
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The American attitude toward Indian trade changed 
as the war progressed. In 1775, the Massachusetts govern­
ment sought trade with the Indians to keep them away from 
British influences. . Later, the government lowered the
I
prices on their goods to hold Indian friendship. By 1777, 
the, Americans felt they were merely buying Indian goodwill, 
although the fiction of trade was maintained in some areas. 
Allan was giving provisions to the Malecites at Machias on 
the pretext that they were soldiers. Letters from downeast 
reflected the new American attitude. One June 6, 1777, 
Francis Shaw, an officer at Machias, wrote that he had no 
doubt that Indian friendship "must be dearly bought” and
4-4depended upon well-stocked truck houses. Indian behavior 
reinforced the American view. Colonel Benjamin Foster 
wrote to the Council on August . 27, Mil that ’’the Indians 
among us appear dejected and apprehend they shall be 
obliged to join the enemy for support.” In other words, 
the Indians*  hearts might be for the Americans, but they 
would join the British if colonial support and supplies 
were lacking.
The shortages in eastern Maine made the Indian 
attitude seem all.the more mercenary to the colonists.
^Massachusetts, House of Representatives, Journal, 
p. 185; Minutes of the Watertown Conference, Baxter MSS., 
XXIV, 175; letter, Shaw to Mass, govt., XIV, 424.
45Baxter MSS.. XV, 25-6.
99
Machias was a lumbering center before the war, importing 
most of its supplies from the west* British naval activity- 
endangered this supply line, and needs of military re­
inforcements and Indians increased the demand for supplies. 
The result was constant shortage. The people of Machias 
made great sacrifices for the American cause; the Indians 
threatened to join the British if they were not constantly 
supplied. Machias men could hardly be blamed for belittling
46* For reports on shortages in Machias, see letters 
from Stephen Smith, truck master, to Mass, govt., July 4, 
and August 28, 1777, also Mass. Council order, October 10, 
1777, Baxter MSS*. XV, 154-5, 15, 234-5. The Indians re­
quired substantial quantities of goods. On June 21, 1777, 
the government ordered the following to be sent to Machias: 
200 gallons of rum, 200 bushels of corn, 60 bushels of salt,
200 gallons of molasses, 6 barrels of pork, 200 pounds of
hog fat, 1,000 yards of various cloths, 200 pounds sugar,
one cask of wine, 100 pounds of powder, 400 pounds of balls,
one cask of raisins, 12,000 wampum, 1,000 tobacco pipes and 
varying quantities of hats, hatchets, knives, ribbons bind­
ing, tin kettles, steel beads and coarse lace thread. See 
Baxter MSS., XV, 130-1.
^Proclamation, Allan to Machias, September 8, 1777, 
report, Allan to Mass. Board of War, September 25, 1777, 
Baxter MSS.. XV, 195, 231.
46Indian devotion to the American cause.
The shortages in Machias created another problem 
for Allan. He discovered that the Indians were selling theJ
provisions they obtained at the truck house to the settlers. 
They then returned to the truck house and demanded more 
goods. With his supply problems, Allan could not provide
47them with essentials.
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The Nova Scotians shared Allan’s problems in com­
mercial relations with the Indians*  Neither side was able 
to furnish all the materials the Indians wanted, and 
neither side was able to control the Indians through trade 
policy as long as alternative sources of supply existed. 
As long as the Indians could trade with both sides, they 
abandoned neither.
The year of 1777 saw the substantial growth of 
British power in eastern Maine and Nova Scotia. Operating 
out of Halifax, the British secured the. disputed territory
i
around the St. John River and gained a foothold from which 
they could implement an Indian policy. The American effort 
under John Allan remained strong but was encountering 
difficulties as British power grew. By the end of 1777, 
the British had moved to terminate their weakness and were 
preparing to take the offensive in eastern Maine and 
adjacent parts of Nova Scotia.
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1 Chapter 4
STALEMATE: 1778
The period 1778 and 1779 saw a basic shift of 
power in Maine and Nova Scotia. The British seizure and 
retention of Castine against a Massachusetts counterattack 
in 1779 put the Americans on the defensive in eastern Maine. 
John Allen and his compatriots were now operating from a 
position of weakness, and all their old problems of supply 
and lack of troops grew worse. Surprisingly, however, 
their position in the struggle for Indian support did not
I
seriously deteriorate, and the American alliance with 
France in 1778 awakened old Indian loyalties. The Americans 
were able to use these loyalties to counter a well-planned 
and better supplied British drive for Indian allegiance. 
American control did slip as Michael Francklin moved among 
the Nova Scotian tribes, but neither side could gain com- • 
plete dominance among the Indians.
The passage of several years of fighting had not 
altered strategic considerations in Nova Scotia and eastern 
Maine. The Indians remained an important factor in the 
situation, and the Battle of Machias showed that they would 
fight. Nova Scotia, although stronger than she had been at 
the opening of the war, distrusted the tribes, who seemed 
attached to the Americans and capable of doing much damage 
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in Nova Scotia. The alliance between the rebels and 
France, established in.1778, made the situation more vola­
tile because of Indian devotion to the French. The Ameri­
cans under Allan also were apprehensive. Eastern Maine 
was very weak, and only the Indians seemed able to defend 
it. Colonel Allan was plagued with shortages and knew 
that he could lose their support very quickly. Both Maine 
and Nova Scotia felt threatened by the Indians, therefore, 
and strove desperately for the friendship of the tribes.
The relative strengths of the two sides were re­
flected in the communications they were having with their 
superiors. On the St.- John River, Major Studholme felt 
quite secure in his well-entrenched British fortification. 
At the same time, Machias dreaded an attack from Nova 
Scotia. On January 24, 1778, the Machias Committee of 
Safety wrote the Massachusetts Executive Council that "our 
enemies mean to deprive us of every means of getting our 
lively hood in any Quietness^ and if possible make, them*--
2 selves masters of this part of the Country."
The government of Massachusetts was concerned 
about the weakness of eastern Maine and sought to protect 
it from the British. A resolution passed on March 13J778 
stated that the retention of Indian friendship to secure
Letter, General Massey to Germain, March 13, 1778, 
Nova Scotia A. XCVIII, 48.
^Baxter MS3.. XV, 335. ^Baxter MSS., XV, 363-5. 
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the very valuable eastern part of the state was of "the
3utmost importance.” After this renewed committment to 
defend eastern Maine, in April of 1778 the people of 
Machias petitioned the General Court to make Machias the 
"frontier,” the most advanced outpost of the American 
cause. The government agreed that Machias was the best 
place on the coast to make a stand, and the.town unoffi-
4 cially became the colony’s first line of defense.
This support from Boston notwithstanding, Colonel 
John Allan was in the midst of a difficult.period at the 
beginning of 1778. He was short of men, money and supplies. 
The British were endangering his communications with 
Boston, and the Indians were complaining as they usually 
did when supplies were short. A British, truck house on the 
St. John was complicating his life by making the Indians 
even more difficult.
The new year had opened on an auspicious note for 
Allan in terms of money. On January 2, he was granted 
2300 by the government. Ten days later, however, he asked 
for 2400 more to meet unexpected demands. Even this was 
not enough for his work, and Allan raised money on his own 
credit. Finally in April, the government repaid 2237 that 
Allan had borrowed and granted him 21.200 for his work,
^Baxter MSS., XV, 363-5.
^Baxter MSS.. XVI (1910), 5-7.
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5ending his financial plight for a time.
Allan was short of supplies as well as of money.
Even when he had money available, he could not always get 
what he needed. Enemy activity and unsettled conditions 
had almost halted farming downeast, and. the British navy 
was harassing shipments along the coast. Such a weakened 
supply system could not fill the needs of Allan1s estab­
lishment. A government estimate of Allan’s requirements 
for three hundred men for six months show the enormity of 
the task. This estimate called for 81,000 pounds of beef, 
54,000 pounds of flour and bread, 565 bushels of peas, 
5,900 pounds of rice, 618 pounds of soap, 50 pounds of 
candles plus war supplies such as ammunition.& Excluding 
the war supplies, this was over 160,000 pounds of rather 
bulky material. Other supplies for the Indians’ would have 
increased the tonnage. Allan’s difficulties in getting 
this material from Boston through, the British patrols to 
Machias on small ships were immense, and he was often
^Resolves, Mass, govt., January 2 and April 17»1778, 
petitions, Stephen and Ralph Cross to Mass, govt., and 
James Avery to Mass, govt., Baxter MSS», XV, 522. 524. 419- 
20, 589-90.
^Letters, Machias Committee of Safety to Mass, govt., 
January 24, 1778, and Stephen Smith to Mass, govt., report 
of a committee of the General Court, Baxter MSS., XV, 554-5, 
540, 584.
I 
unsuccessful.
The shortages of supplies greatly hampered operation *
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of the truck house, now primarily a supply depot for the 
Indians. The older commercial role was much reduced. 
Allan determined what the-Indians were ”in want of & from
7 time to time Orders Such Things from the Truck House.” 
The Indians could also trade their furs for supplies and 
thus got a considerable amount of credit for additional 
provisions. Indians around Machias came in weekly for 
rations at the beginning of the year. Truck master Smith 
praised Allan for his frugality but still had to borrow
Q 
supplies to meet the needs of the Indians.
The limited provisions at Machias had to be-used 
for the soldiers as well as for the Indians. The great 
distress among these men forced Allan to take this step. 
Many of them did not receive their full rations, and in 
April, a number of officers at-Machias petitioned the gov­
ernment for a monetary payment for rations not given.
9Some men had more than 150 rations due them.
^Letter, Stephen Smith to Mass, govt., January 24, 
1778, Baxter MSS.. XV. 536,.
o
Allan’s journal, the source of information regard­
ing weekly supplies for the Indians around Machias, was not 
kept after January of 1778. There is no reason, however, 
to suppose that the practice was discontinued. See Allan’s 
journal for January 5 and 10, 1778, in Kidder, Military 
Operations, pp. 161-2; letter, Machias Committee of Safety, 
to Mass. govt., January 24, 1778, Baxter MSS.. XV, 536-8.
^Letter, Stephen Smith to Mass, govt., and an 
account of rations due, April 15, 1778, Baxter MSS.. XV. 
533, 412-15.
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Allan found it difficult to solve his supply prob­
lems by mail, and in late spring he sought an agent in
10Boston, He evidently felt that the bureaucracy was. not 
paying sufficient attention to his requests.by letter; a 
man on the spot could get some action by harassment of . 
appropriate officials, speeding the shipment of supplies. 
No agent was permanently appointed, however.
Allan*  s force at Machias in the late winter and 
spring of 1778 was not large, although the supply problems 
would seem to indicate otherwise. Allan, who had the sup­
port and approval of the Machias authorities, commanded a 
total of 151 men on April 5, 1778.■ Earlier in the year 
he had commanded about seventy Indians, but the numbers 
dropped as hunting seasons approached. A fort was under 
construction in the area but was not complete. The 
Machias Committee of Safety had requested Continental 
troops to protect the area but did not get them. Massa­
chusetts authorities instead authorized the raising of one
I
hundred troops and one hundred Indians. The extra one
^Petition to Mass, govt., James Avery on behalf 
of Allan, May 19, 1778, Baxter MSS.. XVI, 9
^The troops under Allan were one captain, three 
lieutenants with the rank of captain, one first lieutenant, 
one second lieutenant, one commissary, two Indian chiefs, 
one conductor, one sergeant, one corporal, 153 privates, 
two fifes and drums and four couriers. See letter, Machias 
Committee of Safety to Mass, govt., January 24, 1778, and 
return of troops at Machias, April 4, 1778, Baxter MSS., 
XV, 536, 406. ' 
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hundred, men were not raised, however, due to the severe 
economic depression under whidh most of Maine was
12 laboring.
By May, the rising expense of the truck house at 
Machias was too much for Massachusetts, and her government 
decided that henceforth the cost was to be paid by the 
United States. Congress was notified, and all Allan*s  
correspondence and accounts were sent to them withj the hope
13 that they would provide for future supply.
Conditions among the Indians on the Penobscot River 
were worse than those at Machias. The Massachusetts govern­
ment liquidated its Indian operation there in January of 
1778. The General Court resolved that there was no need for 
a truck house on the river and later ordered Colonel Lowder, 
the truck master, to repay the £400 he had been given for 
supplies. The guard force on the river under Andrew Gilman 
was also discharged, although Gilman was made government 
agent and interpreter among the Penobscot tribe. Except 
for one agent-spy, the whole Indian apparatus.at Penobscot
12Letter, Machias Committee of Safety to Mass, govt., 
January 24, 1778, resolve of Mass, govt., March 13, 1778, 
letter, George Stillman to Mass, govt., August 8, 1778, 
Baxter MSS.. XV, 335-8, 351-2, XVI, 46.
^Resolve of Mass, govt., April 17> 1778, Baxter MSS.. 
XV, 420-1.
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was thus ended.14
By April, the situation, on the river had deterio­
rated seriously. Josiah Brewer wrote Colonel Lowder on 
April 12 that less than three weeks supply of corn remained 
and that the Indians were approaching desperation. No one 
could predict what they might do. The settlers were in 
similar straits. They had, been forced to eat their seed
15 potatoes, and had none for planting.
The government. in Boston could not ignore this 
situation. They re-opened their Indian trade and sent 
Supplies to the Penobscot, combining for the first time 
under Allan’s command the operations there and at Machias. 
The government also sent 150 bushels of corn to keep the
16Indians going until spring.
Aside from the ever present problems of supply, the 
early months of 1778 were relatively quiet for Allan and 
the Americans. In January, he commissioned a number of 
Indians to establish a post at Passamac[uoddy. The offi­
cers of the force were chosen at a conference on January 5» 
The purpose of the new post was to cut off the communi­
cation and trade with Nova Scotia. The post was to seize 
April 17, 1778, order
Mass• govt•, 
of the Mass.
January 22, March 9, and 
Executive Council,
April 27, 1778, Baxter MSS.. XV, 535-4, 380, 587, 418-9,426.
Vfoaxter MSS.. XV, 411-2. 
v^Aesolves of Mass, govt., 
Baxter MSS.. XV, 409, 425*
April 9 and 25, 1778,
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all British vessels and vessels with both British and
17American papers.
The selling of liquor to the Indians continued to 
be a problem, and the government increased the penalty to
1 a fine of £50 or twelve months imprisonment. Allan had 
not been able to enforce the lesser punishment, however, 
and the stiffer penalties caused little change.
In May,- discontent among the Penobscots all but 
cancelled the effect of the new alliance with France. 
Several Penobscots arrived in Allan’s camp and announced 
that the Generals Gates and Lafayette wanted to meet some 
of the Passamaquoddies. A conference was held on May 16 
with chiefs Ambrose St. Aubin and Pierre Toma in attend­
ance. The Penobscots spoke as if the Indians were to go 
and put themselves under the direct command of the French. 
Ambrose and Pierre opposed such a move but were outnum­
bered. Allan finally consented although he had a feeling
19 that something was wrong.
Allan’s hunch proved to be right. In the evening 
of the fourteenth of May, he learned from several Indians 
that the Penobscots were unhappy with him. They thought
^Allan’s Journal, entries for January 5 and 5, 
1778, in Kidder, Military Operations, pp. 161-2.
1SBesolve of Mass, govt., April 17, 1778, Baxter 
MSS., XV, 421.
(JJ^leport, Allan to Mass, govt., May 22, 1778, V 
Baxter MSS.. XVI, 12-5.
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he was diverting their supplies to Machias for his own use. 
They did not understand that the lack of supplies for them 
had been the result of the closing of the Penobscot truck 
house by the government. Some of them had, therefore, 
decided to return to their old friends, the French, who 
were once more in the country and wanted the Passamaquod-
20dies and Malecites to go with them.
Armed with, this knowledge and aided by an improved 
state of mind among the Penobscots, Allan was able to 
dissuade the Indians from going en masse. He promised to 
visit the Penobscots as soon as possible to help with their 
problems and proposed a compromise in the matter of meeting 
the French. Two Indians would go to Boston to meet French 
officers and welcome their old allies. Two other Indians 
would go to Canada by way of the St. John River to spread 
the news of the new French-American alliance and find out 
how many men in the Canadian tribes would now turn out to 
fight the British. The Indians also hoped that the mission
21 to Boston might at last,result in the procuring of a priest.
With this result, the. conference broke up amicably, had 
Allan thus managed to repair a serious breach between him­
self and the Penobscot tribe.
Despite the seeming success of the conference,
Allan was uneasy. Many Tories were coming into the area
20Ibid. 21 Ibid.. pp. 13-5.
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around Passamaquoddy, and he was afraid of the effect of 
this on the Indians. He.also worried about the compara­
tively well-stocked British truck house on the St. John
22and its impact on his fickle "sauvages."
While .Allan struggled with many problems during 
early 1778, a much calmer attitude prevailed among the 
British and colonial authorities in Nova Scotia. General 
Massey, commander of the forces in the colony, had a bad 
moment or two in January when he received the preposterous 
news that Colonel Allan had 800 men under his command at 
Machias. This Report stirred the colony to action, however, 
and Major Studholme was sent io the mouth of the St. John 
with a pre«Rframed blockhouse and a force to hold the river. 
By March 15, Massey reported to the Secretary of State, 
Lord Germain, that Studholme was well-entrenched and
23secure.
The British authorities in North America were now 
mounting a concerted effort to hold Indian allegiances. 
Governor Carleton of Canada reported to Lieutenant Governor 
Arbuthnot of Nova Scotia that some of the St. John and 
Micmac Indians had been to Canada the previous summer. 
They were treated well and directed to apply to the Nova 
Scotian authorities for their needs. Carleton also felt
22Ibid., pp. 14-5.
v ^Letters, Massey to Germain, January 25 and
March 13, 1778, Nova Scotia A. XCVIII, .35-6, 48. 
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that the Canadian Indians would have a good effect in 
bringing ’’their Brethren below to a proper sense of their 
Duty*.'  Carleton’s actions were effective simply because 
he was in Quebec, the former center of the Indians*  old 
French allies.
The Nova Scotian authorities were also taking steps 
to procure a priest. The Indians had been asking for one 
since the conflict opened. Only the British had a supply 
of French priests available, but were reluctant to promote 
Catholicism among the Indians. The provincial authorities 
were apprehensive about the reaction such a move would 
provoke in London and made every attempt to put it in the 
most favorable light, stressing the American effort to win 
the Indians and Allan*  success in removing the Malecites 
from the St. John to Machias. A priest among the Indians 
would “prevent any further mischief,” according to Lieu-
25 tenant Governor Arbuthnot.
Once the authorities made the decision, obtaining 
a priest was no problem. Arbuthnot sent a letter to 
Carleton at Quebec in late December of 1777 asking the 
governor to obtain permission from the Bishop for one Father 
Bourg to come to Nova Scotia to serve the Indians. The 
priest was sent quickly to Halifax with Carleton’s
^Letter, February 25,1778, Nova Scotia A, XCVIII, 
59-60.
^Letter, Arbuthnot to Germain, April 8, 1778,
Nova Scotia A, XCVIII, 56-7.
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recommendations.^
The Nova Scotians wasted no time in taking advan­
tage of their new priest. Even before Bourg arrived, Major 
Studholme at Port Howe was inviting the Indians to come to 
the fort, get supplies and meet with the priest who was
27expected soon.
When war with France threatened, the British author­
ities were particularly anxious to get a priest. Arbuthnot 
wrote Germain on May 17, 1778 that "In the case of War witlr 
France, ... this Province has every Mischief and Hostility1
28to apprehend from the Indians and French Acadians.” 
Arbuthnot further reported that the Indians had been under 
arms against the British at Fort Cumberland and on the St. 
John River, and he expected France to attempt to stir them
29 up again in these areas.
Back in Machias, summer and the priest from Quebec 
brought more problems for Allan than the French-American 
alliance did for Francklin. The acute lack of supplies 
and men, inflation and heavy British sea power were
26ibid.; letter, Carleton to Arbuthnot, February 25, 
1778, Nova Scotia A, 58-9.
^Letter, Allan to Mass, govt., May 22, 1778, 
Baxter MSS., XVI, 13-4.
28Nova Scotia A, XCVIII, 76. ■
29Ibid.
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critical in eastern Maine. Allan went into summer in an 
increasing desperation that belied the outward calm 
affected by the Americans in both Boston and Maine.
Word of the new pact with Prance reached Allan 
before May 22, 1778, and he and the Boston authorities 
soon took advantage of the effect of the new alliance upon 
the Indians. The Council sent a letter to the Malecite 
tribe on June 11 reminding them that their "Bather the 
French King" had taken ’’the United States by the hand,”
30 and made their enemies his own.
The French alliance, however, did not save Allan 
from severe problems during the summer. The American 
Superintendant of Indian affairs, who had 106 Indians in 
service on July 31, 1778, still, had tremendous supply 
problems. On August 4, he wrote an almost hysterical let­
ter to the government explaining his problems and seeking 
aid. The goods he had ordered had not arrived, and those 
on hand would last no more than five weeks. Indians 
flocked into Machias with many women and children, and none 
could be refused without angering them all. There was so 
much coming and going that Allan could never be sure just 
whom he was supporting, and the Indians were careless of 
the supplies they were given. They spent much time "in
^Letter enclosed in letter from Lieutenant 
Governor Hughes of Nova Scotia to Germhin, January 16, 
1779, Nova Scotia A, XCIX, 22r4.
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Common recreation Tearing Leggins, Coats Blankets, &
31Shirts, in Pieces.” Many of the goods were poor and 
wore out quickly. If the Indians were the least bit in ' 
want, their clamor was tremendous, and Allan’s standing
32among them fell because they blamed him personally.*̂
Allan had ordered supplies to remedy the situation 
and had tried to keep expenses down by giving the Indians 
far less than the French had formerly given, but the gov­
ernment sent him only one-third of the provisions necessary 
to do even this. The government had further ordered him to 
keep no more than one hundred Indians under arms. To do so, 
however, Allan had to support four hundred Indians because 
the families of those in service lived at Machias. These 
families gave their rations, to others who were not being 
supplied and then demanded more from Allan and the truck 
house. The extra was charged to their accounts, but a 
reminder to them of their debts resulted in “a Speedy 
departure," making the debt uncollectable.
In the absence of supplies, Allan was forced to 
hold the Indians by playing upon their emotions. Once he
53Ibid.. pp. 50-2
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gained their trust, they confided in him and took every­
thing he said seriously. He was able to adjust his allo­
cation of the meager provisions accordingly; if they were 
in a bad mood, he gave them more than when they were in a 
good mood. Unfortunately, under this system, the Indians 
got more than their share of what came down to Machias, but 
Allan feared that otherwise he would lose them.
Allan now had. secured another agent to try to expe­
dite matters. He notified the Council that Francis Shaw,Sr. 
was to attempt to handle his business in Boston. All Allan 
himself could do, however, was to threaten the government 
with disaster should his needs not be met. He begged that 
the necessary supplies be speeded to him to “prevent those 
fatal Consequences which may happen in this part of the 
United States of America if Omitted.
Allan was aware of the peculiar problem of infla­
tion in the securing of supplies for the Indians. He told 
the government that he realized how much prices had risen 
and that it was not for him to determine how the needed 
articles were purchased. He noted, however, that some 
articles were priced at 180% over the cost in sterling, a
^^Under this system, certain goods were more 
important than others. Allan was hindered, for example,*  
by a lack of hats among the trade goods from Boston. He 
was forced to take hats from his friends and give them to 
the Indians. Hats were a highly prestigious possession 
among the Indians.
■Report, Allan to Mass, govt., August 4> 1778,
Baxter MSS., XVI, 52-4.
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fact that "must make every honest Inclined person Shudder
36 who has management of Public business. V-' Allan tactfully 
suggested that he might buy goods to great advantage in- 
Nova Scotia. Such goods would be much cheaper and of much 
better quality than the merchandise usually sent from 
Boston.
In addition to problems of supply, Allan had to 
deal with an active opponent. In the summer of 1778, he 
received rumors of a new British push for Indian support 
along with an attack on eastern Maine. Allan, who got this 
news through family connections in Nova Scotia, kept it to
38 himself but began to take defensive steps. '
The most important of these steps was an Indian 
conference at Passamaquoddy at which Allan planned to 
gather the Indians and prepare them for war. He met with 
some Indians there during.the first week of July and gave 
them provisions and a pep talk. He then had several 
smaller meetings with various groups throughout the month. 
The Micmacs sent in a pledge of loyalty with the proviso 
that they could not go to war immediately, but they prom­
ised to act when called at a later time. Receiving infor­
mation of British activity along the coast, Allan ordered
56Ibid.. p. 49
3‘Ibid. The government did not accept his 
suggestion.
38RepOrt, Allan to Mass, govt., August 9, 1778, 
Baxter MSS.. XVI, 60-1.
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all the Indians to Machias, where on the thirtieth of July 
a general conference was held with Indians present from all 
tribes in eastern Maine and Nova Scotia. Allan demanded 
that the tribes get ready to fight, and they promised to do 
so. A ’.’festival” concluded the conference.
By now many of the Malecites were coming into 
Machias in response to Allan’s orders that they cease all 
contact with the British in preparation for war. With 
other Indians in the area, they were thoroughly aroused by 
the French alliance and called for action. They had seized 
a British vessel out of Nova Scotia and sought further 
instructions. They wanted to attack Fort Howe on the St. 
John, but Allan did not have the men or the supplies to 
mount such a campaign, much to his regret.
The St. John tribe was not to be denied, however, 
and Allan finally sent them to the area around the mouth of 
the river to harass the British garrison and destroy their 
provisions. The Indians were not to harm settlers. Allan 
felt this a good move. It was not expensive but gave the 
Indians a sense of participation in the American cause.
The Indian force proceeded to the St. John River 
and ordered the garrison to leave or be killed. They were
^Ibid.. pp. 63-5*  4Qibjd.. pp. 65-7*
41 Report, Allan to Mass, govt., August 17, 1778,
Baxter MSS.. XVI, 71-2.
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Americans, the Indians said, and the King of England never 
had any rights in their lands. They now knew that the 
American cause was just because the King of France sup- • 
ported it.in spite of these brave words, the Indian 
force did not seriously harm the British.
While Allan was sending the Indians off to harass 
Fort Howe, Nova Scotia was consolidating her position 
and preparing an offensive of her own. The first item on 
her agenda was to secure financing for the priest among 
the Indians. The colony had previously been allowed money 
for such a purpose from Britain, but this money had ceased 
in 1773*  When the province took Father Bourg into its 
service, it found it necessary to pay him from the treas­
ury. The government now asked the British government to
45 re-instate the priest’s allowance and assume the burden.
Now that Francklin had the assistance of a priest, 
he decided that the time had come for a major effort among 
the Indians. He accordingly sent a message to Pierre Toma 
and other Indians asking them to come to Fort Howe for a 
conference. In spite of efforts by Allan to keep them
^^Letter, Indian forces to British officers at
. Fort Howe, drawn up at Machias on August 12, approved by 
Indians at Aukpaque on August 18, 1778, Baxter MSS..XVI, 
74-5.
^Letter, Hughes to Germain, August 29, 1778,
Nova Scotia A, XCVIII. 151-2; resolve of Nova Scotia
Countil, August 21, 1778, Nova Scotia B, XVII, 143. 
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away, a large number gathered for the meeting with the Nova
44. 'Scotia representatives.
Francklin, Major Studholme, Father Bourg and several 
other Nova Scotian officials met the Indians at Menaguashe 
near Fort Howe on September 13, 1778 for a week of confer­
ences. The Indians in attendance represented both the 
Malecite and Micmac tribes. The final treaty bound the 
British to construct a truck house at the falls of the St. 
John, in return for which the Indians took an oath of alle­
giance to the King, turning over to Francklin the presents 
they had received from General Washington and a copy of the
45 treaty with Massachusetts signed at Watertown in 1776.
The Nova Scotian authorities were very pleased and 
relieved when this treaty was concluded. Lieutenant Gover­
nor Hughes wrote Lord Germain that:
we were really fortunate in this business, for these 
savages had actually sent in a formal Declaration of 
War to Major Studholme, and returned the British flag to him at Ft. Howe.4
Maine Rubicon, p. 116.
45ibid.; letter, Hughes to Germain, October 12, 
1778, Nova Scotia A. XCVIII, 180-3.
^Letter, October 12, 1778, Nova Scotia A, XCVIII, 
180-3. The declaration of war was the letier the Indians 
had drawn up in Machias on August 12, 1778, and the Indians 
who sent it in were those that Allan sent from Machias to 
harass Fort Howe.
• \
Allan, of course, was very worried by the conference 
on the St. John. He warned Boston that two hundred Micmacs 
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had gathered there with Francklin and the French priest. 
Allan did not know what was happening but knew it would
47 probably bring trouble for him.
Colonel Francklin, something of a hero now, made 
his report to the Council on November 6, 1778. He reported 
that he had renewed the treaties of peace and friendship 
with the Indian tribes at a meeting on the St. John River 
and added at this time that the Male cite tribe was particu-
48 larly strong in its devotion to these new treaties.
Francklin’s popularity in the Council dipped, how­
ever, when he laid a bill for the conference before it. 
He had previously been granted 33100 in advance to finance 
the meetings, but now he came forward with a bill for over 
£500 for additional expenses and "keeping a table" during 
the festivities surrounding the conference. The Council 
paid the bill, but ordered the colony to apply to the 
Secretary of State, Lord Germain, for repayment of the sum
49 from the British treasury. -^
At this same meeting, the Council also confirmed 
Indian possession of a grant of land promised them in 1768.
^Report, Allan to Mass, govt., September 21, 1778, 
Baxter MSS., XVI, 87.
^^Minutes of the Nova Scotia Council, Nova Scotia B, 
XVII, 150-1.
^Minutes of the Nova Scotia Council, August 21 and 
November 6, 1778, Nova Scotia B, XVII, 143> 15001.
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As a further conciliatory measure, they appropriated £30 to
50 build on the land a log house "for them to resort to*"
By late summer, Nova Scotia was thus in a favorable 
position vis, a vis Massachusetts in matters concerning the 
Indians*  Allan, who had been somewhat short of supplies 
all summer, now had to face the winter with little prospect 
for improvement. The situation was not new for him, how­
ever, and he dealt with it as well as he could*
At the beginning of October, Allan's command con­
tained eighty Indians and ninety-five soldiers at Machias 
and twenty-one Indians on the St*  John*  His supply needs 
were still very great, and he was fearful of British acti­
vity against him on the heels of the great. British confer­
ence on the St. John*  Some of the troops in Machias were
51 soon to be disbanded, weakening that outpost even more.
Allan's major concern was the influence of Francklin 
and Bourg among the Indians. Father Bourg was a special 
threat. Allan expected him to lure the Indians from the 
Americans with conferences and religious services and
^Minutes of the Nova Scotia Council, Nova Scotia B. 
XVII, 151.
Allan still needed large shipments of supplies 
for his reduced forces. For October and November of 1778, 
the General Court ordered the following for him: 21,5O5i 
pounds of pork, 6,932 pounds of beef, 27*033  pounds of 
flour, 3*931^  pounds of bread,3»722i pounds of rice, 308 . 
fallons of molasses,.448 pounds of butter or hogsfat and
6 bushels of peas. See resolve of Mass, govt., October 2, 
1778, reports, James Avery to Mass, govt., Baxter MSS*. 
XVI, 52, 97-8, 92.
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52 introduce them to Francklin*s  influence at Fort Howe.
52Report, Allan to Mass, govt., October 8, 1778, 
Baxter MSS., XVI, 111. ' . . . .
53j{eport, Allan to Mass, govt., Baxter MSS., XVI
126-8.
To counter Bourg’s activity, Allan sent Lieutenant 
Gilman from the Penobscot down-the St. John River to neu­
tralize the propaganda moves by the British and their 
priest. This was successful, and they gathered intelli­
gence as well. 53 The Americans were crippled, of course,
I
in the new situation, because one expedition of short 
duration could not compete with the permanent residence of 
a priest whose services were eagerly sought by the Indians.
To keep his rear as secure as possible, Allan also 
paid a fall visit to the Penobscot Indians. If he was 
seeking good news among them, he certainly did not get it. 
Orono, the Penobscot chief, presented him with a long list 
of complaints and made the tribe*s  dissatisfaction very 
clear. The promised truck house had not been built, 
complained Orono, and no supplies had been sent. The 
whites on the river supplied the Indians with liquor and 
took advantage of them, treating them more like enemies 
than allies. The whites continued to settle on Indian 
lands, and the Indians wanted assurances that their title 
to it would be honored. Allan reported that the basic 5
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Indian demands were just and sought supplies for the
54Penobscots.
The problems of the Penobscot trip became somewhat
easier to bear, however, when a delegation from the Resti- 
gouche Micmacs sought Allan to pledge their support for the 
American cause. Their new devotion was a result of the 
French alliance. Allan sent them along ^o Boston with the 
recommendation that no treaty be made with them because the 
last treaty with the Micmacs, early in the war, caused much
rrresentment in the tribe. 5
The Americans were very weak in regard to the Mic­
macs. Allan remarked in his report that these Indians from 
Restigouche should be loyal to the British because of their 
proximity to Nova Scotian settlements. He was thus very 
pleased that they came. He also noted that other Micmacs 
had started for Machias but had been turned back by Father
Bourg.
The Indians continued to establish contacts with
same report gave an example of Allan’s
fundamental attitude toward the Indians. He did not sym­
pathize with their basic aims. When the Indians on the 
Penobscot requested guarantees that their lands would be 
protected, Allan told the government that “a great pity 
would it be not to have such a fine country settled with 
Civilized Inhabitants.” He advocated confirming only 
Indian hunting rights. See Baxter'MSS., XVI, 99-105.
5^Report, Allan to Mass, govt., October 8, 1778, 
Baxter MSS.. XVI, 110-1.
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the French during late 1778, much to the benefit of the 
Americans. On November 9, 1778, the Independent Ledger 
of Boston reported that Indian chiefs and delegates from 
the Penobscot River and Nova Scotia had visited Count 
D’Estaing and declared their attachment to France. 
D’Estaing told them of the French alliance with the Ameri-
57 cans, gave them gifts and sent them happily away.
The visit of the Indians to Boston was the last 
major event of 1778 in the struggle between Massachusetts 
and Nova Scotia. Winter usually brought a lull, and the 
winter of 1778-1779 was no exception. Difficulty of com­
munication and movement effectively ended most activities 
except those concerned with survival. That year marked 
the end of American offensive activities in Maine. In 1779» 
the British would seize the initiative at Majabagaduce,
4
and, for the rest of the war, Allan and Massachusetts would 
be reduced to hanging on desperately to Maine and reinforc­
ing the wavering allegiance of the people in the threatened 
areas. In spite of American supply shortages and the minis­
trations of Nova Scotia* 8 French priest, Allan maintained 
the friendship of the Indians. If his control had loosened 
somewhat, he could at least be sure that the basic sympa­
thies of the tribes were with him, and the danger of an
/
Indian attack on the Americans in Maine was slight. Neither
(^Independent Ledger /Boston7« November 9» 1778, <
p. 3.
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side, however, was deriving much benefit from the Indians, 
on whom they were spending considerable sums of money.
This state of affairs would persist through 1779.
127
Chapter 5
A STRIKE BY THE BRITISH: 1779
The year 1779 was a disastrous one for the American 
cause downeast. The British seized Majabaduce and inflicted 
a major defeat upon the forces sent to expel them*  The 
British action reduced the Americans to a desperate struggle 
to retain their outposts in Maine, where, even as 1779 
opened, conditions were severe*
The new British thrust made the Americans all the 
more anxious to retain the friendship and support of the 
tribes. Machias now had enemy forces to her rear and lived 
under the constant threat of attack. Indian troops and 
militia constituted the bulk of her defense; defection of 
the Indians would nearly destroy her ability to defend her­
self. Furthermore, in the unlikely event that .an American 
offensive was attempted, Indians would be needed for any 
chance of success. Allan thus continued to wage a desper­
ate campaign for Indian friendship in the full knowledge 
that an Indian attack would probably sweep all eastern 
Maine into British hands.
Nova Scotia no longer felt endangered by the Indians. 
Its garrisons had been reinforced and held the colony se­
curely. The government remained anxious to avoid hostili­
ties with the tribes but no longer saw a threat to the
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colony’s existence in an Indian war. Lord Germain in 
London had suggested recruiting Indians to fight the Ameri­
cans, and, while the colonial, authorities resisted this, 
they felt quite secure behind the shield provided by the 
British Empire.
In Machias, the winter had been quiet, as it was 
in Nova Scotia. The lumber industry, the major means of 
support around the town, was dead, due to the war and the 
British fleet, and on January 22, 1779 the people petitioned 
the government for relief. The problems persisted into 
spring; in late April, 1779, Allan was seeking assistance 
from Boston because he simply could not get the goods he 
needed and which had been promised.
Conditions on the Penobscot were little better. 
British cruisers had cut communications, and.the Indians 
were in poof shape. Jonathan Lowder feared that they would 
join the British unless more supplies arrived. No matter 
what the Indians did, Lowder was now pessimistically pre-
2 dieting the fall of eastern Maine.
Allan made a trip to Boston in late April to seek, 
with some success, more men and supplies for his command.
1 Petition, people of Machias to Mass, govt., and 
letter, Allan to Mass, govt., April 29, 1778, Baxter MSS.. 
XVI, 161-5, 240-1.
^Letter, Lowder to Mass, govt., March 28, 1779,
Baxter MSS.. XVI, 202-3.. ’ 
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He received authorization to raise one hundred rangers and 
three hundred other troops for Machias. He was also suc­
cessful in gaining supplies, some of which were to be bor­
rowed from Continental stores. These were not clear victo­
ries, for promised goods were frequently never delivered. 
Allan was also forced to seek aid in recruiting the addi­
tional troops. He could not raise them soon enough to meet 
the urgency of the situation.
Allan returned to Machias on May 18 and reported 
that the men he had. left in charge had held the Indians to­
gether in spite of the British. Other conditions in east­
ern Maine were bad, however, and Allan reported that Ameri­
can supporters were suffering under depredations of British
4. vessels and American privateers.
The Indians remained basically pro-American but 
were constantly visiting the British posts and received 
many supplies from them. English goods were plentiful in 
the province and were easily obtainable by the. Indians. 
Francklin and Father Bourg were at work along the eastern 
coast, and by now, their efforts seemed to have freed
^Orders of Mass, govt., April 23 and 24, 1779, and 
memorial, Allan to Mass, govt., April 25, 1779, Baxter MSB.. 
XVI, 234-6. z ..........
^Letter, Allan to Major General Heath, May 18, 1779, 
in Kidder, Military Operations, p. 259; report, Allan to 
Mass, government, May 18, 1779, Baxter MSS.. XVI, 255-7.
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5 Nova Scotians from fear of the Indians.
I
Francklin*s  work among the Indians had attracted 
attention in high places. Lord Germain wrote to him on 
May 3, 1779, informing him that the King was pleased with 
the treaty made on the St. John the previous September. 
Germain included a slight rebuke with his praise, however; 
he cautioned Francklin about writing to him on matters that 
did not concern the Indians. Similar praise (without the 
criticism) appeared in a letter written to Lieutenant Gov- 
ernor Hughes on the same day.
Germain’s letter to Francklin also, revealed British 
policy in regard to Maine and Nova Scotia.for the following 
year. Germain wrote that there was a. good chance. that the 
coast of Maine would be invaded, and he was . sure that 
Francklin*  s influence over the Indians would enable him to 
secure their aid in this assault. As an added inducement, 
Germain was asking the Treasury for 33500 for gifts to the 
tribes.?
Germain’s prediction of an assault on the Maine
L?letter, John Starr to Allan, May 18, 1779, in 
Kidder. Military Operations, p.-, 262.
^Nova Scotia A, XCIX, 74-6. 66-7 • In the letter 
to Hughes, Germain’s lack of exhaustive knowledge of America 
was revealed. He refers to the Indians of Nova Scotia as 
the ’’Merrimacks," substituting the name of a river in north­
ern Massachusetts for the tribal name ’’Micmacs. '*
^Nova Scotia A, XCIX, 75•
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coast could not have been more accurate. On June 17, 1779, 
about seven hundred troops under the command of Brigadier 
General Francis Mclean landed at Majabagaduce, present day 
Castine, on Penobscot Bay and proceeded to construct forti­
fications. The British thrust was part of a plan to secure 
the Penobscot country for Britain when peace was made. The 
British planned to erect a new province here by the name of 
New Ireland, and use it as a place of refuge for displaced 
loyalists.®
■The establishment of a British post between Machias 
and Boston was a devastating blow to Allan and his work. 
Already harrassed unmercifully by British cruisers, his 
fragile line of supply and communication to Boston was now 
even more exposed. Furthermore, he had no way of knowing 
what the. latest British move.might portend for Machias.
... Allan^s first action upon receiving word of the 
Brisith landing was to send word to Boston, which he did on 
June 25, 1779. Allan had had intelligence that the British 
had sailed in secret from Halifax, but this news came too
9late to be of assistance in repelling the invaders.
Once he had warned Boston, Allan set out to calm 
the downeast settlers and infuse them with a will to resist.
C^Ahlin, Downeast Rubicon, pp. 123-5. For a full 
account of the battle for Majabagaduce, see the above, 
Chapter XI, pp. 121-36.
^Report, Allan to Mass, govt., June 23, 1779,
Baxter MSS.. XVT, 298.
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One can imagine that this latest British incursion had 
greatly alarmed them. Allan therefore issued a proclam­
ation on June 23, promising to do all possible to defend 
the area and claiming that there was little danger of an 
Indian attack. Most of the Indians in the area were sup­
posed to be sufficiently pro-American to keep them out of 
British control. As further encouragement, Allan added 
the dubious information that the St. Francis Indians had
10recently.declared against the British.
Allan’s report to Boston, sent the same day as his 
proclamation was.issued, indicated that the situation was 
not so rosy as the general population was told. He inform­
ed the government that the Indians were very uneasy. The 
British on the St. John were supplying them more lavishly 
than Allan could ever hope to match. He had not heard from 
the Penobscots since the invasion and did not know what was 
going on. among them. He would have to have more troops and 
supplies if he was to hold the Indians to the American
11cause.
In spite of the initial alarm and continuing uneasi­
ness, the British presence on the Penobscot proved to have 
little immediate effect upon the American post at Machias. 
The people were in bad shape with few provisions but were
(^Continental Journal / Boston7, July 15, 1779,
no page.
Q/June 23, 1779, Baxter MSS. ■ XVI, 300-1.
133
resolved to resist any British assault upon them. They 
were building blockhouses for defense, and Allan was 
seeking to bring in as many loyal Indians as possible. 
Morale was hard to maintain, however, as supplies were used 
and not replaced. Allan reported on July 16, 1779, that 
for the past three weeks, bread rations had been down to ‘
12 'two pounds each.
The British, however, were not the only significant 
new presence in eastern Maine during the summer of 1779*  
Allan had finally secured a priest for the Indians. At 
first he was very pleased with the conduct of Father de la 
Motte, who was obtained from the French fleet in American 
waters. He was sent to gather friendly Indians to help 
defend Machias and later went among the Penobsfcots who were 
upset by the British on the lower river. In July, Allan 
reported that the priest’s "Beheavor & Conduct has given me
13 much satisfaction. He is Indefatiguable in the business."
Allan’s opinions of the priest changed, however.
By October 27, 1779, Allan wrote that de la Motte had 
become a problem. He was a great expense, and his bad 
disposition made him dangerous to the American cause among 
the Indians, and "as to Ecclesiastical matters he will be
12Reports, Allan to Mass, gavt., June 23 and July 16, 
1779, Baxter MSS.. 299-300, 363.
13C<Ahlin, Downeast Rubicon, p.118; reports, Allan 
to Mass/govt., June 23 and July 16, 1779, Baxter MSS.. XVI, 
300, 362, 365; Lucey, Catholic Church in Maine, pp. 22-3*
134
of no use without a Reformation.”^
De la Mottee’s arrival at Machias and his early 
work there encompassed a very confusing period for Allan 
and his command. Allan was anxious to do everything pos­
sible to expel the British from the position to his rear 
on Penobscot Bay, but his role was limited. Massachusetts 
assembled a fleet to retake the British-held position, but 
there seemed to have been few efforts to draw Allan tightly 
into the plans. There was no thought that Allan*s  forces 
might make a significant attack on the British.
The American colonial authorities were interested 
in securing Indian help for the expedition, however. On 
July 2, the Council voted long-sought supplies for the 
Penobscot tribe provided they help in the coming struggle 
against the British. On July 12, 1779» Brigadier General 
Lovell, who was to command the Penobscot expedition, was'
15 given similar orders in regard to these Indian supplies.
At Machias, Allan was also making arrangements to 
employ the Indians in the operation. Captain John Preble
(^letter, Allan to unknown person, probably in the 
Mass, govt., October 27, 1779, Baxter MSS.» XVII (1913), 
409-10. It was not possible to discover the exact nature 
of Allan’s theological problems with de la Motte. Ahlin 
(Maine Rubicon) was of no help; he took no notice of this . 
problem at ail, simply stating on page 118 that the priest 
served until August 5, 1781. This was incorrect, however; 
Ahlin confused de la Motte with a later priest who served 
the Indians. Father Frederick De Bourger served with 
Allan from August, 1780 until August 1781.
^Orders of Mass. Council, July 2, and 12, 1779, 
Baxter MSS.. XVI, 322, 385.
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was sent to the Penobscot River to command the Indians if 
the American commander on the river approved,. which he did. 
Preble and twenty Indians were waiting when the American 
fleet arrived in Penobscot Bay. He wrote the President of 
the Council that sixty more Indians from Passamaquoddy were 
awaiting orders to join his present force. Preble was sure 
the Indians would fight. General Lovell, seeking more 
Indian support, issued a proclamation noting the friendship 
and cooperation of the Indians and hoping that more of them 
would come forward to serve.
The auspicious beginnings came to naught, however, 
as the Penobscot expedition met a disastrous end. Unable 
to seize the British post, the fleet was driven up the 
Penobscot by the surprise arrival of a British fleet and 
most of the ships were captured or sunk. The troops marched
17home overland.
Preble, Allan’s man on the scene, expressed his 
dissatisfaction with the leadership of the attack in a
LL%eport, Allan to Mass, govt., July 16, 1779, 
letter, Preble to President Powell of the Mass. Council, 
July 24, 1779, orders from headquarters of the Penobscot 
expedition, July 26 and 27, proclamation by General Solomon 
Lovell, July 26, 1779, Baxter MSS.. XVI, 565, 595-6, 598, 
599, 406.
l^There are few records fully describing the role 
of Preble and his Indians in the battles, or even to 
reveal the tribes to which the participating Indians be­
longed. The only scrap of such evidence is noted in the 
next paragraph. A conference cited below indicated that 
at least some of the Penobscots present were killed or 
wounded. For a more complete account of the American 
-defeat, see Ahlin, Maine Rubicon, pp. 126-56.
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letter to the Council on August 20, 1779# In it he ex­
pressed the wish that Allan might have been present; had 
he been, Preble felt a better result might have been 
achieved. Preble briefly described his own role as serving 
alternately with the Massachusetts troops and the Indians. 
He closed the letter with assurances of continuing Indian 
friendship, although he had feared that defeat would drive
18 the tribes into Britain1 s arms.
An impromptu piece of Indian diplomacy took place 
almost immediately after the American defeat when the com­
mander of the troops tried to cushion the impact of his 
defeat upon the Penobscots. The tribe had evidently fled 
up the river from their settlement, because General Lovell 
apologized for the necessity of flight and promised to 
restore their previous condition as soon as possible. The 
chiefs were sympathetic; they knew he had lost everything 
and. pledged him their assistance. They promised not to 
join the British, who had hurt their young men. The chiefs 
re-affirmed their adherence to George Washington and the 
King of France.
During the meetings with Lovell, the chiefs asked 
that no more of their supplies be sent to Machias. Lovell 
was forced to promise a truck house on the Kennebec River
■ H II »■—................... .....
1 Baxter MSS,. XVII. 35-6,
4q
Minutes of conference, General Lovell and Penob­
scot chiefs, August 8, 1779, Baxter MSS.. XVII, 12-5*  
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when the Indians swore they could not live without it*  
Following this promise, eight Indians escorted the General 
overland to the Kennebec and Fort Western for two dollars 
a day, hard money. This route, and that of most of the 
other survivors of the defeat, was by way of the Sebasti-
20cook River.
Colonel Allan was rather isolated from the action 
during the battle on the Penobscot. He had called the 
Indians together for the voyage to Castine but found that 
they were quarreling among themselves over religion and the 
news from the St. John. Allan was able to gather forty­
seven Indians and twenty whites in spite of the disputes 
but delayed sailing due to poor weather and reports of an 
impending British attack on Machias. He finally set out on 
August 15, 1779, turning back when he learned of the Brit-
21 ish victory and the scattering of the American forces.
Preparations for the attack on Castine were not the 
only activities in Nova Scotia during the summer of 1779. 
Francklin and Father Bourg were active, and the government 
was attempting in every way to cement, the Indians.’ alle­
giance. Land grants to the Indians were made and goods
2©Ibid; letters, General Lovell to Mass, govt.,
August 28, 1779, F. H. Tarkson to Powell, August 28, 1779, 
Baxter MSS., XVII, 62, 57. To Lovell’s credit, he was per­
sistent in seeking fulfillment of his promises to the 
Penobscots, following up his initial report with a letter 
seeking action on the matter. See Baxter MSS.. XVII, 66.
^ieport, Allan to Mass, govt., Baxter MSS.. XVII, 
104-8.
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22were distributed.
Lord Germain had hoped that Francklin could provide 
Indians to assist in the Penobscot operation, but Franck­
lin had refused. The Nova Scotian Indian superintendent 
was simply too unsure of his charges to put them ini;o the 
field. He was not certain that his Indians would fight the 
people of New England, for whom they evidently felt some 
affection or fear. He had gotten some cooperation from the 
tribes in resisting privateers but could guarantee nothing . 
more. If the Indians could be enlisted, the cost would be 
very great; families of the men who went to war. had to be 
supported. Finally, Francklin very much feared the French 
influence among them. If.Nova Scotia, armed the tribes and 
organized them into a fighting force, the appearance of a 
French vessel or other force might cause them to defect and 
do great damage to the thinly populated colony.
In early August of 1779» Francklin also had a new 
problem. Although constantly short of money for his activ­
ities, he had been able to supply the Indians rather lav­
ishly through his access to the King’s Stores in Halifax. 
A new commanding officer of the army had now cut this off.
22Minutes of the Nova Scotia Council, Nova Scotia B, 
XVII, 174.
^Letter, Francklin to Germain, August 3» 1779, 
Nova Scotia A, XCIX, 101-3• Lieutenant Governor Hughes 
agreed with francklin about the potential dangers of 
enlisting Indians.
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Francklin would soon be short of both money and supplies; 
he begged Germain to arrange support for him from military 
funds and to reopen the stores for the Indians. If this 
were not done, Francklin could not guarantee to hold the 
Indians.
Francklin1s reputation in London may have worked 
against him as he sought to regain access to the military 
supplies. Corruption had long reigned in the Nova Scotian 
government, and Francklin had been at the center of the 
group that perpetrated it. The Board of Trade was ’’uneasy” 
about him and had received complaints about his arbitrary 
manner. They also suspected him of using his positions for 
his own profit and to aid his friends.The suspicions of 
the Board of Trade probably contributed to the appointment 
of another to govern Nova Scotia after Legge *s  dismissal. 
Lord Germain was happy to have Francklin18 talents among 
the Indians when the Nova Scotian situation was desperate, 
but as that colony became more secure, -the old suspicions 
re-emerged, and the Secretary of State took steps to remove 
Francklin*s  hand from the till.
Francklin’s shortage of supplies was particularly 
critical at that time because of the arrival and circu­
lation among the tribes of the priest from the French fleet.
24Ibld.. pp. 103-4.
25Brebner, Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia, pp. 224 > 
226, 259
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The superintendent told Germain of this and said that he 
was sending Father Bourg and one of his agents to try to. 
hold the Indians and keep them from being used against the 
post on the Penobscot. Francklin himself was not going 
among the Indians because they would expect that which he 
could not give them.
In spite of his problems, Francklin was increasing­
ly confident. As the news of the American defeat upon the 
Penobscot spread, Britain’s stock among the Indians was 
sure to rise. The St. John Indians in contact with Franck­
lin, had refused to join the Americans, and Bourg was well- 
received among them. Francklin now had hopes of winning 
over the remainder of the tribe that. had.previously sided 
with Colonel Allan and the Americans. Difficulties remained, 
however, as many of the most loyal Indians complained that 
they were ignored more than they should be under the circum­
stances.
General McLean on the Penobscot was also attempting 
to win over the Indians of that river. General Lovell 
reported to Boston on September 4, 1779, that McLean had 
sent a flag of truce to the Penobscots seeking friendship.
^Letter, Francklin to Germain, August 3, 1779, 
Nova Scotia A, XCIX, 104-5.
27.'Letter, Francklin to Germain, August 8, 1779,
Nova Scotia A, XCIX, 129-31.
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28 Lovell expected that he would.get a poor reception.
In September of 1779. the Nova Scotian authorities 
had Indian troubles in a rather strange quarter. Some 
Indians of the Miramichi region (in present-day northeast 
New Brunswick) suddenly rose in the rebel cause and plun­
dered a number of loyal citizens. This was an area far 
from Allan’s sphere of influence, but the Indians there 
had been in contact with him, expressing sympathy for the 
Revolution. A British warship was in the area, and its 
captain went ashore and quickly quelled the disturbance, 
killing one Indian and capturing sixteen more, three of 
whom were released almost at once. The rest were carried 
away. Their families were supplied by the British, and 
Francklin felt that the loyal Indians of the area would 
not take offense. Father Bourg was well-received in the 
region, and there seemed a chance that the disaffected 
could be won over in the aftermath of the Penobscot vic- 
tory.28 9
28Letter, Lovell to Mass. Council, September 4, 
1779. Nova Scotia A. XVII., 84.
29 ̂Letter, Francklin to Germain, Nova Scotia A, XCIX,
128-50. At Machias, Allan reported the incident to the 
authorities in Boston with the hope that it would aid him 
in his duties. See Baxter MSS. VII, 109-10.
The capture of the troublemakers did not end the 
affair, however. They were carried to Quebec in the Viper, 
the vessel that had captured them. The Nova Scotia Council 
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asked General Haldimand, the governor of Canada, to hold 
them until he could decide what should be done*  In the 
meantime, a deputation of the tribe came to Francklin to' 
seek more aid for the families of the prisoners, and 
Francklin used the occasion to secure a new treaty with the 
Indians of the Miramichi.^0
This treaty, if kept, would provide good relations 
between the Miramichi Indians and the colonial government. 
The Indians promised to behave themselves, to protect the 
whites in the region and to seize and hand over any of their 
number who molested the settlers. They also promised to 
shun contact with John Allan and all other enemies of Brit*  
ain and to use their influence with other Indians to encour­
age them to do the same. All former treaties were ratified 
again, and the government promised to keep its troops and
31 subjects from interfering in Indian hunting or fishing.
The treaty marked the formal end of the incident 
and seemed to be regarded in Halifax as the solution to the 
problem. The Council refused to send troops to protect 
further the settlements in the area. They felt no addition­
al force was needed, as the Indians had been ’’brought to
v?yi!Iinutes of the Council, September 11, 1779» Nova 
Scotia B, XVII, 195-6; letter, Francklin to Germain, 
September 26, 1779» Nova Scotia A, XCIX, 139-40.
Treaty signed by Francklin and the Indian dele­
gates from Miramichi, September 22, 1779> enclosed in 
letter, Francklin to Germain, September 26, 1779» Nova 
Scotia B. XVII, 142-7.
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Peace and good temper,” by Captain Hervey and the Viper. 
General Haldimand sent the captive Indians to Halifax in 
mid-October, and the Council ordered all but.two released 
on October 14. The two held were the foremost trouble­
makers and were to be hostages for the good behavior of the 
rest of;the tribe. The rest departed for home in good 
spirits and the incident was over.^
By fall, Francklin*s  problems at Miramichi and else­
where were minor compared to John Allan’s at Machias. He 
was still coping with the aftermath of the defeat at Penob­
scot, which had an unfortunate effect on Indian-American 
relations. The Indians around Machias were sure that the 
defense of the region depended upon them and were, making 
all manner of threats and demands. Some of them, certain, 
that Machias would soon fall, fled north to. the lakes ? 
between the St. John River and Machias, from which Allan 
supposed they would join those of their tribe who supported 
Nova Scotia. In spite of all this, Allan did not expect 
them to become hostile to the Americans. They were deeply 
divided by religious and other matters, and he was using
34 every trick he knew to keep them friendly.
^^Minutes of Council, September 28, 1779, Nova 
Scotia B, XVII, 199.
^Minutes of the Council, October 14, 1779, Nova 
Scotia B. XVII, 201.
^4Report, Allan to Mass, govt., September 10, 1779, 
Baxter MSS.. XVII, 109.
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The Penobscot tribe, now in desperate straits, sent 
a delegation to Boston to try to get results that they had 
failed to get from Allan.. They told the committee that met 
with them that they were destitute, having received no sup­
plies for two years. They were devoted to the American 
cause and their former French sovereign but had to have .. 
supplies. The committee assured the Indians of the contin­
uing friendship of France and promised to try to get food 
for them.
The Penobscot visit to Boston set off an investiga­
tion of the supply effort on the river. The Board of 'War 
was ordered to furnish an account of the supplies they had 
delivered for the Eastern Indians. Allan informed the 
government that he had given the Penobscot tribe close to 
$2,000, but they had spent most of it for rum, in spite of
36 efforts to curb the liquor traffic.
The committee on the Penobscots*  demands found no 
evidence of wrong-doing and moved to seek solutions rather 
than scapegoats. Their major recommendation was that a 
truck house be set up for the Penobscots. On September 24, 
the House and Council adopted their recommendation and 
ordered a truck house to be established at Fort Halifax on
'^Conference, Penobscots and Committee of the Mass, 
govt., Boston, September 10, 1779, Baxter MSS.. XVII, 
119-20. _
^Hesolve of Mass, govt., September 15, 1779, and 
report, Allan to Mass, govt., September 24, 1779, Baxter 
MSS.. XVII, 135, 182.
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the Kennebec at the mouth of the Sepasticook River. Colonel 
Josiah Brewer was to be the truck master with £60-a year 
salary. He was to have all necessary supplies but could 
give them to none but Indians. Furs were to be taken in
37 trade when possible, all profits going to the state.
Allan, freed by the Kennebec truck house from the 
care of the Penobscots, had plenty of problems to keep him 
occupied. He was quite successful even now in keeping 
Indians around Machias, but he lacked the goods to supply 
them once they came. On October 20, 1779# he reported that 
the expense in keeping the Indians away from the British on 
the St. John was immense and that the priest was less help 
than he had supposed. Furthermore, as a result of his 
influence, many Indians were coming in to the camp at 
Passamaquoddy and there would be heavy new demands on 
already scarce supplies. A week later he reported that 
these new arrivals were eager to fight, but that he dared 
not attempt it. With forty regulars, however, he would 
attack Fort Howe on the St. John.^
The supply problem under this new influx of men was 
serious enough to cause Allan to threaten to resign if he 
did not get some assistance from Boston. ’’The Court may
)
— . - I. - - - —■ -
^Report, Committee on Penobscot Indians to Mass, 
govt., September 17, 1779, and resolve of Mass, govt., 
September 27, 1779, Baxter MSS.. XVII, 121, 247-8.
^Report, Allan to Mass. govt., October 20, 1779, 
and letter, Allan to unknown person, October 27, 1779, 
Baxter MSS.. XVII, 399, 412.
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suppose many things Comes here,” he wrote, “but there is 
seldom more than two thirds & often not more than one half
39what they Vote, & that of the most Inferior sort.”
By November, Allan felt that he could no longer
handle both command of the garrison at Machias and the work 
with the Indians. He hinted in his letters to Boston that 
he would like his military command terminated, and the 
Machias Committee of Safety supported him. Allan felt 
weighted down by the cares of the garrison, especially the 
’•perpetual Broils” between townspeople and soldiers. The 
government, however, refused to go along and kept him in
40command of both departments.
Allan’s work among the Indians, no matter how
hemmed in by other considerations, was still tremendously 
successful. In early November, he went east to meet the 
Malecites and found them basically favorable to the Ameri­
cans, in spite of strong efforts by the British. Allan now 
decided that he must take the Indians back to Machias to 
free them from British influence, and, as a measure of his 
own influence, was able to persuade 280 of the tribe to 
make the move. These forty-six wigwams would be added to
I
•^Letter, Allan to unknown person, October 27, 1779, 
Baxter MSS.. XVII, 411.
^Report, Allan to Mass, govt., November 15, 1779, 
resolve, Machias Committee of Safety, November 6, 1779, and 
resolve of Mass, govt., December 18, 1779, Baxter MSS.. (
XVII, 441-2, 420, 421.
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thirty-six already around Machias.^
For Allan, short of supplies as usual, to have 
gathered so many Indians so far from their homes was a 
considerable triumph and proof of his success with the 
Indians. Francklin simply did not have the power to com­
mand Indians on this scale. Such events point to a contin­
ued American influence, at least among the Indians on the 
St. John. Coupled with the recent disturbances at Mira- 
michi, in which a number of Indians had risen in the Ameri­
can cause, this indicated strong American hold on many of 
the Maine and Nova Scotia tribes as late as 1779.
Among the Indians Allan brought back to Machias 
was Pierre Toma, the second chief of the Malecites, who 
had taken the British side since 1775. His defection was 
a major blow to Nova Scotia’s efforts. Both chiefs of the 
St. John tribe now favored the Americans. Chief Ambrose 
had a been a follower of Allan since the beginning of 
Allan’s service at Machias.
Shortly after arrival in Machias, Pierre Toma made 
a speech in which he discussed his situation and why he had 
come over to the Americans. He had supported the British 
out of fear, he said, but had never been hostile to the 
_____ — /
(Report, Allan to Mass, govt., November 10, 1779,
Baxter MSS., XVII, 428-51. If 46 wigwams contained 90 men 
and 190 other Indians, 56 wigwams would have held approxi- ,
mately 180 Indians, including about 60 men. Allan thus 
had between 450 and 500 Indians to support, although only 
about 150 were men of fighting age.
■ / -■ Y". " 
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colonies. Now he came to fight for the Americans and the 
French, "our old Allies." Toma stressed, however, that the 
tribe was now almost totally dependent upon Allan and the 
Massachusetts government for supplies. The Indian old 
people and children must be supported or the Malecites 
could not remain around Machias.
Allan was fortunate to have the added Indian forces 
because he was dependent upon them for defense. As he went 
into winter, the Indians were quiet and peaceful but appre­
hensive in regard to spring, when they expected an on-
43slaught of Canadians.
During the winter, Nova Scotia’s efforts to win the 
Indians slackened. Except for the usual wrangling over 
money and supplies, all was quiet. In December, Francklin 
received the rather disturbing news that supplies for his 
department had been sent to New York to be forwarded to 
Halifax, an occurrence that would give him much trouble. 
He also was refused extra funds by Germain, who informed 
him that when he was given a salary of £300 per year, it 
was intended that there should be no further expense. If 
the army wanted Indians on its side it would have to pay
^Baxter MSS,, XVII, 32-4.
^Report, Allan to Mass, govt., November 29, 1779,
Baxter MSS.. XVIII, 16.
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for them itself.
The year 1779 thus ended quietly. It had seen a 
major British military victory on the Penobscot and a 
sound American triumph in removing most of the St. John 
Indians to Machias. The American agent, John Allan, con­
tinued to hold the ‘’hearts and minds” of most of the Indi­
ans, although lack of supplies prevented him from cementing 
his hold over them.
^Letters, Germain to Francklin, November 4 and 
December 4, 1779, Germain to Hughes, December 4, 1779, 
Nova Scotia A, XCIX, 177, 213-5• 209-12. According to 
an estimate sent to Germain, between June 10, 1773, and 
October 20, 1779/ Nova Scotia spent f1543-2s-10£d on the 
Indians, for which they now hoped to be reimbursed. (See 
Nova Scotia A, XCIX, 169.) It was this expense that led 
Germain to warn the colony not to expect any more money 
from Parliament.
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Chapter 6
DECLINING COMPETITION: 1780-1785
$he final three years of the war were relatively 
quiet among the Indians of Maine and Nova Scotia. Lulled 
by British confidence that the danger was past, the Nova 
Scotian effort among the tribes dwindled, coming to an end 
with the death of Francklin in December, 1782. In Machias 
during the same period, the problems that had plagued 
Allan throughout the war almost overwhelmed him and severely 
restricted his ability to act.
By 1780, both sides had lost much of their fear of 
an Indian war. The tribes now seemed unlikely to partici­
pate in an offensive against either side. The British, 
with significant forces in the region, thus became less 
concerned with the Indians and cut back their efforts to 
keep them content. Francklin, the Nova Scotian Indian super­
intendent, was unhappy with the course of action ordered by 
London. The British government did not err in their judge­
ment; Nova Scotia suffered no harm as a result.
The American position was very different from the 
British. American forces in eastern Maine were weak and 
nearly surrounded by British outposts. The British power 
that allowed Halifax to curtail its Indian operation was a 
real threat to the Americans, and one of the few forces
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they had for defense was the Indians. Accordingly, Massa­
chusetts maintained its Indian effort until very nearly the 
end of the war. Unfortunately, it was no longer within 
their power to mount a successful campaign for Indian 
friendship. They could not supply the manufactured goods 
and.provisions sought by the tribes, and their support 
among the Indians waned. It may have been only Nova Scotia’s 
growing lack of interest in the tribes that kept Massachu­
setts from suffering a serious setback in eastern Maine.
During these years of declining activity,, the 
government of Nova Scotia and the British Crown spent con­
siderable time quarrelling over the advisability of contin­
uing the Indian program, the level at which it should ’be 
maintained and the financial responsibilities of its oper­
ations. Halifax wanted a substantial program at little 
cost to itself, while London sought to reduce expenses and 
halt a suspected boon to the sticky-fingered politicians of 
Nova Scotia.
The question of Francklin*s  access to army stores 
was at the center of the conflict. These stores had previ­
ously yielded up the provisions that Francklin thought nec­
essary for the Indians, .but General McLean had closed them 
to him. In March of 1780, Hughes appealed to Lord Germain
for help in re-establishing Francklin*s  access to the sup­
plies , assuring the Secretary of State that only the most 
frugal use would be made of the government’s resources.
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Francklin wrote a similar letter to Germain on May 4, 1780, 
and Hughes tried again on May 6, stressing the need for the 
supplies and the good use previously made of them.-’
This correspondence came to nothing, however; on 
May 18, 1780, Francklin sent Germain a letter in which he 
stated that he had learned that there was to be no money or 
supplies forthcoming. Francklin noted that the Indians 
were being strongly courted by the Americans, and if sup­
plies were not available, such advantages as the mast­
harvesting on the St. John and the overland communication
2with Canada might be lost.
Germain proved adamant, and the supplies remained 
under McLean’s control. Much abuse had arisen in America, 
Germain wrote, and must now be stopped. McLean was to 
judge what supplies were necessary. Rations would be given» 
to Indians who were under orders from McLean or the Com- 
mander-in-Chief in America or who came into Halifax or the 
various posts with legitimate business. Visits to Halifax 
were to be discouraged, and the number of conferences were 
to be kept down, as they “Seldom answer any purpose save 
that of expense.”
^Nova Scotia A, C, 24-6, 33-4, 34-5, 39-40.
2Nova Scotia A, C, 65—7.
^Letter, Germain to McLean, July 5» 1780, Nova
Scotia A, C, 108-11.
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Germain then told Francklin that there was to be no 
more money for Indian expenses in Nova Scotia except his 
salary. He felt that large expenditures were no longer 
needed. The British held the Penobscot, and Machias was 
nearly abandoned.The settlers of Nova Scotia thus had 
complete security by land, and a small fleet hopefully soon 
would protect them by sea. Germain felt that if they 
could not get along with the Indians under these conditions,
5it was their own fault.
Francklin was dismayed by this letter and accepted 
it with ill grace. He wrote Germain that no further expense 
would be incurred unless he had the money in advance. He 
hoped, however, that should an Indian disturbance occur, he 
would be held responsible only so far as it had been in his 
power to prevent it.
Francklin*s  little jab about lack of money brought 
a rebuke from Germain, who wrote that, "I do not apprehend 
you can have any reason to fear the King*s  Affairs will be 
allowed to suffer from the want of Provision to enable you
• ^Although conditions were bad, to call Machias
nearly abandoned was an exaggeration.
^Letter, Germain to Francklin, July 7, 1780, Nova 
Scotia A, C, 112-4.
^Letter, Francklin to Germain, November 21, 1780, 
Nova Scotia A, C, 196-7. The same letter gave an example 
of tow the new restrictions might be evaded. Hughes as 
Navy Commissioner had paid one part of the Indians expenses, 
and Hughes as Lieutenant Governor had paid another.
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7 to effect any really necessary and important service." 
Germain further stated that the province should assume all 
non-military Indian expenses but recommended that the Treas­
ury in London pay those bills currently due because he did
g
not think the province was going to pay them.
When he became aware that there would be little 
additional money, Francklin moved to cut expenses. He had 
planned to meet with the Indians on the St. John on May 25, 
1780, but cancelled his personal participation to save 
money. Major Studholme went in his place and conducted a
9 
successful mission.
Although the conference was almost a month later 
than planned, it was well-attended; more than 900 Indians 
were present, including deputies from the Ottawas, Hurons, 
Algohkians, Abnakis and other Canadian tribes... The Canadian 
Indians informed the Nova Scotian tribes that they had de­
clared war on the Americans and would not tolerate any 
further collaboration between Indians and the Americans. 
Francklin felt that this warning severely reduced the number 
^Letter, Germain to Francklin, Februsry 28, 1781,
Nova Scotia A, CI, 64-5*
8Ibid. As his letter of August 5, 1781, showed 
(Nova Scotia A, CI, 154-5), Francklin continued to fear 
Indian uprisings, but none occurred.
^Letters, Francklin to Germain, May 4 and May 18, 
1780, and Francklin to the Indians, May 18, 1780, Nova 
Scotia A, C, 56, 67, 282.
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of Indians frequenting Machias, although he was apprehen­
sive about the arrival of a priest and several gentlemen 
from the French fleet in Rhode Island.^
In these last lean years of Francklin1s efforts, he 
was helped by a fortunate circumstance. Earlier in the war, 
as a reward for loyalty, the King had ordered E500 spent on 
gifts for the Indians on the St.John. The shipment had 
been sent to New York to be forwarded to Halifax but was 
lost in shipment. It had arrived in Halifax in 1780, but 
the letters with it were missing. Discovered again by acci­
dent late in the fall, it fell into the custody of the
^Letter, Francklin to Germain, August 5, 1781/ 
Nova Scotia A, C, 194-6•
Letter, Francklin to Germain, August 5, 1781, 
Nova Scotia A, CI, 135-4. /
12Letters, Francklin to Germain, August 5» 1781, 
and November 22, 1781, Nova Scotia A, CI, 134, 265-6; 
minutes of Nova Scotia Council, August 9, 1781, Nova Scotia 
B, XCIII, 42-3.
troublesome General McLean. His successor, General Camp-
11bell, finally released it to Francklin in the late summer.
Some of the St. John chiefs had been wavering, com­
plaining of British neglect, and Francklin wanted to deliv­
er the gifts as soon as possible. The Council awarded him
£100 to defray the costs of delivery and on October 2, 1781, 
he met with the Indians about fifty-five miles up the river.
About 380 Indians attended and were very pleased with the
12goods.
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A number of other events occurred at this confer­
ence. Francklin intervened in a dispute over tribal elec­
tions, fearing thst the struggle might split the tribe and 
send the losers into the American camps. Sir Andrew Hamond 
told the Indians that they were to have a priest once again, 
and, in gratitude, the Indians promised to plant corn to 
reduce their dependence upon government supplies and to 
influence other tribes to abandon the Americans. Francklin
1 3 now felt that the Indians would take up arms for the Crown.
This conference, which received royal approval, 
was the last major Nova Scotian action of the war.^ The 
King’s interest did not spur any major new grants of money. 
By this time, the war seemed to be nearly over, and Indian 
affairs were less important.
The only significant action taken after the confer­
ence was the appointment of a new priest to replace Bourg. 
Oliver Henley, an Irish priest who had been working with 
the Cape Breton Indians since 1778, came to the St. John 
in the spring of 1782. It was his imminent arrival that 
Francklin announced to the Indians during the last confer­
ence. No money was allowed for his maintenance-, but the 
Council ordered that he be paid from the money appropriated
(/^Letter, Francklin to Germain, November 11, 1781, 
Nova Scotia A, CI, 265-9•
^Letter, Germain to Francklin, February 28, 1782, 
Nflva Scotia A, CII, 16.
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15for the defense of the sea coast.
In his last report, Francklin noted that the Indians 
were quiet. The tribe on the St. John was especially use­
ful because they were protecting the harvesting of masts
16on that river.
Michael Francklin died on December 5, 1782, in
Halifax and was buried with the participation of about two
17hundred Indians. A successor was appointed, but 
Francklin’s death marked the dissolution of the wartime 
Indian effort. By then, peace was coming, and the prov­
ince’s attention was fixed upon other matters.
While Nova Scotia’s Indian effort ended in lack of 
funds and official complacency, Massachusetts’ operation 
under Allan was foundering under serious problems. At 
Machias, Allan still faced acute, shortages of supplies and 
men, was beset with British posts on almost every side and 
was harassed by the British navy, whose assaults on his 
long and exposed line of communication further complicated
1^Hutton, "Micmac Indians of Nova Scotia,” p. 192; 
memorial, Lewis Delesdernier to John Hancock, Governor of 
Massachusetts, no date, Baxter MSS.. XX, 26; Minutes of 
Nova Scotia Council, March 23, 1782, Nova Scotia B. £VTII, 
57. There is no record of what happened to Father Bourg, 
although it is likely that he returned to Canada.
16Letter, Francklin to Earl of Shelburne, Secretary 
of State for the American Department, June 16, 1782, Nova 
Scotia A, CII, 52-3.
^Ahlin, Maine Rubicon, p. 110.
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his situation.
Allan’s problems of supply were severe throughout 
the last years of the war. In February of 1780, he report­
ed that,he was, "Intirely Distitute of Every Assential to
18 Defend this Post, or secure the Interest of the Indians.” 
He had been supported so far by “kind Providence” but could 
expect little more such luck. The Indian effort depended 
upon provisions, and he had none. This lack was destroying 
the influence with the Indians that he had been building 
since childhood. If he could not. have what he needed, he 
would resign. He refused, to continue unless he could be
19effective.
Even when supplies were sent, however, they did not 
ease the situation significantly. When a shipment arrived 
at Machias in June of 1780, it disappeared quickly. Allan 
reported that when each Indian received a small amount, the 
whole shipment was gone, and none of the Indians was satis-
18Letter, Allan to General Court, February 25, 1780, 
Baxter MSS., XVIII, 106-7.
^Ibid. Allan’s desperate reports on the state of 
his supplies were too numerous to be detailed in the text 
but can be found in Baxter MSS.« XVIII, 60-1, 115-9, 165-6, 
293, XIX, 22, 122-4, 189-90, 285-6, 370-2, 388, 439-40, 
XX, 26, 29, 53-4.
Of)Report, Allan to Powell, President of Mass. 
Council, May 25, 1780, Baxter MSS.. XVIII, 265-7. Reports 
of supplies or money sent to Allan can be found in Baxter 
MSS.. XVIII, 76, 167, 188-9, 190, 412, XIX, 67-8, 153-4, 
253.
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The steady flow of provisions that would have been 
necessary to maintain the post at Machias in a proper 
manner simply could not be sustained; the Massachusetts 
government was plagued with shortages during the whole war. 
After 1780, Allan received little or none of the goods the 
General Court ordered for him. The situation hit bottom 
in the spring of 1781, when John Hancock, Governor of 
Massachusetts, informed the General Court that supplies 
recently assigned could not be delivered because the state
21 simply did not have them.
i
When goods were shipped, they often failed to 
arrive in Machais. In the spring of 1780, for example, a 
Mr. Parker, on the way to Machias with ,a supply of meat, 
was captured and taken into Majabagaduce. As a result,
22Allan had no meat at all.
The goods that were obtained and shipped past the 
British were often of such poor quality that the Indians 
did not want them. On at least one occasion the Indians 
told Allan they could get better supplies from the British
23 on the St. John.
Report, Allan to Powell, July 12, 1780, order of 
Mass Council, April 19, 1781, address, Hancock to General 
Court, March 9, 1781, letter, Allan to Richard Devens, 
Commissary-General of Mass. August 22, 1782. Baxter MSS,. 
XVIII, 547, XIX, 208-9, 181-2, XX, 74-5.
^Report, Allan to Mass. Council, May 28, 1780, 
Baxter MSS.. XVIII, 283.
23Ibid.
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In desperation, Allan tried a number of stop-gap 
measures. In the spring of 1780, he petitioned the towns 
•west of Camden for provisions. He hoped that if any ves­
sels arrived with such goods, these towns would send them 
on to Machias.24 That summer, he put all idle men to fish­
ing in an effort to gain more food for the garrison and 
Indians.
Allan also borrowed food from, persons in the area, 
but even this worked poorly. Machias was in desperate . . 
shape, and eventually Allan found himself using up most of 
his shipments from Boston to repay loans. He also went 
deeply into debt personally. The government paid some of 
these debts, but by 1782, there was too little money in the 
treasury to pay the rest, and people who lent provisions
26 were forced to petition Boston for repayment.
The supply problem seriously weakened the American 
forces east of the Penobscot. All Allan’s activities were 
hampered by it, and his effectiveness was reduced. After 
1780, the situation was critical, for as he reported, any
^Letter, Allan to the several towns west of Camden, 
Msrch 5, 1780, Baxter MSS.. XVIII, 123. Allan probably 
derived no benefit from this action, because all Maine was 
distressed by this time, and some of these towns had already 
petitioned the government for help.
^Report, Allan to Mass. Board of War, June 11, 1780, 
Baxter MSS., XVIII, 307.
Petition, George Stillman to Governor Hancock, 
April 6, 1781, memorial, Allan to Mass, govt., June 20, 1781, 
petition, James Avery to Mass, govt., January 18, 1782, re­
port, Allan to Hancock, July 1, 1782, Baxter MSS.. XIX, 
189-90, 370-2, XX, 55-4.
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British attack upon the area must certainly succeed; 
poverty had reduced the country to the point where they
27 could not defend themselves.
The sorry condition of. the country made it impos­
sible for Allan to raise troops to strengthen Machias. In 
1780, he had hopes of gaining one hundred more men, and 
using them to halt the British lumber trade on the St. John 
and to keep the Indians out of the enemy camp. By fall, 
however, he was occupied solely with keeping a garrison 
for Machias, as expiring enlistments would soon leave him
28 with only fifteen men.
The government authorized the raising of additional 
men on several occasions, but few could be raised under the 
conditions prevailing in the area. By 1781, Allan was 
relying more and more on the militia as his regular garri-
29son shrunk. J
Without supplies or men, Allans reported in early 
1780 that he was surrounded with enemies, both British and 
Tories. The Indians were mostly at Passamaquoddy, nearer 
27'Report, Allan to Mass. Board of War, June 11, 
1780. Baxter MSS.. XVIII, 307.
28Reports, Allan to Mass, govt., May 15, 1780 and 
November 2, 1780, Baxter MSS.. XVIII, 268, XX, 2-9.
2^Mass. Council Order, January 26, 1780, resolves 
of Mass, govt., March 21 and November 28, 1780, report, 
Allan to Hancock, May 9, 1781, Baxter MSS., XVIII, 85, 
147-52, XIX, 60-1, 111, 256.
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their hunting grounds, and Allan was left dependent upon his 
shrinking garrison for defense.
In February he took a number of Indians with him on 
a sweep to the west to catch people trading with the British. 
A few were caught and held over-night, but Allan did not 
have the resources necessary for more permanent action. 
Most of the people were friendly but depressed by the pov­
erty caused by the war. The area was almost defenseless, 
and Allan feared it would fall once the ice went out in the 
spring.-^0
Allan devoted his attention during the spring and 
summer of 1780 to a series of Indian .conferences. He had 
called the first of the conferences for Passamaquoddy on 
May 25 and asked the Penobscots, Malecites, St. John, Mic­
macs, Madawaska and other friends of the Americans to attend. 
The Indians remained attentive to Allan at the meeting but 
no longer did his bidding. They demanded supplies that he 
did not have and thus maintained considerable independence 
of purpose. Allan was unable to keep them from boarding a 
B ritish vessel that arrived in the bay during the confer­
ence; they were determined to seek supplies wherever they
31 could be found.-7
^Petition, Alexander Campbell to Mass. Council, 
January 20, 1780, reports, Allan to Mass, govt., February 
20 and March 5, 1780, Baxter MSS.. XVIII, 7.0-2, 100-5, 
116-7.
•^Letter, Allan to Indians, April 2*7, 1780, report, 
James Avery to Mass. Council, June 4, 1780, Baxter MSS.. 
XVIII, 287-8, 292-3.
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Allan’s conference at Passamaquoddy was held just 
before a large Nova Scotian meeting on the St. John.
Anxious for news, Allan sent Ambrose St. Aubin to the river 
to meet with the gathering Indians. They assured him of 
their continued friendship for the Americans, whom they had 
no intention of attacking.-'
This news from the St. John was cheering, but Allan’s 
own conference was not entirely successful. Pierre Toma 
told him that the Indians appreciated the huge effort he had 
made to support them last winter, but the tribe had become 
poor in the American service. For the good of their souls, 
they must now go to see the priest at the Nova Scotian con­
ference. Ambrose brought the same message from the Malecites 
on the St. John. Allan, who feared the British priest’s 
influence, could not dissuade them, although he was reas­
sured by the words of the St. John Malecites, who told him 
that “We are to Assure you, that our Language to. the Britons 
is from our Lips only, but when we address the Americans & 
French, its from our hearts.”^
Allan’s fears were well-placed. The priest tried to 
persuade the gathered Indians to go to Halifax, promising 
them free access to every town in Nova Scotia. The Indians, 
(^Letter, Francklin to Germain, November 21, 1780, 
Nova Scotia A. C, 194-5; report, Allan to Board of War, 
June 11, 1780, Baxter MSS.. XVIII, 306-7.
Allan’s report on the Indian Conference, July 1, 
1780, Baxter MSS.. XVIII, 355-9.
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however, refused, telling the priest that they would remain 
friends of the Americans, who would protect them from the 
British. The Indians then withdrew to the lakes north of
34Machias•
By the summer of 1780, the number of Indians in 
American service was greatly reduced. According to Freder­
ick Delesdernier, one of Allan*s  aids, there were 187 men on 
the rolls at this time. This was not a coherent force, how­
ever, because they were widely scattered• Fifteen men were 
at Passamaquoddy, thirty-one were at Schoodic. on the lakes, 
and eighty were Malecites and Passamaquoddies who were not 
gathered in any particular place. Fifty-one were Penobscots
folbid.. 339-40.
^Return of the Indians in or who have been in United 
States Service, Frederick Delesdernier, July 28, 1780, in 
Kidder, Military Operations, pp. 284-5* The 187 men support<- 
ed 172 women and 193 children.
^Message, Allan to St. John tribe, no date, enclosed 
in letter, Francklin to Germain, November 21, 1780, Nova 
Scotia A, C, 200-1.
35 who may or may not have been available to Allan at Machias.
Allan and the. American cause received, a new blow in 
late summer or fall of 1780 when Ambrose.St.. Aubin.died. 
Allan sent the tribe a letter of consolation, and his grief
36was real. Ambrose had been a true friend of the Americans. 
He had taken their side early in the war and never wavered. 
By contrast, the other major chief of the St. John Malecites, 
Pierre Toma, showed a distressing tendency to side with the
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British, although he swore that this was for the sake of 
expediency.
By late fall and winter of 1780-1781, Allan’s spirits 
had picked up, and he was showing new confidence. Although 
their leaders often had contact with the British, most of 
the settlers were strong for the American cause. The Indians 
were uneasy over rumors of an attack upon them from Canada 
but remained inland north of Passamaquoddy, away from the 
British. Allan met with many of them on January 3> 1781, 
and, although he could not deliver promised supplies, he was 
in the company of a priest from the French fleet at Newport. 
The Indians were very pleased and declared their strong 
attachment to the Americans and French. If he could get
supplies, Allan was sure he could gain their assistance in 
37“any sort of Business the States may require.”
Spring brought conditions to dampen anyone’s feelings,
however. British ships were roaming the coast and burning
the houses of American sympathizers; several leaders of the
area east of Penobscot were attempting to have the area de­
clared neutral, Allan had been put in command of all the 
militia east of Frenchman’s Bay and had orders to act 
against the Tories in the area. He now had no regular troops
and asked permission to move his headquarters east, nearer
^Reports, Allan to Mass, govt., November 2, 1780 
and January 26, 1781, Baxter MSS.. XIX. 24-31. 106-9. The 
visit of the priest is discussed more fully below.
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to the Indians, closing the operation at Machias.
In June of 1781, an event occurred that impressed - 
the Indians and cost Allan very little in effort or supplies. 
A french frigate, the Marrs, arrived at Machias and cruised 
down the coast to Passamaquoddy. The Indians were thrilled, 
as they always were by any major contact with the French.^ 
Unfortunately for Allan, the Indians needed more 
concrete gestures. Their stomachs were not filled by the 
visit of a French frigate. Accordingly, when Allan visited 
the Indians at Passamaquoddy later in June, he found them 
despondent and surly.They had left their river for the 
Americans and expected to be cared for. They had not hunted, 
according to their spokesman, because they were busy defend­
ing the country, and now had no furs to trade and little to 
eat. They had expected more from their American friends. 
Allan tried to soothe them but with limited success.
The situation was unimproved by the fall of 1781. 
Most of the Indians had returned to the lakes, and Allan 
dreaded their coming to Machias, because he had no supplies 
for them. He wrote Hancock that his situation was very bad, *40
^Resolves of Mass, govt., March 10 and May 5» 1781, 
reports, Allan to Hancock, March 17 and May 9, 1781, letter, 
Francis Shaw to Mass, govt. , May 3, 1781, Baxter: MSS.. XIX, 
18>4, 234, 186-7, 256-7, 236-7, 246-9.
(l^keport, Allan to Hancock, June 16, 1781, Baxter 
MSS.. XIX,,283-4.
40Ibid.. p. 284. 41 Ibid.,
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but he was relieved that the season of danger was over and
42 hoped that the war would soon end.
By the fall of 1781, Allan again was seeking permis­
sion to move his operation closer to the Indians, who now 
seldom came to Machias. There were no. longer any troops in 
Machias except, the militia, and these were under good offi­
cers. Allan felt that a man of his rank was no longer need­
ed. He wanted to move to the St. Croix River where the 
Indians were hunting. He felt that such a move would serve
43 to hold the area for the United States.
Allan got the permission. he needed to move in April 
of 1782 but could hot go at once. Reports of British activ­
ity on the St. John kept him in Machias, although.he sent 
his sons among the Indians as proof of his good intentions. 
He visited Passamaquoddy for a short time, during the sunmer 
but was back in Machias in August. By November, however,- 
Allan and his family had permanently moved to Passamaquoddy
44 where they spent a hard winter.
42Report, Allan to Hancock, October 17, 1781, 
Baxter MSS., XIX, 355-6.
43ibid.; report, Allan to Hancock, March 28, 1782, 
petition, delesdernier to Mass, govt., March 28, 1782, 
Baxter MSS., XIX, 437-8, 437-8.
^^Resolve of Mass, govt., April 29, 1782, reports, 
Allan to Hancock, June 4, August 22, 1782 and April 16, 
1783, representation, inhabitants of Machias to Mass, govt., 
November 12, 1782, Baxter MSS.. XX, 9, 28-9, 78, 218, 135-4.
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Not everyone was pleased with Allan’s move. The 
people of Machias felt that he had taken too many supplies 
with him, particularly guns and ammunition. They felt it 
bad to have one man in command of troops and Indians, be­
cause the Indians got provisions and the troops did not. 
Now that Allan was gone, they sought more such goods and a 
captain to command the post; with these and their militia
45Machias promised to hold out.
Allan’s move to the St. Croix was a good one. As 
early as the spring of 1782, most of the Indians were on the 
St. John. They had gone because of dissatisfaction over the 
supply situation the summer before, and the Nova Scotian
46 authorities were trying to hold them there.
Allan met with the Passamaquoddies and some Malecites 
in August of 1782 and tried to explain why he was no longer 
able to provide for them as he once’had. The Indians were 
surprised and unsympathetic. All the St. John Indians 
present intended to go at once to their old homes. Some of 
the Passamaquoddies were in Canada, and the rest were going 
inland to the lakes. Allan planned to remain nearby to keep
47American influence among them.
^Representation, inhabitants of Machias to Mass, 
govt., November 12, 1782, Baxter MSS., XX. 154-5.
^Report, Allan to Hancock, March 8, 1782, Baxter 
MSS.. XIX, 457, 459.
^Report, Allan to Hancock, August 22, 1782, Baxter 
MSS.. XX, 76-8.
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During 1780 and 1781, Allan had been assisted by 
another priest from the French fleet, Frederick de Bourger, 
who replaced Father de la Motte. Allan had been without a 
priest for some time when James Avery went to Rhode Island 
in August of 1780 and asked the French Admiral to send a 
suitable person to Maine. The request was granted, and the 
Indians were quickly notified; the lack of a priest had been 
one of the principle American weaknesses through-out most of
., 48the war.
The new priest arrived shortly in Boston, where he 
was given provisions and the services of Gideon Delesdernier, 
the father of Frederick Delesdernier, one of Allan’s aides. 
Although anxious to get to Machias before winter, de Bourger 
was delayed by lack of transportation for over a month but 
reached Machias in time for Christmas. The Indians were
49elated.
Allan was nearly as pleased as the Indians. The 
priest was very good, he reported, and he ’’Appears the Most 
Calculated for the Indians then Any U ever saw — either 
from the French or the Britains. The Conduct he pursues
^Letter, James Avery to Governor of Mass., August 
18, 1780, Kidder, Military Operations, p. 286; message, 
President of the Mass. Council to the Indians, August 23, 
1780, Baxter MSS.« XVIII, 376-8; message, Allan to St. John 
Indians, no date, enclosed in letter, Francklin to Germain, 
November 21, 1780, Nova Scotia A, C, 202-3*
^Petitions, de Bourger to Mass. Council, August 23 
and September 14, 1780, letter, James Avery to Mass. Council, 
Au gust 24, 1780, reports, Allan to Hancock, December 15, 
1780 and January 26, 1781, Baxter MSS.. XVIII, 378-9, 417, 
381, XIX, 65, 106.
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50 gives the Indians the Greatest Satisfaction." If he 
could stay in this area, he would be of great use. 
Furthermore, if supplies were sent to supplement the work 
of the priest, Allan even hoped to gain military assist-
51ance from the tribes.
De Bourger moved among the Indians for over six 
months and was used by Allan to quiet unhappy Indians. 
There was a limit, however, to what de Bourger could do, 
and the hardship caused by the lack of supplies cast a 
pall over his efforts. By the time he left in the summer 
of 1781, Allan was writing of a "Gloom & Coldness" among
52 the Indians that even the church could not cure.
The British post on the Penobscot at Majabagaduce 
isolated Allan from the rest of his command. He was nomi­
nally in charge of efforts to keep the Penobscots friendly 
but no longer had much contact with them. As seen in the 
previous chapter, a truck house on the Kennebec River in 
Winslow now handled their needs and was virtually an inde­
pendent operation controlled from Boston.
51Ibid.. pp. 106-9.
^Rgpoyts, Allan to Hancock, March 17 and June 16, 
1781, Baxter MSS.. XIX, 189, 284. De Bourger left Maine 
sometime before September 5, 1781. On that date he was in 
Boston petitioning for back rations. See Baxter MSS., XIX, 
320.
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This second major Indian agency in Maine, the 
operation for the Penobscots, was centered at Fort Halifax.^3 
When the British arrived on the Penobscot, this tribe found 
itself adjacent to British power, but derived little bene­
fit from it at first. General McLean, the first commander 
at Majabagaduce, ignored the Penobscots, thinking them 
perfidious and inconsequental. During the final years of 
the war, however, the British became more responsive to the 
tribe, realizing the need for their friendship in the 
accomplishment of the long-term British plans, the estab-
54 lishment of a new colony of loyalists.
In 1780, the Americans were also increasingly aware 
of the semi-displaced Penobscots. General Wadsworth,com­
mander of the American forces in Maine, asked the
•^Massachusetts operated a third Indian agency late 
in the war. This agency, on the Androscoggin River, was an 
informal one and received little notice in the Massachusetts 
records. An agent to the Eastern Indians, one John Lane, 
had been appointed in 1775 but remained inactive through 
most of the war. In May of 1782, he was living at Fryeburg 
when the thirty-two Indians on the Androscoggin asked him 
to send a message to Boston. They expressed of the Canadian 
Indians, who were supporting the British, and sought a land 
grant upon which they could settle their families in safety 
and embark upon a more agricultural existence. They also 
had furs to barter for supplies, which they desperately 
needed. The government in Boston did not respond to their 
plea for land but did send supplies to Lane for the tribe. 
See petition, John Lane to Mass, govt., May 24, 1782, and 
resolve of the Mass, govt., June 10, 1782, Baxter MSS.. XX, 
20, 3o-i;
54«a General State of the Country between Falmouth in 
Casco Bay and the River St. Croix.”
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Massachusetts Council to take more notice of the tribe and 
requested a priest, hopefully to be obtained from the 
French at Newport. Josiah Brewer, the truck master at Fort 
Halifax, took six Penobscots to visit the French in Rhode 
Island, hoping to impress the tribe with the French alli-
55ance.
Demand for more attention also came from Chief
Orono. The Penobscots had taken part in military actions 
with the Americans and felt themselves to be in American 
service. Orono reminded the Massachusetts authorities of 
this in a petition in October of 1780. The tribe, he wrote, 
had been driven from its home by the British and was in 
need. The Penobscots had four widows of men who had fallen 
in battle with the British and they needed special help.
The British were now offering presents and supplies, he con­
tinued, but the Indians hoped the promises made by General 
Lovell following the defeat at Majabagaduce would be kept
56 and that the truck house at Winslow would be supplied.
57 Supplies arrived in Winslow in response to Orono’s plea.
55•^ Report, Wadsworth to Mass. Council, October 7, 
1790, and report, Brewer to Mass. Council, October 24, 1780, 
Baxter MSS.. XVIII, 460, XIX, 1.
^Report of a committee of the Mass, govt., October
31, 1780, and petition, Orono to Mass, govt., October 30, 
1780, Baxter MSS.. XVIII, 8-9, 6-7,.
^Resolve of Mass, govt., Baxter MSS.. XVIII, 16.
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The Penobscots were willing to enter American mili­
tary service to get what supplies they needed, Orono made 
this offer in 1781 when the tribe found it hard to gather 
food with the British in possession of their old settle­
ment . 58
The truck house at Port Halifax, which the govern­
ment intended to remedy the supply problems of the Penob­
scots, was established at the junction of the Kennebec and 
Sebasticook Rivers for the convenience of the Indians and 
the government*  The Sebasticook formed part of the ancient 
Indian route from the Kennebec to the Penobscot; a truck 
house at its mouth was about the closest point to the Penob­
scots*  hunting grounds that could be supplied from Massa­
chusetts*  Winslow was the head of navigation on the Kenne­
bec River, and the supplies could be brought to the fort in 
small ships. Port Halifax was therefore the most conven­
ient spot for both parties.
The government in Boston appointed Joshua Brewer 
to run the truck house in Winslow. Brewer, who had pre­
viously been active in the Indian operations on the Penob­
scot, faced many of the same problems that plagued Allan 
at Machias. He was frequently seeking supplies, often with 
little success. Although the situation was eased when the 
Indians returned to their hunting grounds, he occasionally
Petition, Orono to Mass, govt., June 7, 1781,
., XIX, 198-9.Baxter Mi
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59 had as many as thirty Indians a day coming in to trade.
As seen above, Brewer had not been popular with the 
Penobscots when he had been in government service on the 
Penobscot, and reports of his dishonesty and of Indian 
dislike for him continued to reach Boston throughout the 
last years of the war. Juniper Berthiaume, a French reli­
gious instructor with the tribe, sent in a complaint 
against Brewer. The truck master persisted in cheating 
the Indians, according to the Frenchman, with dishonest 
weights and measures. He also kept back and sold items 
intended by the government as gifts. Berthiaume further 
accused Brewer of trading with the British. The Indians 
were so upset by this that they were driven to the British 
at Majabagaduce for their supplies. Two letters from 
William Lithgow, a prominent leader on the Kennebec and 
former trader at Fort Halifax, repeated the Indian accu­
sations of fraud and suggested that a man whom the Indians 
hated was ill-suited to be the government’s chief agent 
among them. Lithgow was careful to point out that he did 
not know whether the accusations were true. Brewer, him­
self, however, admitted after the war that he had been 
forced to employ sentries to keep the Indians in line when
^Petitions, Brewer to Mass, govt., November, 1780 
and June 22, 1781, resolve of Mass, govt., November 11, 
1780, letters, Brewer to Richard Devens, Commissary-General 
of Mass., June 6 and October 4, 1782, Baxter MSS., XIX, 37, 
292, 293, 43-4, XX, 11, 105-6.
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60 they otherwise might have rushed the truck house. There 
was no record of any investigation in this matter, but the . 
Indians were plainly dissatisfied with Brewer, although 
with how much justice is unknown.
The Indians hoped that Brewer would be replaced 
with Colonel Ezekial Pattee, a man who evidently had gained 
considerable prestige among them. Lithgow mentioned Pattee 
as a possible replacement for Brewer in his letters to 
Governor Hancock, and the Indians themselves requested 
that he be appointed.
Colonel Pattee had gained this following among the 
Indians during the winter of 1780-1781 when approximately 
one hundred of the Penobscots had settled in Winslow near 
the truck house. These Indians were frequently at Pattee*s  
house, where, in. the absence of supplies in the truck house 
and to keep the peace of the settlement, he furnished them 
with provisions. He had evidently done so at the request 
of Berthiaume, the French Kecollet among the Indians, and 
Chief Orono, who later asked the Massachusetts government 
to repay him. Pattee later successfully petitioned the
6°Complaint, Berthiaume to Mass, govt., November 20, 
1781, letters, William Lithgow to Hancock, August 13, 1782 
and January 25, 1783, letter, Brewer to Hancock, October 17, 
1783. Baxter MSS.. XIX. 372-4. XX, 70-1, 157-8, 273-4.
■^‘Letters, William Lithgow to Hancock, August 13, 
1782 and January 25, 1783, Baxter MSS.. XX, 70-1, 157-8.
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government for repayment of the money.
Brewer, faced with Indian distrust and reluctant 
competition from Pattee, had yet another problem, the hos­
tility of the people of Winslow, who petitioned to have the 
truck house moved elsewhere. When the Indians settled in 
Winslow during the winter of 1760-1781, they caused prob­
lems. At first the Penobscots bartered furs for provisions 
at the truck house. Eventually, however, both furs and 
supplies ran out, and the town was forced to provide relief 
for the Indians, who were very demanding. The Indians were 
disruptive as well as expensive. Drunkenness was a con­
stant problem, and hordes of dogs, to whom the Indians 
were passionately attached, raised havoc among the settlers
63livestock. The people of Winslow thought the Indians 
would be more contented nearer their hunting grounds, and 
their departure would certainly help the town’s state of 
mind.
Winslow’s unhappiness with the operation in its 
midst, reports of Brewer’s dishonesty, and recommendations 
from men like Lithgow that the truck house be closed made 
a strong impression in Boston, and in October of 1782, the
62Petition, Winslow to Mass, govt., January 27, 
1781, certificate, inhabitants of Winslow to Mass, govt., 
June 30, 1781, petition, Ezekial Pattee to Mass, govt., 
September 26, 1781, resolves of Mass, govt., July 5, 1781 
and March 8, 1782, Baxter MSS., XIX, 113-5, 312, 299-300, 
333-9, 300-1, 421-2.
(& Petition, Winslow to Mass, govt., January 27, 
1781, Baxter MSS.. XIX, 113-5.
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government ordered the termination of the operation and the 
dismissal of Brewer, The truck house was found to be unnec­
essary, although Brewer recently reported that thirty Indians 
a day were trading there. The closing marked the end of the 
official American effort among the Penobscots, but the 
truck house did not close immediately. Brewer was unaware 
of the government’s decision until March 18, 1783 and kept 
the operation going. He could not have had many supplies 
to offer the Indians, but he maintained an American presence 
among the Penobscots and reduced the effect of the govern­
ment’s action until nearly the end of the war.
Two other individuals were independently active in 
the effort to retain Penobscot friendship. One of these 
was Juniper Berthiaume, already mentioned, and the other 
was Lieutenant Andrew Gilman.
Gilman lived with the Penobscots during the most of 
the war as an interpreter and resident representative of 
Massachusetts. He seems to have filled no major role, and 
his influence among the Indians was uncertain. His honesty
^Letters, William Lithgow to Mass, govt., August 
13, 1782, and January 25, 1783, resolve of Mass, govt., 
October 17, 1782, letter Brewer to Richard Devens, October 
4, 1782, letter, Brewer to Hancock, October 31, 1783, 
Baxter MSS.. XX, 70-1, 157-8, 112, 105-6, 274-5. By the 
end.of the war, Brewer was in poor health and almost desti­
tute. The British occupation of the Penobscot ruined him 
financially. In recognition of his efforts for the Ameri­
can cause, the government granted his request and allowed 
him to remain in a house at Port Halifax for one year after 
the war. See letters, Brewer to Hancock, September 15 and 
October 22, 1783, resolve-of Mass, govt., March 2, 1784, 
Baxter MSS., XX, 261, 308, 315.
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and loyalty were questioned at times, but nothing was ever 
proved, nor, indeed, were any investigations made. He was 
finally dismissed along with Josiah Brewer in October of
651782, when the truck house at Winslow was closed.
The other member of the Massachusetts mission to 
the Penobscot tribe in the final years of the war was a 
French Recollect, Juniper Berthiaume. Berthiaume was 
evidently obtained for the American service by the French 
consul in Boston in October, 1780. He was given the title 
of '’Instructor*. ’ to the Penobscots, provided with supplies 
by the Massachusetts government, and sent northward to meet 
the Indians. He joined Gilman occasionally and worked with 
the tribe between the Kennebec and Penobscot Rivers. As 
did practically everyone in government service in Maine, he 
had problems getting his rations but usually lived on what
67the Indians gave him.
Berthiaume’s sense of duty and devotion to the
^petitions, Gilman to Mass, govt., no date, and 
June 26, 1781, resolves of Mass, govt., December 4, 1780, 
July 2, 1781, and October 17, 1782, memorial, six Penob­
scots to Mass, govt., August 27, 1782, Baxter MSS.. XIX, 
63-4, 64, 297, 298, XX, 112, 81.
The Recollects were a division of the Observant 
Franciscans who followed an especially strict rule.
^Letter, Brewer to Mass. Council, no date, petition, 
Brewer to Mass, govt., November, 1780, resolve of Mass. govt. 
November 11, 1781, memorial, Berthiaume to Mass, govt., 
July 6, 1781, letter, Brewer to Mass, govt., May 6, 1782, 
Baxter MSS.. XIX, 2, 36-7, 43, 291-2, 303, XX, 11.
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Indians landed him in-trouble. He reported the Indian dis­
like and distrust of Brewer to Boston, and Brewer evidently 
struck back. Berthiaume was shortly dismissed by the gov­
ernment on charges made by Brewer. The Indians were angry 
and declared the charges false.’ Berthiaume obtained and 
sent to Boston papers showing that Brewer’s witnesses had 
drunkenly signed the depositions upon which he based his
68case.
Berthiaume* s  dismissal caused great discontent 
among the Indians, and documents flowed into Boston in his 
behalf. Four Penobscots sent in a deposition affirming the 
Recollect’s innocence, and Ezekial Pattee asserted that the 
Frenchman had been a great help to Winslow and that the 
Indians were less troublesome after his arrival. The tribe 
asked William Lithgow to write in Berthiaume’s behalf, and 
he did, giving his opinion that the Recollect was a good 
man who tried to keep good relations between whites and 
Indians. His dismissal was a major grievance among the 
Indians, who were devoted to him, according to Lithgow, and 
his re-appointment would be of great benefit. Three other 
worthies of the Kennebec region, James Howard, Esq., Lieu­
tenant Colonel William Howard and Colonel Joseph North, 
added their voices to the chorus. They felt Berthiaume was 
/To
• Complaint, Berthiaume to Mass, govt., November 20,
1781, memorial, six Penobscots to Mass, govt., August 27,
1782, letter, Berthiaume to Mass, govt., September 30, 1782, 
Baxter MSS.. XIX, 372-4, XX, 81, 82-3.
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an honest man, devoted to the United States, who had rend­
ered good service and who should be returned to his post. 
Berthiaume himself reminded the government that problems
69 were likely to arise if he was not re-instated.
Faced with such testimony regarding Berthiaume’s 
worth, in October of 1782 the government returned him to 
his work. As the Indians demanded, Brewer and Gilman were 
dismissed and the truck house was closed at.the same time
70 that Berthiaume was re-instated. It was unlikely that , 
Brewer’s actions in attempting by shady methods to secure 
Berthiaume’s dismissal did his reputation little good in 
Boston and was a factor in his own sudden discharge•
Berthiaume evidently resumed his duties with great 
zeal and concern for the Penobscots. He operated out of a 
building at the junction of Mile Brook and the Sebasticook 
River in Winslow. The Indians: remained devoted to him and 
usually followed his instructions. He continued his service 
officially until June 4, 1783, when he was once again dis­
missed by the government, which evidently felt him unneces­
sary in peacetime. He received no notice of his dismissal, 
^Deposition by Joshua Brewer, Justice of the Peace, 
June 7, 1782, letter, Pattee to Hancock, August 10, 1782, 
letter, Lithgow to Hancock, August 13, 1782, letter, Howard,. 
Howard and North to Mass, govt., September 30, 1872, Baxter 
MSS.. XX, 71, 67-8, 71, 82-3.
^Resolve of Mass, govt., October 17, 1782, memorial, 
six Penobscots to Mass, govt., August 27, 1782, Baxter MSS., 
XX, 112, 81*
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however, and continued his work until June of 1784, when 
he sought wages for his service from the time of dismissal 
until he learned of the action. He hoped to use the money 
to finance continued work among the Indians. He did con-
71 tinue his work after the war for an undetermined period.
Colonel John Allan, who was theoretically in charge
of the waning activities of the Indian agencies at Winslow 
and throughout Maine, was in Boston when the first rumors 
of impending peace reached him. He had been seeking per­
mission to make the trip since June of 1781 and finally 
went in April of 1783. The Indians were quiet, and he was 
not feeling well. He had thus decided to go to Boston and 
settle a number of affairs and report to the government in
72 person. Francklin was dead by this time, and Britain had
shut off most of the money for Nova Scotian Indians, so the 
threat from that quarter was small. Much of Allan’s influ­
ence with the Indians was gone, destroyed by the great lack 
of supplies during the past several years. Thus a relative 
Henry D. Kingsbury and Simeon L. Deyo, Illustrated # 
History of Kennebec County, Maine (New York: H. W. Blake, 
1892), pp. 546, 550; resolve of Mass, govt., June 4, 1783, 
petition, Berthiaume to Mass, govt., June, 1784, Baxter MSS., 
XX, 233, 285. The information from the History of Kennebec 
County came from the work of Mrs. Elizabeth Freeman, a 
daughter of Ezekial Pattee who evidently wrote down a num­
ber of her childhood memories about the early history of 
Winslow.
72Reports, Allan to Hancock, June 16 and October 17, 
1781, March 8, 1782, and April 12 and 16, 1783» Baxter MSS., 
XIX, 287-8, 356, 436, XX, 217-8, 219.
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calm had settled oyer the tribes of Maine and Nova Scotia. 
With peace in the air, Allan was given authority
73to settle accounts and to close out his operation.
The peace treaty was finally signed in Paris on 
September 3, 1783, and the war ended. The conflict that 
had once again made the Indians important thus came to an 
end, and with it, the Indians1 prosperity, meager though it 
was. Neither the Massachusetts nor the Nova Scotian author­
ities were likely to pay much attention to the Indians un­
less the tribes were useful to them in some way. With the 
end of the war, that usefulness ceased.
^Letter, Allan to Hancock, April 25, 1783, petition, 
Allan to Mass, govt., June 2, 1784, Baxter MSS., XX, 222, 
352.
The Indians east of the Penobscot fared somewhat 
better than their brethren on that river, whose truck house 
had already been dismantled and whose religious instructor 
was dismissed at the end of the war. After peace came, 
Allan laid his accounts before Congress and the Massachu­
setts authorities. Congress, vested with the control of 
Indian affairs, put the Indian agency on a peace basis and 
kept it in operation. In January of 1784, however, Massa­
chusetts asked the Congress to end its Indian role in 
Maine, and Congress complied. The Indian agency was dis­
solved the following March, and the United States govern­
ment took no further notice of the tribes. The government 
of Massachusetts did little to replace the former agency, 
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and the Indians, resumed the long slide into poverty and 
despair that ha£ been temporarily slowed by the war,^
John Allan, who had been established as a leader 
beyond the Penobscot by his wartime activity, continued 
to have influence among the settlers and Indians. In 1784, 
he was appointed an agent of the Massachusetts government 
to prevent British encroachment upon that state’s land, and 
continued to be active in matters concerning the border 
for the rest of his life. His influence among the Indians 
remained great and his advice was sought on the many prob-
75lems they faced.
Thus the Indian effort in Maine and Nova Scotia 
faded and. died. Fueled by mutual fear, it was dampened 
when the British government decided that there was no 
longer any need to fear the Americans in Maine. Supplies, 
so necessary to hold the Indians, were virtually cut off 
in Halifax, and Francklin*s'  death gave Nova Scotia’s 
effort the coup de gr^ce. On the American side, the lack 
of supplies reduced John Allan to the exercise of psycho­
logical warfare. Beginning with the closing of the truck 
house at Fort Halifax, increased, security caused Massachu­
setts to cut back its effort, slowly, until the end of the 
^Allan’s report on the Indian Tribes, 1795, 
Kidder, Military Operations, pp. 515-5*
\ 5.Xbid., pp. 514-6; Ahlin, Downeast Rubicon,
p. 150; resolve of Mass, govt., July 9. 1784. Baxter MSS., 
XX, 596.
184
"war found only Allan’s small Continental agency near 
Passamaquoddy still in operation, and it, too, soon closed, 
as all sides lost interest in the people "who had once seem­
ed so important.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION
The War of the American Revolution brought the 
Indians of eastern Maine and Nova Scotia into prominence 
once again for the first time since the French and Indian
X7\'7
War and for the last time in their history. ' To the govern­
ments of rebellious Massachusetts and loyal Nova Scotia, 
these tribes of Indians seemed to hold the balance of power 
in a thinly settled region. If the Americans were going to 
win the whole of British North America, as they hoped, the 
Indians in these eastern regions would be most helpful in 
the thrust toward Nova Scotia. To lose their friendship 
would lead to the devastation and possible loss of a valu­
able part of the state. On the other side, threatened by 
the early American moves to win Indian friendship and com­
bat assistance, Nova Scotia was forced to move to keep the 
Indians from attacking them. The leaders of the province 
never contemplated leading the Indians into the field 
against the Americans because they did not trust the tribes 
and feared such a maneuver would backfire.
When the Revolution broke out and the competition 
for the Indians began, eastern Maine and Nova Scotia were 
very thinly populated. Furthermore, even the largest 
settlements lay between the sea and miles of forest that 
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cloaked every Indian activity. Nova Scotia’s population 
was centered around the long coastline of the peninsula. 
The wild interior of the colony offered an ideal base for 
attacks in every direction. Using these interior lines of 
communication, hostile Indians could strike .many settle­
ments before the news of hostility reached Halifax along 
the traditional route by sea around the coast. The small 
and weakened tribes of the area were thus in a position to 
do much damage, and the two colonial governments were soon 
forced to contend for their friendship.
From the start of the war, it was unlikely that the 
tribes would actually take to the field against either 
group. Demoralized by earlier.defeats and economically 
depressed, the Indians of Maine and Nova Scotia were mainly 
concerned with survival and the preservation of what remain­
ed of their traditional life style. The leaders of the 
colonial war efforts were not aware of this, however. They 
remembered too well the recent devastating struggles with 
the Indians and French and could see no reason why the 
tribes would not repeat their earlier performance. Both 
colonies thus believed that the Indians held the balance 
of power in the thinly settled area. Moves by either side 
only reinforced this initial impression, and the rivalry 
grew by feeding on itself.
From the .heg^nrring of the war, the Americans were 
helped by a reservoir of good will among the Indians. 
Although it is doubtful that the Indians understood the
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issues of the war, emotionally they seemed to side with 
the Americans. The British had driven out the tribes*  old 
French allies and remained rather distant in their relations 
with’.the Indians, who were more familiar with the Massachu­
setts colonial officials and such private individuals as 
John Allan of Nova Scotia. When these people became rebels 
and were supported in Indian affairs by important men such 
as George Washington, the Indians were impressed. Later in 
the war, when the French joined the Americans against the 
British, the Indians gave little further thought to any 
hostile acts against the friends of their old allies.
The American rapport with the Indians was continued 
and expanded under the leadership of John Allan, a long-time 
friend of the Micmacs, who became Continental Indian agent 
for eastern Maine and Nova Scotia. Allan’s understanding of 
the Indians and their deep respect for him prevented hostil­
ities between the Americans and the Indians throughout the 
war. Under the most difficult conditions, often armed only 
with the trust and knowledge established over many years, 
Allan protected the isolated settlements of eastern Maine 
from Indian attack. Even when the growth of British power 
drew the Indians into Nova Scotian forts and conferences, 
they constantly assured Allan that their hearts were with 
the Americans, whom they would not harm.
Most of the problems Allan faced sprang from the 
weakness of the American supply effort. Tribal friendship 
needed a constant flow of provisions into the camps to keep 
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it strong. The Indians had become dependent upon manufac­
tured goods and provisions and naturally sought sources of 
such supplies. The Massachusetts truck house system was- 
designedto fill these needs and was expanded in the war 
effort. The Americans, however, were soon faced with 
severe shortages. The supply from England dried up, of 
course, and native manufacturers could not make up the 
deficit. As a result, officers such as Allan in the out­
posts were soon faced with critical shortages in the goods 
needed to support the Indians. The problem worsened as 
British sea power disrupted the long American supply lines. 
As a result, the Indians were forced to depend at least 
partially on Nova Scotian sources of supplies. The Malecites 
for example, whom Allan had successfully isolated from the 
British, slowly began to return to their lands and the 
British posts. The Indian respect for the Americans held 
up, however, and kept the tribes from falling under the con­
trol of the Nova Scotia authorities.
Michael Francklin, the Indian agent in Nova Scotia, 
was aware of the Indian feelings for the Americans and 
never seriously considered using the tribes for military 
purposes. Faced with Massachusetts*  stated intention to 
use the Indians militarily, Francklin and the provincial 
government labored mightily to prevent Allan from launch­
ing Indian hostilities against the sparsely settled prov­
ince. They hoped to gain neutrality rather than alliance. 
Francklin knew of the Indians*  fundamental friendship for 
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the Americans and was satisfied with the basic peace he 
maintained.
Francklin enjoyed several advantages over Allan in 
the struggle. Throughout most of the war, he had access 
to the supplies he needed for the Indians. Late in the 
conflict when the British government cut off the. flow of . 
provisions, the American supply effort had almost complete­
ly failed, and Allan reaped no benefit from the British . 
economy move. Francklin also had access to Roman Catholic 
priests, who were in great demand among the Indians. Heli- 
gion was a big factor in the lives of the Indians,.and con­
trol of it served the British well. Priests worked on the 
American side only after France entered the war and then 
only for short periods. These advantages were crucial to 
Francklin in the battle to overcome the natural American 
inclination of the tribes.
The final years of the war and the British incur­
sions into Maine demoralized the Americans and bred confid­
ence in Nova Scotia. The failure of the American ability 
to act and resist was matched by reduced operations from 
Nova Scotia as the government of the United Kingdom attempt­
ed to save money in the area they considered secure. The 
war in Maine and Nova Scotia thus dwindled away into peace.
The Indians for whom the opponents fought—Penob­
scots, Malecites, Passamaquoddies and Micmacs—did indeed., 
hold the balance of power in Maine and Nova Scotia, but .the 
inability of either side to meet the demands of the Indian 
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dependence upon manufactured goods did not allow them to 
exercise that power. At no point in the war could the 
tribes survive comfortably on what they could obtain from 
one side. Their needs forced them to remain in peaceful 
relations to both sides, and neither Americans nor British 
could shake the Indians from this basic neutrality. The 
only winners in the competition were the Indians, who for 
a brief period were important once again.
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Appendix 1
THE WENDALL ESTIMATE
Tribe
Men in
1690
Men in
1726
In New Hampshire
Pennacook 90 5
In Maine
Pequaket 100 7
Saco 50 4
Androscoggin 160 10
Norridgewock 250 25
Sheepscot 150 3
Pemaquid 100 10
Penobscot 350 90
Machias 100 5
Passamaquoddy 220
Sub-total for Maine 1,480 184
In Nova Scotia
St. John River (Malecite) 350 80
Chignecto 150 20
Minas 100 10
Annapolis Royal 100 10
"Pubenque” 300 30
‘’Port La-lore” 300 30
La Have 120 10
’’Mallagash” 200 20
’’Sachpogtogen" 150 10
"Sheedoroer” 200 20
Island Harbor 150 15
Richibucto 220 20
”Astegenash” 400 JL2.
Sub-total for Nova Scotia 2,740 320
Total 4,310 506
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Appendix 2
GYLES’ STATEMENT
Tribe
Men above
16 years of age
"Ersegontegog” 20
Wowenoc 50
St. John River 100
Passamaquoddy 50
Machias 10
Penobscot 150
Norridgewock 40
Androscoggin 5
Pequaket . 24
Total 589
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Appendix 5
1790 CENSUS
Men of 16 years
Town or older Total
Hancock County
Barrettstown 61 175
Belfast 64 245
Bluehill 69 274
Camden 95 551
Canaan 54 152
Conduskeeg Plantation 145 567
Deer Isle 175 682
Ducktrap '78 278
Eastern River Twp. No, 2 59 240
Eddy Twp. 19 110
Frankfort 255 891
Gouldsborough 78 267
Isleborough 90 . 582
Mount Desert - 191 744
Orphan Island 55 124
Orrington 114 477
Penobscot 249 1,048
Sedgwick
Small islands not belonging
144 569
66to any town 19
Sullivan
Trenton (including Twp. No 1,
126 504
east side of Union River 75 512
Twp. No. 1 (Bucksport)
Twp. No. 6 (west side of
85 316
Union River) 69 259
Vinalhaven ..■VI 578
Total 2,436 9,549
Washington County
Bucks Harbor Neck 14 61
Machias
Plantations east of Machias
229 818
No. 1 (Perry)
No. 2 (Pembroke,
18 66
Dennysville) 41 144
No. 4 (Robbinston) 16 54
No. 5 (Calais) ' 24 84
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Appendix 5 (continued)
Men of 16 years
Town or older Total
Ko. 8 (Eastport and
Lubec) 75 244
No. 9 (Trescott Twp.) 9 30
No. 10 (Edmunds Twp.) 14 42
No. 11 (Cutler) 8 37
No. 12 (Whiting) 13 54
No. 15 (Marion Twp.) 1 7
Plantations west of Machias
No.. 4 (Steuben) 71 233
No. 5 (Milbridge and
Harrington) 45 177
No. 6 (Addison) 56 207
No. 11 (Cherryfield) 22 95
No. 12 (Columbia) 4 8No. 15 (Columbia and
Columbia Palls) 51 223
No. 22 (Jonesport, Jonesboro,
Roque Bluffs and Beals
Island)
Total 754 2,759
o
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Appendix 4
POPULATION OP NOVA SCOTIA 
1764
Town or area Population
Halifax 3,000
Chester 100
Lunenburg 1,600
Dublin 100
Liverpool 500
Barrington 300
Yarmouth 150
Annapolis County 1,000
Cornwallis 518
Horton 670
Falmouth 278
Newport 251
Cobequid region 400
Fort Cumberland County 750
Northern coast 381 .
On the River St. John 400
Acadians throughout the colony 2,600
Total 13,000
d>
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Appendix 5
POPULATION OF NOVA SCOTIA
1784
Town or Area Population
In and about Halifax 1,200
On the coast west of Halifax 800
District of Shelburne 10,000
County of Annapolis 4,000
In and about Windsor 800
Cumberland and Partridge Island 700
Halifax east to Chedabucto 2,000
Chedabucto to Isthmus of
Cumberland 900
Total 20,400
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Appendix 6
MAP OF MAINE
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Appendix 8
MAP OF NORTHERN NEW ENGLAND AND THE MARITIMES •
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Appendix 9
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Baxter MSS.—Baxter Manuscripts
D. A. B.—Dictionary of American Biography
I.—Island
Ibid.—Ibidem
Mass.—Massachusetts
Mass, govt.—Massachusetts government
No • —Number
NS—New series
ser.—series
Twp.—Township
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